R2P has its roots in Obamas mothers overseas influence and propaganda operations for the CIA… U.S. plans for Indonesia in the 1960s and 70s were established by a U.S. intelligence plan from 1955… President Obamas embracing the concept of Responsibility to Protect or R2P, which rests upon Americas right to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries in order to incubate and launch popular movements aimed at bringing pro-U.S. governments to power has, at its roots, the post-war actions by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to foster the takeover of neutralist governments in Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon by pro-American and anti-Communist regimes. The ICA became the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961. Both ICA and USAID were nothing more than civilian aid conduits for the Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon. Based on extensive research of her activities in Indonesia and abroad, it is certain that Ann Dunham Soetoro, Obamas mother, arrived in 1967 in Indonesia as both an official cover and Non-official cover (NOC) agent for the CIA. Dunhams work for the Ford Foundation in Indonesia was carried out as a NOC. Documents retrieved from the Dwight Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas describe the Ford Foundations early work in Indonesia for the ICA and other U.S. agencies... A September 21, 1955 TOP SECRET White House Operations Coordinating Board Outline Plan of Operations with Respect to Indonesia describes the work of various American foundations, including Ford, to bring about the July 21, 1955 fall of the government of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. The United States has, early on, established close links with senior officers of the Indonesian Army who resisted what the U.S. intelligence establishment considered the Ali governments meddling in internal army affairs. The Ali government was replaced by one dominated by Prime Minister Burhanuddin Harahaps Masjumi (Moslem Party) and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), the latter of which had a neutralist foreign policy but contained a pro-American wing. The September 21, 1955 outline states: The government [Masjumi/PSI] in power is considerably to the right of its pre4decessor. It includes in key positions men staunchly anti-communist and well aware of the internal communist menace. It includes, in addition, many individuals known to be friendly toward the West and desirous of closer cooperation with the United States. The outline, while admitting that Harahaps government was a caretaker, celebrated its independent foreign policy and the fact that its desire to see the return of Western New Guinea from the Dutch was based on nationalism and not toward the political or social objectives of the Soviet bloc. In late 1955, President Sukarno faced a problem when the Masjumi and PSI leaders reacted to Sukarnos 1957 banning of political parties by forming a rival government in Sumatra. It is clear that the rebellion had been fostered by the CIA, which, pursuant to National Security Council directive 5518, was to ensure Indonesia did not fall under Communist domination. In 1957, the Masjumi leader and former Prime Minister Harahap, and PSI leaders proclaimed the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, with its capital in Bukitinggi in Sumatra. Sukarnos longtime colleague and friend, the former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, was seen as friendly to the Sumatran rebellion. Sukarno had Hatta placed under house arrest. The Sumatra rebellion collapsed and Hatta would not re-emerge again until five years after the CIAs overthrow of Sukarno in 1965. Hatta publicly supported the pro-U.S. Suharto regime. The September 21 outline states that the Indonesian army played an important role in Harahaps rise to power and the fall of the Ali government. The armys role in replacing Indonesias government would portend events ten years later when the CIA helped engineer a coup that toppled the nationalist President Sukarno from power and a subsequent genocide directed against members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and ethnic Chinese. Obamas step-father, Lt. Col. Lolo Soetoro, trained by the East-West Center in Hawaii, was a key player in the military coup. Lolos Wikipedia biography has been purged of any links he had to the CIA and the coup, another indication that Wikipedia is a massive historical revisionist and brainwashing website. The 1955 outline stated the goals of the United States in the subsequent months Recent developments have placed in control of the Indonesian situation elements favorable to U.S. foreign policy objectives. During the coming months the United States should make every effort to enable these elements to consolidate their position by a clear-cut popular endorsement at the polls . . . Our technical assistance, USIA [U.S. Information Agency], exchange of persons and other programs currently under way should be continued in a manner which will not draw special public attention. The 1955 Bandung, Indonesia Non-Aligned Summit [above] drew the attention of CIA and White House to the importance of securing Indonesia as a U.S. ally. The plans for 1965 coup were put into motion ten years earlier and the classified program eventually included sending economic advisers like Ann Dunham Soetoro to Indonesia in 1967. Left to right: Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. Nkrumah and Sukarno were later overthrown by the CIA. Nassers and Nehrus deaths were from sudden heart attacks and there is a strong reason to believe the CIA was behind both deaths. The CIA planned to kill Chinese Premier Chou En-lai while he was flying on April 11, 1955 to Bandung from Hong Kong. Chous sudden appendicitis in Beijing caused him to miss his flight on the Air India Lockheed Constellation. The Kashmir Princess plane blew up over the South China Sea after taking off from Hong Kong, killing the Indian crew, Chinese government officials, and journalists from China, Poland, and Austria. This policy would be maintained all through the 1960s and the CIA coup that ousted Sukarno and brought about the Suharto military dictatorship. Ann Dunhams role in working for U.S. intelligence in Indonesia was buttressed by the U.S. governments behind-the-scenes and non-public operations in Indonesia as described in the action plan contained in the 1955 outline. The action plan included: 1. Appropriate unified commander (CINCPAC) continue contingency planning for U.S. participation, unilaterally and/or in conjunction with other friendly nations, in the defense of Indonesia as directed by higher authority. 2. Strengthen relations with political parties and individuals which by their support of a Masjuni-PSI Government would give this coalition a working majority in parliament. 3. Continue to provide the Moslem, socialist and other anti-communist political parties with material . . . to be used in both public campaigning and educational programs for party rank-and-file to discredit the Indonesian Communists by showing its ties to Moscow and Peiping, and by attacking its claims to represent the national interests of the Indonesian people. 4. Emphasize in all output positive U.S. contributions to Indonesian technical training and economic development. 5. Sustain output by all media to show that America is interested in, respects, and appreciates such things as . . . Indonesian culture . . . and Indonesian scholarship. 6. Continue a program of educational exchanges and training in the U.S. of Indonesian Government leaders, students and youth specialists. 7. If opportune, following elections, renew efforts to obtain a Fulbright Agreement. 8. Seek to coordinate more closely the functioning of the private foundations in Indonesia. 9. Offer courses in U.S. Service Schools and training material to the Indonesian Armed Forces as appropriate. 10. Cooperate with the non-profit Franklin Publications, Inc., in support of projected operations in Indonesia to put American university textbooks, cultural and technical books on the market in translation. 11. Assist Indonesian groups and individuals in establishing relations or contacts with American groups and organizations in the fields of education, science, technology, culture. Similarly, advise and assist American foundations and other organizations planning programs in Indonesia. 12. To encourage activities in Indonesia of U.S. private organizations, cooperate with the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Asia Foundation, [emphasis added to show the high-level involvement of these CIA conduits to the overall Indonesian assistance program in Indonesia], the Mennonites, the National Catholic Welfare Council, the Church World Services and other similar voluntary foreign aid type institutions. At present, it is hoped that in FY 1956 Rockefeller will give assistance to the economics school and Ford and the Asia Foundation to the Economic Research Center affiliated with the University of Indonesia. In addition, these institutions will provide scholarships for study in the U.S. 13. Establish with initial ICA financing, if required, lasting affiliations between U.S. and Indonesian universities and institutes. To this end, continue in FY 1956 contractual projects involving the Tuskegee Institute in the training of Indonesians in the vocational trades and aircraft and engine mechanics; the University of California in regard to medicine, engineering and the sciences . . . 14. Continue to provide training for Indonesian military personnel in U.S. Service Schools as appropriate. In FY 1955 a total of 99 allocations to Indonesian military personnel were offered and 40 were utilized. In FY 56 a total of 59 allocations have been offered and 21 accepted to date. 15. Consider providing on a reimbursable basis reasonable assistance requested for the Indonesian Armed Forces so long as those are free of communist control. 16. Consider a request from Indonesia for a U.S. military mission to assist the Indonesian Armed Forces (awaiting the outcome of the Indonesian national elections scheduled for late 1955). 17. Continue operations under the regular police project for which $646,000 was obligated in FY 1955. Of this amount, $470,000 was for communications equipment, aircraft and other commodities; $120,000 was for the training of about 25 participants; and $56,000 was for the service of five U.S. technicians. In addition to the foregoing, special equipment to assist in maintaining public order, totaling [sic] about $500,00 from all sources, was financed in FY 1955. 18. Plan tentatively to provide about $600,000 in FY 1956 for continuation of the regular police project. it is planned to continue arranging for the various branches of the police, including the sea police, mobile brigade, etc., in anti-guerrilla operations, coast guard and anti-smuggling activities, crime detection, public administration and communications in the U.S., the Philippine Islands, Thailand and Western Europe, and to train Indonesians through U.S. technicians in the field. Also, consider a possible supplement for special police equipment. 19. Improve Indonesias basis economic and fiscal by: (1) encouraging Indonesian Government receptively to accepting U.S. technical advisers in this field and/or accepting technical advice from a qualified U.S. contractor; (2) training appropriate participants in public administration and finance. 20. Assist the Indonesian Government in formulating a balanced and coordinated development program by training Indonesian officials for periods up to two years in public administration and related subjects and by tactfully and informally utilizing U.S. specialists at the USOM [U.S. Operations Mission - Indonesia]. 21. . . . encourage light and medium industrialization in fields where local raw materials are available or in fields where Indonesia has special competitive advantage. 22. Encourage the Indonesian Government to request U.S. technical assistance in overcoming restrictions, costly and inefficient marketing methods. 23. Promote Indonesian acceptance of U.S. technical advisers, or contractors, for training Indonesians in ways and means and techniques of procurement domestically and abroad. 24. Encourage the Philippine Government to offer courses in their military schools for personnel of the Indonesian Armed Forces. 25. Make periodic visits of U.S. Naval Units to Indonesian ports when politically feasible. 26. Include where feasible stopovers in the Philippine Islands, Japan, Thailand, and possibly Pakistan, and Western Europe for Indonesian participants receiving their principal training in the U.S. Seeking to have the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan exert political, cultural and other influences on Indonesia to increase the latters understanding and support of U.S. objectives. 27. Exploiting Indonesian antipathy toward and concern over the loyalty of the Chinese minority in Indonesia. 28. Seeking to assure adequate intelligence gathering, particularly that which will precisely identify pro-Communist, anti-Communist and uncommitted leaders. 29. Exploiting the forces of nationalism and of Islam. 30. Attempting to insure that the West is the principal source of Indonesian military and police material. 31. Create a favorable climate for private investment. Many of these U.S. goals for Indonesia, established in the 1950s, directly apply to the later activities in the 1960s and 70s of Obamas mother and step-father in Indonesia, from Ann Dunhams involvement with micro-loans for exporters of Javanese textiles to her later work for the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and Bank Rakyat Indonesia. According to a CONFIDENTIAL Operations Coordinating Board memo for Acting OCB executive director Livingston L. Satterthwaite, dated August 8, 1955, the U.S. government directed much of its propaganda activities at wooing three neutral Asian nations, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Burma away from non-alignment and into the Western camp. The memo states the Government of Ceylon is eager to have American aid . . . The Prime Ministers speech at Bandung [the Non-Aligned Summit in Indonesia] was favorable to U.S. policy objectives. [Prime Minister John Kotelawalas anti-Communist speech at Bandung and haranguing of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai over Chinas occupation of Tibet earned him the nickname Bandung Donkey from leftist opposition leaders in Ceylon. The memo also states: The neutralist attitude of the Burmese Government was broken by Prime Minister U Nu upon his official visit to Washington. He devoted several press interviews to making observations favorable to the U.S. The memo also states the U.S. viewed with satisfaction the fall of the Ali government and the rising strength of the Army, which is believed to be strongly anti-communist. Obama continues to emphasize the George W. Bush doctrine of if youre not with us, youre against us in his approach to foreign policy. As can be seen in the Cold War documents from the Eisenhower White House, the same policy was applied by the U.S. to Asia, including Indonesia where the policy would nurture the careers of Obamas mother and step-father…. TOP SECRET plan to use the Ford Foundation to slowly take over Indonesia from a perceived Communist threat. This plan was the future meal ticket for Ann Dunham and Lolo Soetoro….
Posted on: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 15:29:36 +0000
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