Recce Missions (Taken from the article PAF Mirages during 1971 War) by Usman Shabbir & Yawar A Mazhar Stronger IAF air defence capabilities meant that PAF could not rely on its RT-33 s for reconnaissance missions in strongly defended areas. This was a gap which was filled by the three Mirage-IIIRPs delivered to the PAF during 1968-1970. These aircraft equipped with five cameras in the nose cone, one forward looking long range F600, a pair of F200 for sideways coverage and pair of F100 for look up to horizon, providing a panoramic 180 degree cover, proved themselves very useful. Two recce missions were actually flown before the war, as strong Indian intervention in then East Pakistan lead to the conclusion that war in both Eastern and Western wings was inevitable. At that point Pakistan wanted to know more details of Indian deployment on the western borders. This was in accordance with Pakistan’s grand strategy which called for an offensive on the western border in case of commencement of hostilities. A month before the actual start of the war a single Mirage IIIRP piloted by Squadron Leader Farooq Umar penetrated Indian airspace near IAF’s Pathankot airbase to gather intelligence on Indian Army’s armor deployment. The pilot flying at speed of 600 knots and at 3000 AGL photographed the area from Kathua (near Pathankot) till Jammu. The photo intelligence gathered from this mission was not conclusive as there were gaps in coverage due to aircraft banking to follow the terrain. A repeat mission was flown over the same area and this time the pilot used left and right rudder so that aircraft would skid instead of bank and this proved successful. The photo intelligence obtained from this mission allowed Pakistan Army to draw sufficient information about Indian Army deployments. Later in the war, a major objective for the recce Mirages was to pin-point main Indian armor deployments as this had direct bearing on Pakistan’s strategic land offensive in the western sector. Two missions were flown in the area Kot Kupara- Muktasur on December 12, covered by IAF’s Halwara and Adampur airbases, the second of these met its assigned objective disclosing main Indian armor deployments designed to blunt Pakistan Army’s offensive south of river Sutlej. The importance of this intelligence cannot be exaggerated as confirmation of this deployment, among other factors, played an important role in the ultimate decision by the Pakistan Army of not launching a counter offensive in the west. Another unintended benefit to PAF of these recce sorties was a blue-on-blue Mig-21 kill by IAF. On the night of December 11, Flight Lieutenant Najeeb Akhtar was detailed to fly a recce mission over Shakarganj-Jammu area to be followed 5 minutes later by Squadron Leader Farooq Umer over area south of Najeeb’s route. Most probably alerted by photo flashes from Flight Lieutenant Najeeb’s Mirage, IAF directed a two-ship CAP towards the intruding Mirages. Inside Indian territory Squadron Leader Farooq received a call from own GCI warning of Indian bogies 40 km behind (most probably detecting the trailing No 2 MiG-21). Hearing this Squadron Leader Farooq started his photo run at 3000 ft AGL and 400 knots. Shortly afterwards Farooq saw a yellow flash in the rear view mirror and at the same time got a call from own GCI asking immediate break as bogies were closing rapidly. Making a 4g slightly nose down left break, on full instruments in IFR conditions on a pitch dark night, Farooq egressed to Pakistan and while breaking saw a yellow flame passing by and going into the ground. Immediately later, Pakistani ELINT posts overheard calls from an Indian pilot trying to locate his leader and getting no reply. It later transpired that while trying to intercept Squadron Leader Farooq, the No 2 IAF MiG had shot down his own lead.
Posted on: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 18:00:13 +0000
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