Reports of Major General Henry W. Slocum, U.S. Army, commanding XII Army Corps OR -- SERIES I -- VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign Part II HEADQUARTERS, XII CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 4, 1863 Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General GENERAL: I have the honor to forward herewith two flags captured by the 60th New York Volunteers, of the Third Brigade, Second Division, in the action of July 2. One was borne by the Stonewall Brigade, and is represented as the Brigade flag. The other was the Battle-Flag of a Virginia Regiment. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H.W. SLOCUM, Major General of Volunteers, Commanding ADDENDA HEADQUARTERS, XII CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, Tullahoma, Tennessee, December 30, 1863 Major General GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: I enclose herewith the report of General T. H. Ruger of operations of the First Division, XII Corps, at the Battle of Gettysburg, together with the reports of his Brigade and Regimental commanders. General Ruger, width a large portion of his Division, was ordered to New York City soon after the battle, and immediately after his return from New York the corps was ordered to this department. The reports of General Williams and myself were delayed with the hope of receiving General Rugers report in time to forward it with them. I deeply regret the necessity which compelled me to send my report and that of General Williams unaccompanied by any report of the operations of the First Division, for although an account of the operations of this division was given in the report of General Williams, who commanded the corps during the battle, I think the absence of Rugers report may account for some of the errors contained in your report as to the operations of the XII Corps. I enclose a letter from General Williams, calling my attention to these errors, to which I respectfully invite your attention, and if anything can be done at this late day to correct these errors, I trust you will do it. Your report is the official history of that important battle, and to this report reference will always be made by our Government, our people, and the historian, as the most reliable and accurate account of the services performed by each Corps, Division, and Brigade of your Army. If you have inadvertently given to one Division the credit of having performed some meritorious service which was in reality performed by another Division, you do an injustice to brave men and defraud them of well-earned laurels. It is an injustice which even time cannot correct. That errors of this nature exist in your official report is an indisputable fact. You give great credit to Lockwoods Brigade for services on the evening of July 2, but state that this Brigade was a portion of the I Corps, while it never at any time belonged to that Corps, but was a portion of the XII Corps, and was accompanied in its operations on the evening of July 2 by General Williams in person. A portion of this Brigade {the 150th New York} is still in General Williams Division. I copy the following statement from your report: “During the heavy assault on our left, portions of the XII Corps were sent as reinforcements. During their absence, the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of General Gearys Division, of the XII Corps, advanced and occupied part of the line. On the morning of the 3rd, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, reinforced by Wheatons Brigade, of the VI Corps, maintained his position, and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.” From this statement it would appear that Gearys Division marched to the support of your left; that Williams Division did not; that his {Williams} Division, or a portion of it, was guarding the entrenchments when the enemy gained possession; that General Geary returned, and with his Division drove the enemy back; that the engagement on the following morning was fought by Gearys Division, assisted by Wheatons Brigade. This I know is the inference drawn from your history of those operations by every person unacquainted with the truth. Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse of the above in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts as set forth in the report of General Geary, as well as that of General Williams. Gearys Division did not march even in the direction of your left. Two of his Brigades, under his immediate command, left the entrenchments under orders to move to the support of your left, but through some unfortunate mistake he took the road leading to Two Taverns. Williams entire Division did move to the support of your left, and it was one of his Brigades {Lockwoods}, under his immediate command, which you commend, but very singularly accredit to the I Corps. Greenes Brigade, of the Second Division, remained in the entrenchments, and the failure of the enemy to gain entire possession of our works was due entirely to the skill of General Greene and the heroic valor of his troops. His Brigade suffered severely, but maintained its position, and held the enemy in check until the return of Williams Division. The spirited contest maintained by General Geary, reinforced by Wheatons Brigade, was a contest for regaining the portion of our entrenchments held by the enemy, and was conducted under the immediate command of General Williams, and was participated in by the entire XII Corps, reinforced not by Wheatons but by Shalers brigade. Although the command of the XII Corps was given temporarily to General Williams by, your order, and although you directed him to meet at the council with other Corps commanders, you fail to mention his name in your entire report, and in no place allude to his having any such command, or to the fact that more than one Corps was at any time placed under my command, although at no time after you assumed command of the army until the close of this battle was I in command of less than two corps. I have now in my possession your written orders, dated July 2, directing me to assume command of the VI Corps, and, with that Corps and the two then under my command {the V and XII}, to move forward and at once attack the enemy. I allude to this fact for the purpose of refreshing your memory on a subject which you had apparently entirely forgotten when you penned your report, for you have not failed to notice the fact of General Schurz and others having held, even for a few hours, commands above that previously held by them. I sincerely trust that you will endeavor to correct as far as possible the errors above mentioned, and that the correction may be recorded at the War Department. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, H.W. SLOCUM, Major General of Volunteers, Commanding [Enclosure] HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, XII CORPS, Tullahoma, Tennessee, December 26, 1863 Major General H.W. SLOCUM, Commanding XII Army Corps: GENERAL: In forwarding the report of Brigadier General Ruger, commanding First Division, XII Army Corps, at the Battle of Gettysburg, delayed to this late day for reasons stated in the letter accompanying the report, I embrace the occasion to call your attention to certain errors and omissions in Major General Meades official report of that battle, which I think do much injustice to some portions of this Corps. These, briefly stated, are: 1. In crediting Lockwoods Brigade to the I Corps. 2. In omitting all notice of the gallant defense by Greenes Brigade of the left flank of our entrenched line on the evening of July 2, after the other troops of the Corps had marched out to the support of the left. 3. In wholly ignoring the operations of the First Division. 4. In repudiating most of the material statements of my report as temporary commander of this corps. 1. As to Lockwoods Brigade, the following is the notice taken of it in General Meades report: “In the meantime, perceiving great exertions on the part of the enemy, the VI Corps {Major General Sedgwick} and part of the I Corps {to the command of which I had assigned Major General Newton}, particularly Lockwoods Maryland Brigade, together with detachments from the II Corps, were all brought up, &c.” I cannot be mistaken in asserting that Lockwoods Brigade was at no time during this battle a part of the I Corps, or under the command of General Newton. It was a part of the XII Corps, and was brought up under my immediate command, with the First Division of same corps, to the support of the left. This Brigade, composed then of the 150th New York and 1st Maryland Potomac Home [Brigade] Regiment, coming from Baltimore, or its vicinity, reported to me as temporary commander of the Corps early on the morning of July 2, while the skirmishers of the First Division, still on the south side of Rock Creek, were engaged with the enemy. General Lockwood being senior to General Ruger, then commanding First Division, and a stranger to the Division, I directed him to take his orders directly from me as an unassigned Brigade during the pending operations. When the First Division and Lockwoods Brigade were ordered to support the left on the afternoon of the same day, I went in command of the supporting column, leaving the Second Division to cover our entire entrenched line. On reaching the crest of Cemetery Ridge, Major {now, I believe, Lieutenant Colonel} McGilvery, of Maine Artillery, in command of one or more Reserve Batteries, reported to me that he was threatened by the enemy, and was without Infantry supports, and that the enemy but a few moments before had drawn off into the woods in his front several pieces of Artillery. I ordered General Lockwood to move into the woods indicated, which was promptly done, and our Artillery, abandoned by the enemy, was almost immediately recaptured. The First Division at the same time was ordered into the woods on the left of Lockwoods Brigade, and both advanced for some distance and until halted, pursuant to superior orders, meeting very little resistance at any point from the retiring enemy. Though we passed large masses of our disorganized men, we saw not one line or body of our troops in position. The enemy seemed to have a clear field in that part of our line, and were helping themselves to our Artillery until interrupted by the approach of reinforcements from the XII and VI Corps, advancing at about the same time. These facts having been fully reported, I am at a loss to comprehend {when all other corps sending supports to the left are especially named} why the XII Corps should be not only not named, but deprived of the small credit of Lockwoods Maryland Brigade for the benefit of the I Corps. 2. In omitting any mention of the gallant defense made by General Greenes Brigade on the left flank of the entrenched line of the XII Corps on the evening of July 2. General Meades report thus speaks of the manner in which the enemy got possession of our line of breastworks: “During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the XII Corps were sent as reinforcements. During their absence, the line of the extreme right was held by a much reduced force, and was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of Gearys Division, of the XII Corps, advanced and occupied a part of the line.” It was the absence of the whole of the First Division and of Lockwoods brigade {supporting the left} and of two Brigades of the Second {Gearys} Division {marching toward Littlestown by mistake} that the enemy took advantage of, not only to occupy our line on the right and center, but also to attack with great vigor Greenes Brigade, of the Second Division {the only portion of the Corps left behind}, on the extreme left of our Entrenched line. General Meade omits all mention of this gallant contest, which lasted fully three hours, and resulted in our retaining this important part of our line of defenses, and enabling us to resist for hours, with comparatively little loss, his heavier attacks on the following day, and finally to expel him wholly from our line. General Meade speaks of another attack in a different part of the field at about the same hour, as follows: “On the extreme left another assault was, however, made about 8 PM on the XI Corps from the left of the town, which was repulsed with the assistance of the II and I Corps.” The similarity of time and circumstances leads me to think that there is a mistake in locality of this attack. It is quite certain that Greene was attacked and was reinforced by the I and XI Corps about the same hour that the report says that the attack on the XI Corps was repulsed by aid of troops from the I and II Corps. Be that as it may, the defense made by General Greene was eminently worthy of notice and commendation. 3. In wholly ignoring the operations of the First Division, XII Corps. The active participation of the XII Corps in the Battle of Gettysburg was, first, the marching of the First Division and Lockwoods Brigade to the support of the left on Thursday afternoon, July 2; secondly, the defense of the left flank of the entrenched line on the evening of the same day; and, thirdly, the long contest on Friday morning, July 3, to recover possession of our line of breastworks. I have spoken of both operations of Thursday. Of those of Friday morning, General Meade thus speaks in his report: “On the morning of the 3rd, General Geary, having returned during the night, was attacked at early dawn by the enemy, but succeeded in driving him back and occupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, reinforced by Wheatons [A mistake for Shalers] Brigade, VI Corps, maintained his position, and inflicting very severe losses on the enemy. With this exception, the lines remained undisturbed, &c.” This is certainly neither a full nor a fair statement of a conflict which was waged almost without cessation for fully seven hours, and in which all the infantry and artillery of the corps were engaged. The idea conveyed by General Meades report is a simple defense by one Division of the Corps. The engagement really began on our side by a heavy cannonading from guns placed in position after midnight. The plan of attack, arranged the night before, to dislodge the enemy from our breastworks, was for Gearys Division to follow the cessation of Artillery firing by an attack along the entrenchments which he held on our left, while the First Division was placed in preparation to assault over the marshy grounds on the extreme right, or attack the enemys flank should he attempt to move beyond the breastworks. The enemy, on the other hand, had brought up strong reinforcements, with the design of carrying the position of our entrenched line, which he failed to drive Greene from on the previous night, and which would have placed him in the rear of our Army, and given him possession of our main line of communication--the Baltimore Pike. Both parties started at daylight with plans of attack, each with the expectation of expelling the other. Not only, as General Meades report says, did Gearys Division {or, more correctly, the two absent Brigades of it} return during the night, but so also did the whole of the First Division and Lockwoods Brigade, and the whole Corps {not Gearys Division alone}, Artillery and Infantry, succeeded in driving the enemy back and occupying its former position. It is a noticeable fact, too, that the portion of the corps not mentioned by General Meade lost more in killed and wounded in this contest, from its exposed line of attack, and, I think, captured more prisoners, than did the Division which gets the entire credit in General Meades report. The commendation given to Gearys Division was justly merited, but the same praise might safely have been extended so as to have embraced the conduct of the whole corps, without doing injustice or giving offense to any portion of it. The entire omission of the First Division is so marked, and the report of the contest on Friday morning so meager, and so at variance with official statements of the superior Officers of the Corps, that I am at a loss to conceive from what source General Meade derived his information. Not, I know, from my report as temporary commander of the Corps, and not, I think, from yours as commander of the troops of the right wing. 4. The fourth item of omissions stated at the commencement of this communication is sufficiently shown in the comments already made. General Meade either has not seen my report, or he has intentionally repudiated all its material statements as to the operations of the XII Corps at Gettysburg. No commanding general can verify by personal knowledge all the occurrences in his own command in a great battle; but so confident am I of the truth of every material statement of my report in this instance, that I could confidently submit its correctness to a decision on proofs in any respectable court of justice. There is another omission which, in connection with those I have named, has a significant bearing. General Meade carefully names all General Officers temporarily in command of Corps. Major General Schurz, in command of XI Corps for six hours, from 10:30 AM of July 1 {when General Howard assumed command of the field} to 4 PM of same day {when General Howard was relieved by the arrival of General Hancock}, is properly reported as such. So are Major General Birney, III Corps, and Brigadier General Gibbon, II Corps {Major General Hancock commanding left center}, named as temporarily commanding corps on different days. I was in command of the XII Corps part of July 1 and all of July 2 and 3, and on the evening of the 2nd {Thursday} attended a council of Corps Commanders on a summons conveyed to me by a Staff Officer of General Meade. I may be pardoned, therefore, for expressing some surprise that my name alone of all those who temporarily commanded corps in this great battle is suppressed in General Meades report. I know General Meade to be a high-toned gentleman, and I believe him to be a commander of superior merit and of honest judgment, and I confess to have read that part of his official report relating to the XII Corps with a mixed feeling of astonishment and regret. I submit these comments to you as the commander of the XII Corps, not in the expectation that any adequate remedy can now be applied after the official report of the Commanding General has become an historical record, but because I deem a statement of the facts and grievances an act of justice to the Corps with which I have been long connected {and which I commanded on the occasion referred to}, and especially to the gallant division which I have had the honor to command for nearly two years. I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A.S. WILLIAMS, Brigadier General of Volunteers, Commanding, First Division, XII Army Corps HEADQUARTER,. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, February 25, 1864 Major General SLOCUM, Commanding XII Corps, Tullahoma, Tennessee: GENERAL: Your letter of the 30th of December last was received at these headquarters during my temporary absence from the Army, which, owing to sickness, was prolonged till recently. This will be excuse for the delay in acknowledging it. I very much regret that any injustice should have been done in my official report of the Battle of Gettysburg to any part of the XII Corps or any Officer in it. I do assure you most sincerely that nothing was further from my intentions, and that what has occurred was the result of accident and not of design, the occurrence of which I will endeavor to explain. To do this, I will take up each of your points seriatim: 1. Crediting Lockwoods Brigade to the I Corps. This I acknowledge a palpable error, which I am utterly unable to account for, unless it is that Major General Newton, in his report of the operations of the I Corps, makes marked mention of the arrival and services of Lockwoods Brigade--and this being in my mind at the time of writing, induced the error. 2. The omission to mention the services of Greenes Brigade on the afternoon of the 2nd July. I am not prepared to admit this as an error. My report, as is fully stated at the close, only pretends to be a general statement of the battle. It was impossible for me to recapitulate and do justice to each Brigade and Division in detail, and hence I refer to the sub-reports. I am willing to admit that, if my attention had been called to the services of Greenes Brigade in the pointed manner it now is, I would have given it credit for this special service. I wrote my report very hurriedly, having been delayed by the failure of Corps Commanders to send in their reports. The great number of these sub-reports rendered it out of the question for me to read and study all of them. I therefore confined myself exclusively to the reports of Corps Commanders, and I think in this I was misled by considering you the commander of the XII Corps, not knowing that you had considered yourself by my orders relieved from that command and that General Williams commanded it throughout the battle. This brings me to: 3. The omission to mention General Williams as Corps commander. This I very much regret, particularly on account of the good opinion I have always entertained for that Officer, and the personal regard from long acquaintance which rendered him the last man in the Army I would intentionally wrong. But, to tell you the truth, I was not aware, or at least it did not occur to me at the time of writing my report, that he was in command, and this arose possibly from the fact that I did not expect or design him to be so. I remember perfectly well that the V Corps, early on the morning of the 2nd, was placed under your command. I also remember that before the VI Corps had actually arrived, I proposed on its arrival to make an attack with your Corps, the V, and VI; but inasmuch as both these corps were removed to another part of the field early in the afternoon, and never returned, I presumed you would understand your command over them was only temporary, and ceased with their removal. I remember perfectly well General Williams being present at the consultation held on the night of the 2nd, but I do not remember having sent for him individually, though I of course sent for Corps Commanders, and I also remember being puzzled to account for his presence, and refraining from courtesy to him from asking any explanation, this arising, as I said before, from the impression on my mind that you were in command of your own Corps on the removal of the V and VI. I cannot say anything more beyond the fact that General Williams commanding the Corps was not impressed on my mind either on the field or when reading your report; hence the failure to read his report and the omission to mention his name. 4. The failure to make special mention of the First Division on the afternoon of the 2nd and on the 3rd. This is again an omission which I am not prepared to acknowledge, either as an error or an act of injustice. There is no Corps in the Army which would not have equal cause of complaint, as it was out of my power, as I stated before, to make mention of the special services of each Division, Brigade, and Regiment. I do not agree with you that the inference can be drawn from my report that Gearys Division alone went to the left on the 2nd, and alone repulsed the enemy on the 3rd, though I am willing to admit that marked prominence is given to the part that Division took on the 3rd, and that I was under the impression the main attack of that day was on Geary. Moreover, if you remember, at the time, from a report made to me by General Wadsworth, I was led to believe General Geary was unnecessarily expending ammunition, and notified you of this. Afterward, I was satisfied of the reverse, and, perhaps, the fear of doing injustice, this impression having existed, induced me to dwell more on Geary than I should otherwise have done. But I remember your dispatch in the night of the 2nd stated that part of Gearys vacated rifle-pits were occupied by the enemy, and you asked for authority for Geary to attack with artillery and infantry at daylight, which I gave you. 5. The error in the case of Shaler was due to General Sedgwicks report, which he acknowledged as soon as my report appeared in print. I have now, General, endeavored to explain the errors and omissions charged, or, rather, to show how they occurred. As you say, it will be difficult to repair them. I will, however, immediately forward to the General-in-Chief the sub-reports of General Ruger, and accompany it with a letter, a copy of which is herewith enclosed, and which I trust will meet with your approval. Respectfully, yours, GEO. G. MEADE, Major General, Commanding Army of the Potomac
Posted on: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 21:11:12 +0000
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