Revolts in Syria: Tracking Convergence between Authoritarianism & Neoliberalism. Authoritarian neoliberalism is rapidly losing its grip over society as well as its remaining legitimacy. So far, the Syrian regime has been able to convince a sizable number of Syrians that the alternatives to its rule are dangerous sectarianisms or dreadful extremisms.But more and more are asking for the downfall of the regime. The inability of the regime to build a viable alliance are almost null. The polarization between the regime on the one hand and the rest of the population is preventing the constitution of a new historic bloc on which the regime could build its future.Unlike the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, Syria’s army and security apparatus and structure of government are loyal to the ruling class. This obviously makes their removal more complicated than in the other cases. However the lower level of institutionalization and independent institutions may also imply the removal of the regime can signify a cleaner break than those countries and a chance for consensus based and participatory institutional building. Once in power, Hafez al-Assad initiated a liberal program to undo or halt the progressive measures that the ‘radical’ faction of the Baath, led by Salah Jadid, had implemented in the previous few years in particular on issues such as land reform as well as curbs on the private merchant sector. At the surface the developmental model pursued by the regime was that of import substitution industrialization whereby the state seizes the commanding heights of the economy, launches infrastructural projects and industrial factories, and imposes quantitative restrictions on international trade. At the same time, the massive Syrian bureaucracy incorporated a large sector of the population under the direct control of the state. (Perthes 1995). However since urban workers and peasants formed two important social bases for the regime, the state-led developmental program was meant to protect them from the market rather than subject them to its discipline. This meant that while the regime was able to launch significant industrial and manufacturing projects, it was not able to make them a source of capital accumulation and the state remained distributive in nature relying on oil revenues, aid, and remittances (Waldner 1999). Lack of viable manufacturing and industrial sectors signified that most of non-oil trade remained agricultural either in production or processing of agricultural products. In other words, the regime used its oil revenues to maintain social programs such as free education, subsidized products, and free healthcare. To borrow from French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the regime used the “left hand” of the state, which consists of the various welfare programs, to elevate the living conditions of the population. However, as Bourdieu explains, the state’s main goal is to maintain the hierarchy of power regardless whether this is achieved through consensus or violence. This is why when it faces a crisis, the state governs through its “right hand,” by deploying its technologies of coercion and violence to squash any protests or social movements that contest its legitimacy. Peasants, workers, and professional syndicates (such as lawyers unions), while incorporated and given official representation in the regime, gradually lost all autonomy-increasingly the leadership was appointed from above rather than elected and strictly based on loyalty considerations. To consolidate his power, Asad increasingly relied on the military and the secret police, in addition to creating a praetorian guard that his brother Rifat led, and which operated in paralegal spaces. Syrian society was living under a permanent state of exception. Under his rule, there were no Syrian citizens, only Syrian subjects. The underside of Asad’s strategy was an increased isolation of the ruling oligarchy.
Posted on: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 16:40:36 +0000
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