Robert M.Grant trong cuốn sách "Contemporary Strategy Analysis", được sử dụng làm giáo trình trong chương trình MBA của nhiều trường đại học trên thế giới, giành hẳn một mục cho case về tướng Giáp và chiến tranh Việt Nam. Nguyên văn như sau: ......... Genera Giap and the Vietnam Wars, 1948–75 As far as logistics and tactics were concerned, we succeeded in everything we set out to do. At the height of the war the army was able to move almost a million soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house them, supply them with arms and ammunition and generally sustain them better than any army had ever been sustained in the field . . . On the battlefield itself, the army was unbeatable. In engagement after engagement the forces of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States that emerged victorious. How could we have succeeded so well yet failed so miserably? Despite having the largest army in Southeast Asia, North Vietnam was no match for South Vietnam so long as the south was backed by the world’s most powerful military and industrial nation. South Vietnam and its U.S. ally were defeated not by superior resources but by a superior strategy. North Vietnam achieved what Sun Tzu claimed was the highest form of victory: the enemy gave up The master of North Vietnam’s military strategy was General Vo Nguyen Giap. In 1944, Giap became head of the Vietminh guerrilla forces. He was commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese Army until 1974 and Minister of Defense until 1980. Giap’s strategy was based on Mao Tse Tung’s three-phase theory of revolutionary war: first, passive resistance to mobilize political support; second, guerrilla warfare aimed at weakening the enemy and building military strength; finally, general counteroffensive. In 1954, Giap’s brilliant victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu fully vindicated the strategy. Against the U.S., the approach was similar. "Our strategy was . . . to wage a long-lasting battle . . . Only a long-term war could enable us to utilize to the maximum our political trump cards, to overcome our material handicap, and to transform our weakness into strength. To maintain and increase our forces was the principle to which we adhered, contenting ourselves with attacking when success was certain, refusing to give battle likely to incur losses." The strategy built on the one resource where the communists had overwhelming superiority: their will to fight. As Prime Minister Pham Van Dong explained: “The United States is the most powerful nation on earth.” But Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars . . . We can outlast them and we can win in the end.” Limited military engagement and the charade of the Paris peace talks helped the North Vietnamese prolong the conflict, while diplomatic efforts to isolate the U.S. from its Western allies and to sustain the U.S. peace movement accelerated the crumbling of American will The effectiveness of the U.S. military response was limited by two key uncertainties: what the objectives were and who the enemy was. Was the U.S. role one of supporting the South Vietnamese regime, fighting Vietcong terrorism, inflicting a military defeat on North Vietnam, conducting a proxy war against the Soviet Union, or combating world communism? The consistency and strength of North Vietnam’s strategy allowed it to survive errors in implementation. Giap was premature in launching his general offensive. Both the 1968 Tet Offensive and 1972 Easter Offensive were beaten back with heavy losses. By 1974, U.S. resistance had been sapped by the Watergate scandal On April 29, 1975, Operation Frequent Wind began evacuating all remaining Americans from South Vietnam, and the next morning North Vietnamese troops entered the Presidential Palace in Saigon. Sources: [1] Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982): 1; [2] Vo Nguyen Giap, Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977); [3] J. Cameron, Here Is Your Enemy (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1966)
Posted on: Sat, 05 Oct 2013 18:06:21 +0000
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