SANAA, Yemen — Last summer a man with an artificialhand walked into a security office in eastern Yemenclutching a letter. This was his second attempt. Monthsearlier, in late 2012 shortly after President Ali AbdullahSalihs government collapsed in the face of widespreadprotests, he had walked into the same office with a letterrequesting that he be named deputy security director forMukalla, a large port city on Yemens southern coast.That time, security officers had ignored him. They knewexactly who he was and they wanted nothing to do withhim, according to one of the officials who saw the letter.But this time the man with the missing left hand wasbetter prepared. He had lowered his sights, asking onlyto be named assistant to the security director, andlined up support in the capital, Sanaa. The local officialshad no choice. They had to give him a job. Jamal al-Nahdi was now a security officer.According to security agents, members of parliament,and government officials similar scenes have taken placeacross Yemen in recent months. But Nahdis case standsout for his personal history. Two decades before hewalked into the security office in Mukalla, Nahdimasterminded al-Qaedas first attack on the UnitedStates.Like hundreds of other Yemenis of his generation, Nahdihad traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the1980s, and toward the end of the war he joined Osamabin Ladens new organization. Not long after he returnedhome, in December 1992, bin Laden tapped him for ajob.Bin Laden had already abandoned Saudi Arabia infrustration over the royal familys growing ties to theU.S. in the wake of the first Gulf War and eventuallysettled on a farm in Sudan, where he could keep tabs onthe shifting politics of the Middle East. Brooding in hisself-imposed exile, bin Laden didnt like what he wasseeing. The American soldiers that had flooded intoSaudi Arabia to protect the kingdom from SaddamHussein showed no signs of leaving. Bin Ladenconsidered the peninsula holy ground, and he viewed thesoldiers continued presence as part of a U.S. conspiracyto take over the region.When the U.S. dispatched troops to Somalia in December1992, as part of Operation Restore Hope, some of theMarines used Aden as a staging ground. Bin Laden hadseen enough. Convinced that the U.S. was once againusing a war as an excuse to station troops on theArabian Peninsula, he opted for force. It would be ninemore years before most Americans knew his name, butbin Laden had made his choice. He was at war with theU.S.On Dec. 29, 1992, Nahdi put bin Ladens plan intomotion . Nahdi wanted a pair of simultaneous bombings:one at the Aden Mövenpick hotel and another at asecond resort hotel, the Gold Mohur, where hisintelligence suggested the Marines were staying. Nahdiand an assistant planted a bomb at the Gold Mohur andthen moved across town to the Mövenpick. But as he waslaying the charges something went wrong and the bombdetonated prematurely, ripping off most of his left hand.Minutes later the bomb at the Gold Mohur went off onschedule, tearing through the hotel and killing twopeople. But Nahdi had picked the wrong hotel. TheMarines werent there and his bomb managed to kill onlya tourist and a local hotel employee. Al-Qaedas firstattack on the U.S. was a dud.At the time, hardly anyone noticed the failed attempt; itwas just one more explosion in a violent country. Thewhole incident would have been little more than afootnote in the prehistory of Americas war with al-Qaeda if the players had remained in the past. But morethan two decades after he planted those bombs, Nahdi,the man who planned al-Qaedas first attack on the U.S.,has reemerged and this time he is ostensibly fighting forthe other side.Although it is unclear to what degree Nahdis views onviolent jihad have evolved over the past two decades, hisnew position — as a high-ranking security officer inYemens Interior Ministry — raises questions as to theextent that jihadis and al-Qaeda sympathizers haveinfiltrated Yemens security services at the same time theU.S. has been pouring millions into the country in aneffort to combat the terrorist group.When contacted by BuzzFeed, Nahdi said he was doing agreat job confronting insecurity and denouncing al-Qaeda. But he refused to discuss the 1992 bombings.Im now a colonel in the Interior Ministry and wasappointed as an assistant to the director of security forMukalla, he said.Nor is Nahdi the only militant to find a second career asa Yemeni security official. In the two and a half yearssince Salih stepped down, Yemen has been in the midstof a messy military transition that appears to have beenexploited by elements of the old regime helping jihadisympathizers secure jobs within Yemens securityestablishment.With limited domestic support, Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi,the new Yemeni president, accepted help from all sides.He welcomed U.S. advice and aid which had dried upduring the bloodiest days of the uprising. (Aid that haddipped to $147 million in 2011 more than doubled whenHadi took office in 2012.) At the same time, he formed acoalition government with local Islamists, handing themseveral coveted government portfolios. And, perhapsmost importantly, Hadi retained questionable elementsof the old regime, which the U.S. has long suspected ofcombating al-Qaeda in public and coddling them inprivate.One of the most controversial of these holdovers is a 68-year-old general named Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. For years,Ahmar was the regimes iron fist, a trusted member ofSalihs inner circle who kept the presidents domesticenemies at bay by acting as unofficial conduit betweenthe military and jihadis. In 1994, he recruited dozens ofveterans from Afghanistan to fight the socialists during abrief but bloody civil war. Six years later, U.S.investigators wondered if some those same men hadbeen involved in the attack on the USS Cole , which wasattacked by al-Qaeda as it refueled in Aden in October2000, leaving 17 sailors dead. But in March 2011, perhapsseeing the writing on the wall, Ahmar defected fromSalihs government, and has since remade himself as anindispensable ally to the new Yemeni president. Ashelpful as Ahmar has been to Hadi in offsetting otherelements of the old regime, the general also brings withhim a significant amount of baggage.There are fears that Ahmar is once again recruitingmilitants and jihadi sympathizers, only this time givingthem official positions within Yemens various securityand military agencies. According to Abdullah al-Maqtari,the head of the Yemeni parliaments state budget andfinal accounting committee, the number of new positionsis somewhere around 200,000. But neither he nor anyoneelse in the government knows if that is accurate — thereis a long-held practice of inflating numbers so generalscan pocket the extra salaries of these so-called ghostemployees.What is known, is that at least a few thousand recruits doexist, and they have been tasked with things likeprotecting government buildings and working as prisonguards. Their incorporation into Yemens securityservices has coincided with a rise in attacks and prisonbreaks in Yemen.One recent prison break, on Feb. 13, freed at least 19 al-Qaeda fighters. According to a Reuters report , whichconfirmed similar accounts in the local media, InteriorMinistry officials knew about the planned escape twomonths before it happened, yet did nothing to preventit. Al-Qaeda tells a similar story. In a video released onMarch 29 to commemorate the return of the escapedprisoners, an al-Qaeda figure claims that the men wereaided by officials within the prison.Over the past few years, the U.S. has refocused itsattention on Yemen in a attempt to combat al-Qaeda,increasing aid and ramping up drone strikes. But at thesame time elements of the Yemeni government appear tobe playing a double game, welcoming U.S. aid with onehand and helping militants with the other. اوباما يمدد حالة الطوارئ في اليمن بعد اكتشاف اعضاء مشاركين في الحكومة على ارتباط بالقاعده
Posted on: Sat, 17 May 2014 20:03:43 +0000
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