Sufism, Salafism and state in Pakistan Makings of an internal jihad by D. Suba Chandran tribuneindia/2012/20121117/edit.htm#4 HOW should one understand and interpret what has happened within Pakistan in recent months, especially the radical groups led by the Taliban and its allied sectarian outfits targeting both the state and society? On the one hand, institutions of the state are being constantly targeted, the recent attacks on the airbase in Kamra and the earlier ones on PNS Mehran in Karachi and GHQ in Rawalpindi would highlight a trend in the Taliban’s war against the symbols of the state. On the other hand, there have also been a series of attacks on various societal institutions, especially sufism; attacks on the famous shrines in Karachi and Lahore, besides those in tribal regions, would also signify another trend in what the radical groups are attempting. Clearly, there is a trend: what do these attacks signify? And where is the trend leading to? It is not difficult to understand why the radical groups are targeting the state and its institutions. Led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the groups that are targeting the state are not monolithic. Some of these groups, like the multiple factions of the TTP with their headquarters in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), reflect the post-9/11 phenomenon. Others such as the two Afghan Taliban factions led by Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis had established their linkages with Pakistan in the 1990s; so has been Al-Qaida, which perhaps is in the last stage of elimination from Pakistan and moving towards another unstable region, perhaps the Middle East-North Africa (MENA). And then there are those home-grown sectarian organisations, a legacy of General Zia and the proxy war led by Saudi Arabia and Iran in Pakistan, in which Islamabad and Rawalpindi played a willing role. The Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other sectarian organisations are the offshoots of this Zia legacy. Of the above groups, there has been an understanding between the TTP and sectarian organisations. Now bracketed as the “Punjabi Taliban” (of course, vehemently denied by the Punjab provincial government in Pakistan), the sectarian organisations from Punjab provide the much-needed access, intelligence and infrastructure for the TTP to strike deep into Pakistan, though headquartered in Waziristan. Other groups – the two factions of the Afghan Taliban, especially the Huqqani network and Al-Qaida --- are still dependent on Pakistan; hence, there have not been any significant cases in which these three groups have turned against Pakistan and started an open war. It is important to note that despite the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and the multiple arrests of its leadership by Pakistan (including those being handed over to the US), Al-Qaida has neither issued a statement nor acted against the interests of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. So is the case of the two factions of the Afghan Taliban. Reasons are easy to predict; these groups are highly dependent on Pakistan for their future course – either in Afghanistan or outside. On the other hand, the TTP and its sectarian affiliates are inward looking and compete with the state for influence within Pakistan. While many within Pakistan believe in a mirage that after the American exit from Afghanistan, the TTP would become a force of stability and an army of peace; given their trajectory, it is unlikely that they would give up. The TTP and its sectarian supporters are targeting the state for the following primary reasons. First and foremost, they are targeting the state in retaliation for the military’s initiatives in containing them. Referred to as “revenge attacks” in the press statements made after their high-profile targets, one could observe the TTP linking it to the death of Osama bin Laden, military operations in Swat and Waziristan, reopening of the NATO supply lines, and Pakistan’s collusion with the US. The second major reason for the TTP targeting the state is what the pro-Taliban analysts and supporters both outside and inside the establishment do not want to understand: the TTP perceives certain areas and issues as their domain, and do not want the state to intervene. The FATA, a few border districts of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, including Malakand and Swat, and perhaps some districts of Balochistan and Punjab are also considered as their areas of influence. Why would the TTP object to the peace march by Imran Khan and his party in Waziristan to oppose the drone attacks? Those who follow these outfits know that Imran Khan is a soft Talibani in his heart and is closer to the TTP in terms of ideology than any of the other political parties in Pakistan. Despite that, the TTP issued a warning against Imran Khan’s proposed march in Waziristan last month. Why? The reason is simple: the TTP considers the region as a part of its own sphere of influence and would not want either the state or any institution, including any political party, to venture into its territory. On a similar note, the TTP is also against a few institutions of society, including sufism. Why would the TTP and its affiliates target sufi shrines? How would a cemetery of a sufi poet constitute a threat to the TTP? If the TTP and its affiliates are against the state and political parties entering into their area and contend for power, they are also against sufism, for it would undermine the TTP influence at the societal level and pose an alternative to the people. These radical groups understand that common people go to sufis and are generally influenced by their teachings, including the Islam propagated by them. These radical groups would not want any institution to challenge their presence at any level – state, political and societal. If they take on the state militarily, they use their own version of Islam, closer to salafism vis-a-vis sufism at the societal level. This fits the agenda of the sectarian groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, who use this to target their primary opponents – the Shias, Ahmediyas and other minority groups. There is a pattern that could be observed in how those adhering to the other faiths are being targeted. While the Ahmediyas and Shias were initially targeted, for they have been an easy prey, now the TTP and its affiliates have started targeting Sufi Islam. It is for the same reason the TTP mullahs and the young leadership is afraid of tribal jirgas and elders as an alternative source of conflict resolution. They do not want any challenge from the tribal elders or jirgas in the decision-making process to invoke legitimacy to what they would like to dictate; they are using their version of Islam as a tool to give verdicts on social issues. Since there is an established tribal way of resolving disputes, the Taliban movement is attempting to usurp that function and decide on its own. So, what does the above reality mean? The Afghan factions of the Taliban and Al-Qaida may not fight Pakistan as they may be dependent on Islamabad in the immediate future. However, for the TTP and its affiliates, it is a different game; it is less to do with the US, drone attacks and the Pakistani support. This is all about gaining power and influence. They are unlikely to give up their fight once the Americans leave Afghanistan. They would wage a two-front war against the state and society. While the state and many of the pro-Taliban analysts consider it as a series of pitched battles at a tactical level, the TTP and its local affiliates inside Pakistan consider it as strategic. For them, the war has just begun. The writer is the Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi
Posted on: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 08:15:59 +0000
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