Summary of facts about the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact Here are the incontrovertible facts summarising very briefly the USSRs position on the question of war with imperialism. First, it was the endeavour of the Soviet Union not to embroil herself in a war with imperialism. Second, since it was not entirely up to her to avoid such war, then, if imperialism should be bent on waging a war against the Soviet Union, the latter should NOT find herself in the position of having to fight alone, let alone face the combined onslaught of the principal imperialist countries - Germany, Britain, France, USA, Italy and Japan. Third, to this end, divisions between the fascist imperialist states on the one hand and the democratic imperialist states on the other should be exploited to the hilt. These divisions between the two groups of imperialism were not a figment of Stalins imagination. They were real, based on the material interests of the two groups of states under consideration. Uneven development of capitalism causes some states to spurt ahead and others to lag behind. The old division of the world no longer corresponds with the balance of forces, thus making necessary a new division of the world. This is precisely what the First World War was about; and this is precisely what Germany, Italy and Japan, having spurted ahead in the capitalist development of their economies, were clamouring for. Whereas the old imperialist countries, notably Britain and France, having lagged behind in the capitalist development of their economies in comparison with the newcomers, notably Germany, were quite happy with the old division of the world. In demanding a new division, the fascist states were encroaching upon the material interests of the democratic imperialist states. There was thus scope for this conflict of interests to be exploited by the USSR. Fourth, to this end, the USSR, pursuing a very complicated foreign policy, did its best to conclude a collective security pact with the democratic imperialist states to deter aggression by the fascist states, providing, in the event of such aggression taking place, for collective action against the aggressors. Fifth, when the democratic imperialist states, overcome by their hatred of communism, refused to sign a collective security pact with the USSR and continued their policy of appeasement of the fascist states, in particular that of Nazi Germany, in an effort to direct her aggression in an eastwardly direction against the Soviet Union, the latter was forced to try some other method of protecting the interests of the socialist motherland of the international proletariat. The USSR turned the tables on the foreign policy of the democratic imperialist states by signing on 23 August 1939 the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Sixth, in signing this pact, the USSR not only ensured that she would not be fighting Germany alone, but also that the latter would be fighting against the very powers who had been trying, by their refusal to agree on collective security, to embroil the USSR in a war with Germany. On 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland. Two days later the Anglo-French ultimatum expired, and Britain and France were at war with Germany. Seventh, the provisions of the additional secret protocol went far enough to safeguard the Soviet spheres of interest, which, as will be seen, proved vital to Soviet defences when the war actually reached her. Finally, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact bought the Soviet Union an extremely valuable period of two years for strengthening her defence preparedness before she entered a war she knew she could not stay out of forever. When the war was finally forced on the Soviet Union she made the most heroic contribution in the crowning and glorious victory of the allies against Nazi Germany and her allies. The Red Army and the Soviet people showed their tenacity, and the tenacity and superiority of the socialist system, by defeating the Nazis in the USSR and pursuing them all the way to Berlin, liberating in the process country after country from Nazi jackboot occupation and bringing socialism to eastern Europe. All revolutionary and honest bourgeois historians and politicians agree on the above summary. Only the most die-hard anti- communists, particularly the Trotskyites, ever dare to dispute it. What follows is a substantiation of the above summary. Soviet Union well aware of the coming war Of course, it is utter nonsense to say that Stalin and the CPSU did not realise that the Soviet Union might have to fight Germany and that she relied on Nazi goodwill. The fact is that the Soviet Union was menaced in the east and west, and the conduct of foreign relations became more complex and demanding as he [Stalin] sought to deflect or at least delay the inevitable war. He carried enormous responsibilities, and only a man of exceptional physical stamina, sharp and disciplined intelligence, and iron self-control could have met such demands. (Ian Grey, Stalin - Man of history, Abacus, London, 1982, p.293). Fundamental to Stalins policies, internal and external, was the conviction that war was imminent and might devastate Soviet Russia before she was able to gather strength. It was this thought that had demanded immediate collectivisation and headlong industrialisation. There was no time to lose ... (ibid, pp.295-296). As early as January 1925, addressing the Central Committee, Stalin, having said that The preconditions of war are ripening ... went on to warn: Our banner is still the banner of Peace. But if the war begins, we shall hardly be able to sit with folded arms. We shall have to come out, but we ought to be the last to come out. And we should come out to throw the decisive weight on the scales, the weight that should tilt the scales. (Stalin, Collected Works, Vol 7 pp.13-14). Everyone is, of course, aware of his 1931 speech containing the following statement which even Deutscher calls a prophesy brilliantly fulfilled: We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under (Stalin, The Tasks of Business Executives, Collected Works Vol 13, p.41). In his autobiography, My Struggle, Hitler had clearly and candidly outlined the foreign policy of the Nazis: We National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period ... We stop the endless German movement to the South, and turn our gaze towards the land in the East... If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia (Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, London 1984, pp.598 and 604). Soviet efforts at achieving collective security & appeasement policy of the non-aggressive imperialist states The Soviet Union can hardly have relished the spectacle of Nazi accession to power in January 1933, which created for the USSR an unprecedentedly dangerous situation. Hence the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy in this period on the preservation of world peace and efforts at concluding a collective security pact with the democratic imperialist counties which had, as already mentioned, an objective interest in the maintenance of the then existing division of the world. In the conduct of foreign policy, Stalin showed great caution, restraint and realism. He needed time to build up Russias industry and military strength. He was constantly provoked in the east and the west, and in ways that must have infuriated him, but he never lost sight of the overriding need to delay the outbreak of war as long as possible. It was for this reason that he placed the greatest emphasis on peace and disarmament in world affairs. At the same time he pursued a policy of collective security ... (Ian Grey, op. cit. p.296). The policy of collective security was pursued because the socialist Soviet Union had every interest in averting war and getting on with the task of socialist construction, which required peace, and because the non-aggressive imperialist countries had an interest in averting a war by the aggressive states or in ensuring their early defeat. Addressing the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March, 1939, and arguing that the war had already started, Stalin said: The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressor states, primarily England, France and the USA, while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors. Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain connivance on their part (Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1953, p.753). Although having an objective interest in entering into a collective security arrangement with the USSR, nevertheless, overcome by their hatred of socialism, Britain and France, led by the governments of Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier respectively, refused to conclude such an alliance. Is it [the policy of appeasement by the non-aggressive states] to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive states? asked Stalin. He went on to answer thus: Of course not! Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and militarily. ... The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly Britain and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of neutrality. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire ... not to hinder Germany, say, ... from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union, to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply in the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, in the interests of peace, and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. Cheap and easy! (ibid p. 754). Further, referring to the Munich agreement which surrendered Czechoslovakia to the Nazis, Stalin continued: ... One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union ... (ibid p.756). Outlining the tasks of Soviet foreign policy, Stalin stressed the need to be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull chestnuts out of the fire for them (ibid p.759). The Soviet government was not even consulted about, let alone included in, the Munich conference which, gathering on 28-30 September, 1938, surrendered Czechoslovakia to the tender mercies of fascist Germany. At the same time the Western powers refused to respond to the Soviet proposals for a grand collective security alliance under the aegis of the League of Nations. This is what Winston Churchill had to say in this context: The Soviet offer was in effect ignored. They were not brought into the scale against Hitler and were treated with an indifference - not to say disdain - which left a mark on Stalins mind. Events took their course as if the Soviet Union did not exist. For this we afterwards paid dearly (W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol 1, p.104). In the same volume Churchill admits that the Soviet plan would have averted, or at least delayed, war for a considerable time, and it was time that the Soviet Union was playing for. (op cit pp 234-251). But the non-aggressive states anti-communism won a temporary victory. Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, told Hitler in November 1937 that: ... he and other members of the British government were well aware that the Fuehrer had attained a great deal ... Having destroyed communism in his country, he had barred the road of the latter to Western Europe and Germany was therefore entitled to be regarded as a bulwark of the West against Bolshevism ... When the ground has been prepared for an Anglo-German rapprochement, the four great West European powers must jointly set up the foundation of lasting peace in Europe (Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-45, Vol 1, London 1954, p.55). The Soviet Union persists in her policy Knowing, as the CPSU leadership did, that the policy of appeasement, which was in conflict with the interests of British and French imperialism, would sooner or later be opposed by powerful representatives of imperialism in these countries, it persisted in its efforts to conclude a collective security alliance. On 15 March 1939, Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia. Public opinion in the West was outraged by the rape of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain was visibly shaken by the angry public and parliamentary reaction. On instructions from the British government, the British ambassador in Moscow called on the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, to inquire what the Soviet reaction would be if Germany were to attack Romania. Litvinov responded the same evening with the proposal that representatives of Britain, France, the USSR, Poland and Romania should meet urgently to forestall this danger. The British government rejected this proposal and instead proposed a declaration that in the event of further aggression the four countries would consult with each other. Although annoyed by this response, the Soviet government agreed to it, provided that Poland was also a signatory. The Polish foreign minister, Col Beck, as anti-Soviet as Chamberlain, refused to sign, proposing instead a Polish-British mutual assistance pact. On 31 March 1939, without prior consultation with the Soviet Union, the Polish-British Pact, giving a unilateral British guarantee to defend Poland against aggression, was announced. On 13 April it was extended to include Greece and Romania. As Ian Grey correctly observes: If Germany attacked Poland or Romania, Britain could do nothing without the support of the Soviet Union, and in a way that was gratuitously insulting, both governments having carefully ignored the Soviet government. Churchill, Eden and others were quick to point out the stupidity of Chamberlains policy (Ian Grey, op cit p.306). Under extreme domestic pressure, the British government, on 15 April, proposed to the Soviet Union that the latter should give unilateral guarantees. The Soviet government turned down this proposal as it provided no assistance for the USSR in the event of a German attack. On 17 April, the Soviet government proposed a British-French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, which was to include a military convention and to guarantee the independence of all states bordering on the Soviet Union from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Chamberlain and Halifax rejected it on the spurious ground that it might offend Poland and Germany, and because it would commit Britain to the defence of Finland and the Baltic states. For Stalin the inescapable conclusion was that the leaders of the British government were so blinded by hostility towards the Soviet regime that not even to avert the horrors of war would they consider an alliance with Soviet Russia against Germany (Ian Grey, ibid p.307). And it was evident that to the British and the French ruling circles, the thought of a coalition with the Soviets was still repugnant ... ; that some leading western statesmen looked upon Nazism as upon a reliable barrier against Bolshevism; that a few among them did toy with the idea of turning that barrier into a battering ram; and that, finally, even among those who saw the inescapable need for an alliance with Russia, some wondered whether it would not be sound policy to let Germany come to grips with Russia first (Deutscher, op cit pp.413-414). On 3 May Litvinov was replaced as Commissar for Foreign Affairs by Molotov. This should have served as a clear warning to Britain and France, for Litvinovs name was very closely associated with efforts for a collective security. Even now the USSR persisted in its policy of working for a collective security alliance. The British government was under increasing public pressure to negotiate with the Soviet Union. On 2 June, the Soviet government submitted a new draft agreement, specifying the countries to be guaranteed and the extent of the commitment of the three signatories. Expressing interest in the Soviet proposals, the British government decided to send a representative to Moscow to speed up the negotiations. Although Chamberlain and Halifax had personally gone to Berlin, they sent a junior official from the Foreign Office to Moscow, a deliberate affront which gave actual offence (Churchill, ibid p.304). [See Note 2] On 17 July Molotov announced that there was little point in continued discussion on the political treaty in the absence of a military convention being concluded. The British government responded to Molotovs announcement by agreeing to send a military mission to Moscow. Instead of sending Lord Gort, chief of the imperial staff, as the Soviet government had hoped, Chamberlain appointed an elderly retired admiral, Admiral Reginald Plunkett-Ernie-Erle-Drax, who proceeded on 23 July by the slowest means of transportation and the slowest route (having been into the bargain instructed to go very slowly with the conversations) and who arrived in Moscow on 11 August. What is more, the Soviet side discovered to its amazement that the British delegation had come merely to hold talks, with no authority to negotiate. What is certain is that, if the western governments had wanted to drive him [Stalin] into Hitlers arms, they could not have set about doing so more effectively than they did. The Anglo-French military mission delayed its departure for eleven precious days. It wasted five days more en route, travelling by the slowest possible boat. When it arrived in Moscow its credentials and powers were not clear. The governments whose prime ministers had not considered it beneath their dignity to fly to Munich almost at Hitlers nod, refused to send any official of ministerial standing to negotiate the alliance with Russia. The servicemen sent for military talks were of lesser standing than those sent, for instance, to Poland and Turkey. If Stalin intended an alliance, the way he was treated might almost have been calculated to make him abandon his intention (Deutscher, ibid p.425). All the same, on 12 August the talks on a military convention began. Marshal Voroshilov, leader of the Soviet delegation, informed the delegates that without Soviet troops being permitted to enter Poland it would be impossible for them to defend it. The Poles declared that they did not need, and would not accept, Soviet aid. If Stalin is to be judged by his conduct at the time [around September, 1938] there is nothing with which he can be reproached (ibid p. 419). And further: The unwritten maxim of Munich was to keep Russia out of Europe. Not only the great and seemingly great powers of the West wished to exclude Russia. The governments of the small east European nations as well squealed at the great bear: Stay where you are, stay in your lair. Sometime before Munich, when the French and the Russians were discussing joint actions in defence of Czechoslovakia, the Polish and the Rumanian governments categorically refused to agree to the passage of Russian troops to Czechoslovakia. They denied the Red Army - and even the Red Air Force - the right of passage not merely because they were afraid of communism; they fawned on Hitler. It must have been shortly after Munich that the idea of a new attempt at a rapprochement with Germany took shape in Stalins mind ... (ibid. p 419). The French and British governments too rejected this provision. It was pointless in the circumstances to continue the discussions, which were adjourned indefinitely on 21 August. After this the Soviet government, realising the stubborn persistence of the British and French governments in their refusal to conclude an alliance with the USSR, resolved to conclude the non-aggression pact with Germany. His [Stalins] foremost concern was still to gain time so that Soviet industry and the armed forces could gather strength. Reluctantly he turned now to the possibility of an agreement with Hitler (Ian Grey, op cit p.309 and Churchill, op cit p.306). As to why Stalin agreed to the Non-Aggression pact with Germany, Deutscher says: That he [Stalin] had little confidence in Hitlers victory is equally certain. His purpose now was to win time, time, and once again time, to get on with his economic plans, to build up Russias might and then throw that might into the scales when the other belligerents were on their last legs (ibid p.430). Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed Although Germany had approached the Soviet Union as early as 17 April 1939 for a normalisation of German-Soviet relations, and subsequent approaches had been made to the Soviet government through the German embassy in Moscow, the German Ambassador, Count Fritz von der Schulenburg reported as late as 4 August: My overall impression is that the Soviet government is at present determined to sign with England and France, if they fulfil all Soviet wishes ... It will take a considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet government to swing (Churchill, op cit, p.305). On 14 August Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, instructed Schulenburg by cable to call on Molotov and to read him the following communication: There is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries ... I am prepared to make a short visit to Moscow ... to set forth the Fuehrers views to M Stalin ... only through such a discussion can a change be brought about... (Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, Vol 7, London 1956, p.63). On 16 August, Schulenburg saw Molotov and read to him Ribbentrops communication. The same night he reported to Berlin Molotovs great interest in the communication, adding that Molotov was interested in the question of how the German government were disposed towards the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union (ibid p.77). Ribbentrop answered the same day, instructing Schulenburg to see Molotov again to convey to him that: Germany is prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. I am prepared to come by aeroplane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal, on the basis of full powers from the Fuehrer, with the entire complex of German-Russian relations and, if the occasion arises, to sign the appropriate treaties (ibid p.84). On 17 August Molotov handed a written reply to Schulenburg proposing a trade agreement to begin with, to be followed shortly thereafter by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. On 18 August Ribbentrop informed Schulenburg telegraphically that the first stage, that of signing a trade agreement, had been completed and requested that he be allowed to make an immediate trip to Moscow. On 19 August Schulenburg answered that Molotov had agreed that: ... the Reich Foreign Minister could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27. Molotov handed me the draft of a non-aggression pact (ibid p.134). On 20 August Hitler sent an urgent personal telegram to Stalin, accepting the Soviet draft non-aggression pact, with the plea that Ribbentrop be received in Moscow on 22 August or at the latest on the 23rd. Stalin replied on 21 August agreeing to the visit: The Soviet government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr Von Ribbentrops arriving in Moscow on August 23 (ibid p.168). Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow at the head of a delegation on 23 August. On the same night he was received by Stalin. According to a reliable account, the meeting was cold and far from amicable. Gauss, chief assistant to Ribbentrop, who accompanied him, recorded: Ribbentrop himself had inserted in the preamble a rather far-reaching phrase concerning friendly German-Soviet relations. To this Stalin objected, remarking that the Soviet government could not suddenly present to their public a German-Soviet declaration of friendship after they had been covered with pails of manure by the Nazi government for six years. Thereupon this phrase in the preamble was deleted (Churchill, op cit p.306). The pact was signed. Under the secret protocol it was agreed that in the Baltic the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR ... and in the case of Poland, ... the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and Sau (Documents on German Foreign Policy, op cit p.264). In other words, the Curzon line was to be this boundary, and in the area east of it, which had been seized by Poland from the Soviet Union after the October Revolution, Germany had agreed to the USSR taking whatever action it liked. Why the Soviet Union signed the 23 August pact Addressing the Supreme Soviet on 31 August, Molotov dispelled the fiction that the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non- Aggression treaty had upset the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations: Attempts are being made to spread the fiction that the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact disrupted negotiations with Britain and France for a mutual assistance pact ... In reality, as you know, the very reverse is true... The Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with Germany, amongst other things, because negotiations with France and Great Britain had ... ended in a failure through the fault of the ruling circles of Britain and France (Molotov, Soviet Peace Policy, Lawrence & Wishart, London, p. 20). Even the historian Edward Carr, decidedly an anti-Soviet writer, is obliged to admit that the Soviet Unions decision to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany was a most reluctant and enforced second choice: The striking feature of the Soviet-German negotiations ... is the extreme caution with which they were conducted from the Soviet side, and the prolonged Soviet resistance to close the doors on the Western negotiations (E.H. Carr, From Munich to Moscow: II, in Soviet Studies, Vol I, October 1949, p.104). The same Edward Carr, noting that the Chamberlain government as a defender of capitalism turned down an alliance with the USSR against Germany, made the following estimation of the gains made by the Soviet Union as a result of signing the Non-Aggression treaty with Germany: In the pact of August 23rd, 1939, they [the Soviet government] secured: (a) a breathing space of immunity from attack; (b) German assistance in mitigating Japanese pressure in the Far East; (c) German agreement to the establishment of an advanced bastion beyond the existing Soviet frontiers in Eastern Europe; it was significant that this bastion was, and could only be, a line of defence against potential German attack, the eventual prospect of which was never far absent from Soviet reckonings. But what most of all was achieved by the pact was the assurance that, if the USSR had eventually to fight Hitler, the western powers would already be involved (ibid p.103). After the above correctly, succinctly and brilliantly summarised gains for the Soviet Union, consequent upon signing the 23 August pact, it is difficult to imagine that there are still people around who assert that in signing this Non-Aggression pact with Germany the Soviet Union was guilty of an abandonment of proletarian internationalism. Unfortunately, there still are such people. It is difficult to say whether it is ignorance or malice that causes them to think and utter such foul thoughts. All we can say is that there are none so deaf as those who will not hear. Hostile as he is, even Deutscher is obliged to admit another gain, i.e., the moral advantage gained by the Soviet Union through signing the 23 August pact with Hitlerite Germany: Her [the USSRs] moral gain consisted in the clear awareness of her peoples that Germany was the aggressor and that their own government had pursued peace to the very end. For our part, we will always look back with admiration and gratitude at this master stroke of Soviet foreign policy which contributed so significantly to freeing humanity from the horrors of Nazi Germany. The results were just what the USSR had expected. Just one week after the signing of the pact, i.e., on 1 September, the Nazis invaded Poland. Two days later, their ultimatum having expired, Britain and France declared war on Germany. While the imperialists, all of whom had planned to throttle the Soviet Union, fought each other, the latter secured nearly two valuable years to prepare herself for the eventual war, which came at 0400 hours on 22 June 1941, with the German invasion in the form of Operation Barbarossa, launched by Hitler with 162 divisions, 3,400 tanks and 7,000 guns. The Soviet Unions heroic defence, the titanic battles she fought, her legendary victories, have passed into folklore and require no further comment here. One final point: circles hostile to the Soviet Union have always equated the Soviet march into Poland east of the Curzon line with the Nazi invasion and occupation of the rest of Poland. The two are qualitatively different. First, the Soviet forces moved only into territory which was theirs before it had been snatched by Poland after the October Revolution. Second, and much more importantly, the Soviet Union waited for 16 days after the Nazi invasion of Poland. When, on 5 September [1939], Ribbentrop began to press the Russians to march into their share of Poland, Stalin was not yet ready to issue the marching orders ... He would not ... lend a hand in defeating Poland, and he refused to budge before Polands collapse was complete beyond doubt (Deutscher, op cit p.432). When it became absolutely clear that the Polish state had collapsed, then the Soviet forces entered Poland (on 17 September) in order to safeguard her defences and the people of territories invaded by Soviet forces alike. The truth is that the Soviet army were greeted by the local population as liberators and heroes. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939, Molotov said: Our troops entered the territory of Poland only after the Polish State had collapsed and actually ceased to exist. Naturally we could not remain neutral towards these facts, since as a result of these events we were confronted with urgent problems concerning the security of our state. Furthermore, the Soviet government could not but reckon with the exceptional situation created for our brothers in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, who had been abandoned to their fate as a result of the collapse of Poland (Molotov, op cit pp.31-32). And further: When the Red Army marched into these regions it was greeted with general sympathy by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population who welcomed our troops as liberators from the yoke of the gentry, from the yoke of the Polish landlords and capitalists (ibid p.33). The Soviet march into these areas had the effect of rescuing 13 million people, including one million Jews, from the horrors of Nazi occupation and extermination. It can only be surmised that those opposed to the Soviet entry into the territories east of the Curzon line would rather have seen these areas overrun by the Nazis! A very queer internationalism indeed! Such people are actually to the right of even some Conservatives. Let the following words, spoken in the House of Commons on 20 September 1939 by Conservative MP Robert Boothby, put such socialists and internationalists to eternal shame: I think it is legitimate to suppose that this action on the part of the Soviet government was taken ... from the point of view of self-preservation and self-defence ... The action taken by the Russian troops ... has pushed the German frontier considerably westward ... I am thankful that Russian troops are now along the Polish-Romanian frontier. I would rather have Russian troops there than German troops (Quoted by Bill Bland in his The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, an excellent paper presented to the Stalin Society in 1992). It is to be hoped that the above re-statement of facts concerning the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact would be assistance to those who are genuinely desirous of knowing the truth concerning this very important treaty and its place inn the complicated world situation at the time.
Posted on: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 16:54:56 +0000
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