THE HOUSE OF JONA. ACCORD OF PROPHETS. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••| The Middle East ACCORD. .......................................° The Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on 17 September 1978, following thirteen days of secret negotiations at Camp David. [1] The two framework agreements were signed at the White House, and were witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter. The second of these frameworks (A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel) led directly to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Due to the agreement, Sadat and Begin received the shared 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. The first framework (A Framework for Peace in the Middle East), which dealt with the Palestinian territories, was written without participation of the Palestinians and had little impact and was condemned by the United Nations. Carter Initiative The Camp David Accords were the result of 14 months of diplomatic efforts by Egypt, Israel, and the United States that began after Jimmy Carter became President. [2] Efforts initially focused on a comprehensive resolution of disputes between Israel and the Arab countries, gradually evolved into a search for a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt. [3] Upon assuming office on 20 January 1977, President Carter moved to rejuvenate the Middle East peace process that had stalled throughout the 1976 presidential campaign in the United States. Following the advice of a Brookings Institution report, Carter opted to replace the incremental, bilateral peace talks which had characterized Henry Kissingers shuttle diplomacy following the 1973 Yom Kippur War with a comprehensive, multilateral approach. The Yom Kippur War further complicated efforts to achieve the objectives written in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Israels Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and his successor, Menachem Begin, were both skeptical of an international conference. [2] While Begin, who took office in May 1977, officially favored the reconvening of the conference, perhaps even more vocally than Rabin, and even accepted the Palestinian presence, in actuality the Israelis and the Egyptians were secretly formulating a framework for bilateral talks. Even earlier, Begin had not been opposed to returning the Sinai, but a major future obstacle was his firm refusal to consider relinquishing control over the West Bank. [4] Participating parties Carter visited the heads of state on whom he would have to rely to make any peace agreement feasible. By the end of his first year in office, he had already met with Anwar El Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, Hafez al-Assad of Syria, and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. Despite the fact that he supported Sadats peace initiative, King Hussein refused to take part in the peace talks; Begin offered Jordan little to gain and Hussein also feared he would isolate Jordan from the Arab world and provoke Syria and the PLO if he engaged in the peace talks as well. [5] Hafez al-Assad, who had no particular interest in negotiating peace with Israel, [6] also refused to come to the United States and only agreed to meet with Carter in Geneva. Begin Initiative The key to an arrangement between Begin and Sadat took place on Sunday, 6 August 1978, as a result of a telephone call made that morning to the Israeli Prime Ministers office by a United States citizen who had an idea for peace. The Prime Minister had not yet arrived at his office and the caller spoke to Mr. Yechiel Kadishai, a Begin staff head. Kadishai said that no one was speaking with anyone and we expect a war in October. He also told the caller that if any high level talks were to occur the caller could be assured that they would be using his approach. Begin arrived, was informed of the plan, and contacted Sadat who agreed to the plan on that day. On the next day, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance traveled to the Middle East to obtain firsthand confirmation of the agreement between Israel and Egypt. The following day, Tuesday, 8 August, the Camp David meeting was scheduled to take place in exactly 4 weeks time; on 5 September 1978. The plan was that Israel agreed on 6 August to return the land to Egypt. Sadat’s then waning popularity would be greatly enhanced as a result of such an achievement. Israels security was insured by the specific activities to take place during the “transition period.” Those activities also were included in the idea for peace communicated to Begins office on 6 August. Sadat Initiative Menachem Begin, Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat at Camp David, 1978 President Anwar El Sadat came to feel that the Geneva track peace process was more show than substance, and was not progressing, partly due to disagreements with his Arab (mainly Syria, Libya, and Iraq) and his communist allies. He also lacked confidence in the Western powers to pressure Israel after a meeting with the Western leaders. His frustration boiled over, and after clandestine preparatory meetings between Egyptian and Israeli officials, unknown even to the NATO countries, in November 1977, Sadat became the first Arab leader to visit Israel. On 9 November 1977, President Sadat startled the world by announcing to parliament his intention to go to Jerusalem and speak before the Knesset. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government cordially invited him to address the Knesset in a message passed to Sadat via the US ambassador to Egypt. Ten days after his speech, Sadat arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit, which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab state. As would be the case with later Israeli-Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise; the White House and State Department were particularly concerned that Sadat was merely reaching out to reacquire Sinai as quickly as possible, putting aside the Palestinian problem. Considered as a man with strong political convictions who kept his eye on the main objective, Sadat had no ideological base, which made him politically inconsistent. [7] The Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, even Jerusalem, to discuss peace. [8] That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would invite him. In Sadats Knesset speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of Israels occupied territories, and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the West and the East, which were to revive the Geneva Conference. The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begins response to Sadats initiative, though not what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his countrys best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders – summit diplomacy –would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carters people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadats representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadats initiative. Indeed, in a sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadats speech at the Knesset were the request for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Sadats visit was the first step to negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977. Begin and Brzezinski playing chess at Camp David A meeting at Camp David with (l-r) Aharon Barak, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, and Ezer Weizmann, 1978 A mechanism had yet to be created for Israel and Egypt to pursue the talks begun by Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem. [9] The Egyptian president suggested to Begin that Israel place a secret representative in the American embassy in Cairo. With American cover, the true identity of the Israeli, who would liaise between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders, would be known only to the American ambassador in Cairo. [9] Sadats liaison initiative spoke volumes about his reasons for wanting to make peace with Israel. He wanted an alliance with the American superpower and he wanted to kill Carters Geneva initiative. [10] His trip to Jerusalem signaled a major reorientation of Cairos place in the global scheme of things, from the Soviet to the American camp. [11] Carters acceptance of the proposed liaison scheme would have signaled American backing for Sadats unprecedented peace initiative. But Carter said no. However, Carter could not thwart the Israeli-Egyptian peace push. Within days Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo, breaking a symbolic barrier, and from there the peace process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli-Egyptian working summit was scheduled for 25 December in Ismailiya, near the Suez Canal. [12] Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their respective interests in mind, both leaders converged on Camp David for 13 days of tense and dramatic negotiations from 5 to 17 September 1978. By all accounts, Carters relentless drive to achieve peace and his reluctance to allow the two men to leave without reaching an agreement are what played the decisive role in the success of the talks. Carters advisers insisted on the establishment of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement which would eventually lead to an eventual solution to the Palestine issue. They believed in a short, loose, and overt linkage between the two countries amplified by the establishment of a coherent basis for a settlement. However, Carter felt they were not aiming high enough and was interested in the establishment of a written and signed agreement. Numerous times both the Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to scrap negotiations, only to be lured back into the process by personal appeals from Carter. Considered as an excellent mediator who arbitrated concessions with confidence, he played a tireless commitment to find formulas, definitions, and solutions to the many intricate variables, regardless of perceived or real political limitations, and was capable of soothing fears and anxieties, always with the goal of keeping the negotiations going. He gradually understood the importance historical events had upon determining personal ideology, but he would not allow it to constrain his political options, and he did not want them to limit the options of those with whom he was negotiating. Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one another that they only seldom had direct contact; thus Carter had to conduct his own microcosmic form of shuttle diplomacy by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin, then returning to the cabin of the third party to relay the substance of his discussions. Begin and Sadat were literally not on speaking terms, and claustrophobia was setting in. President Carter, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Camp David A particularly difficult situation arose on the tenth stalemated day of the talks. The issues of Israeli settlement withdrawal from the Sinai and the status of the West Bank created what seemed to be an impasse. In response, Carter had the choice of trying to salvage the agreement by conceding the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while advocating Sadats less controversial position on the removal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the talks, reported the reasons for their failure, and allowed Begin to bear the brunt of the blame. Carter chose to continue and for three more days negotiated. During this time, Carter even took the two leaders to the nearby Gettysburg National Military Park in the hopes of using the American Civil War as a simile to their own struggle. [citation needed] Consequently, the 13 days marking the Camp David Accords were considered a success. Partly due to Carters determination in obtaining an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, a full two-week pledge to a singular international problem. Additionally, Carter was beneficiary to a fully pledged American foreign team. Likewise, the Israeli delegation had a stable of excellent talent in Ministers Dayan and Weizman and legal experts Meir Rosenne and Aharon Barak. Furthermore, the absence of the media contributed to the Accords successes: there were no possibilities provided to either leader to reassure his political body or be driven to conclusions by members of his opposition. An eventual scrap of negotiations by either leader would have proven disastrous, resulting in taking the blame for the summits failure as well as a disassociation from the White House. Ultimately, neither Begin nor Sadat was willing to risk those eventualities. Both of them had invested enormous amounts of political capital and time to reach an agreement. [13] Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President Jimmy Carter announced the results of the Camp David Accords, 18 September 1978. Remarks on the Signing of the Camp David Accords Jimmy Carter, seated with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, makes statements at a Joint session of the United States Congress following the Camp David Accords. Problems playing this file? See media help. There were two 1978 Camp David agreements: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the second leading towards the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed in March 1979. The agreements and the peace treaty were both accompanied by side-letters of understanding between Egypt and the U.S. and Israel and the U.S. [14] Framework Middle East The first part of the framework [15] was to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to fully implement SC 242. The Accords recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, a process was to be implemented guaranteeing the full autonomy of the people within a period of five years. Begin insisted on the adjective full to confirm that it was the maximum political right attainable. This full autonomy was to be discussed with the participation of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza was agreed to occur after an election of a self-governing authority to replace Israels military government. [1] The Accords did not mention the Golan Heights, Syria, or Lebanon. This was not the comprehensive peace that Kissinger, Ford, Carter, or Sadat had in mind during the previous American presidential transition. [16] It was less clear than the agreements concerning the Sinai, and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The fate of Jerusalem was deliberately excluded from this agreement. [17] The second part dealt with Egyptian-Israeli relations, the real content being in the second agreement. The third part, Associated Principles, declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors. Framework Egypt and Israel The second agreement [18] outlined a basis for the peace treaty six months later, in particular deciding the future of the Sinai peninsula. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, evacuate its 4,500 civilian inhabitants, and restore it to Egypt in return for normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, guarantees of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (such as the Straits of Tiran), and a restriction on the forces Egypt could place on the Sinai peninsula, especially within 20–40 km from Israel. This process would take three years to complete. Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3 km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also returned Egypts Abu-Rudeis oil fields in western Sinai, which contained long term, commercially productive wells. The agreement also resulted in the United States committing to several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to the governments of both Israel and Egypt, subsidies which continue to this day, and are given as a mixture of grants and aid packages committed to purchasing U.S. materiel. From 1979 (the year of the peace agreement) to 1997, Egypt received military aid of US$1.3 billion annually, which also helped modernize the Egyptian military. [19] (This is beyond economic, humanitarian, and other aid, which has totaled more than US$25 billion.) Eastern-supplied until 1979, Egypt now received American weaponry such as the M1A1 Abrams Tank, AH-64 Apache gunship and the F-16 fighter jet. In comparison, Israel has received $3 billion annually since 1985 in grants and military aid packages. [20] UN Rejection of the Middle East Framework The UN General Assembly rejected the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, because the agreement was concluded without participation of UN and PLO and did not comply with the Palestinian right of return, of self-determination and to national independence and sovereignty. December 1978, she declared in Resolution 33/28 A, that agreements were only valid if they are within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions, include the Palestinian right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and concluded with the participation of the PLO. Also the passive attitude of the Security Council was criticised. [21] On 6 December 1979, the UN condemned in Resolution 34/70 all partial agreements and separate treaties that did not meet the Palestinian rights and comprehensive solutions to peace; she condemned Israels continued occupation and demanded withdrawal from all occupied territories. [22] On 12 December, in Resolution 34/65 B, she rejected more specific parts of the Camp David Accords and similar agreements, which were not in accordance with mentioned requirements. All such partial agreements and separate treaties were strongly condemned. The part of the Camp David accords regarding the Palestinian future and all similar ones were declared invalid. EFFECTIVE NOW!
Posted on: Thu, 14 Nov 2013 03:16:42 +0000
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