THE STORY IS YET TO BE COMPLETED BUT JUST READ & THE HOW THE TRAITOR FAMILIES OF NEHRU ARE PLAYING WITH OUR SECURITY SENTIMENTS OF WE HINDUSTANIS. DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF ALL RANKS OF SEVENTH INFANTRY BRIGADE WHO LAID DOWN THEIR LIVES FOR MATRUBHOOMI HINDUSTAN IN THE BATTLE OF NAMKA CHU IN OCTOBER 1962. This book was born in a Prisoner of war camp in Tibet on a cold bleak night. On the night of 21st November 1962, I was woken up by the Chinese Major in charge of my solitary confinement with shouts of good news-good news”. He told me that Sino-Indian war was over and that the Chinese Government had decided to withdraw from all the areas that they had overrun, in their lighting campaign. When I asked the reason for this decision, he gave me this Peking inspired answer: “India and china have been friends for thousands of years and have never fought before. China does not want war. It is the reactionary Indian government that was bent on war. So the Chinese counter attacked in self-defence and liberated all our territories in NEFA & LADAKH, in just one month. Now we have decided to go back as we do not want to settle the border problem by force & we do not have anything against the people of Hindustan as we both have been friends for thousands of years. We have proved that you are no match for us Chinese”. He concluded with this supercilious and patronising remark. “We hope that the Indian government will now see sense and come to the conference table at once so that 1.200 million Chinese & Indians can get on with their national & nation development plans and halt the western Imperialism”. This kindergarten homily was, and remains, the most humiliating moment of my seven month captivity and indeed my life. That night I experienced a wave of bitter shame for my country. In my grief I took a solemn vow that one day I would tell the truth about how, we let ourselves reach such a sorry pass. With time heavy on my hands, as I had no radio, newspapers or books, I brooded over Hindustan’s humiliation and the fate of our Army & my command. I was a haunted man from the time I disused about writing the book, with some of the news reporters who were the pawns in the hands of those traitors congress & the Nehru families. I decided to run away from my country & settle over here in Nepal for the fear of safety of my family”. I was repatriated, along with all the other officers of field rank, on the morning of 4th May 1963. We reached Barrackpore, the military Airport at Calcutta (now known as Kolkatta) at mid-night but could not land there and were diverted to Dum-Dum Airport. We deplaned and were greeted with correct military protocol, tinged with chill reserve. It was only later that I found out that we had to clear ourselves of the charge of having been brainwashed- a strange charge from this same congress government which was brainwashed into championing china’s cause for more than a decade. Without a doubt the prisoners had been declared outcasts. Apparently we should have atoned for the past national sins of omission and commission with our lives. Our repartition was embarrassing as the National spotlight had again been focused on the Sino-Indian Conflict. From the tarmac we were herded straight to the customs enclosure where a sprightly team of appraisers had assembled to ‘examine’ our luggage. They had been told that some Indians had arrived from Hong Kong and were waiting to confiscate transistors and opium. I knew then there had been no material change in India and we were in the same old groove. After a cursory and stereotyped de-briefing at Ranchi, I was ordered to meet the chief of Army staff, Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri at New Delhi on 15th May. He asked me to write a report for the personal information of the Defence Minister and himself. The aim was, in General’s words “To teach ourselves how not to hand over a brigade on a plate to the Chinese in future”. He added that we had become the laughing stocks of even countries like ………. And ……….. (I hesitate to name those countries). I welcomed the opportunity afforded by the chief’s instruction for a personal report as this would give me a chance to collect my thoughts. The basic facts had been branded into my memory. To make doubly sure, I had many sessions with Lt-Col. Riki, Commanding Officer of 2 Rajputs and Lt-Col. B.S. Ahluwalia, Commanding Officer of the 1/9 Gorkhas, Major R.O. Kharbanda and Captain T.K. Gupta of my staff. We recounted, cross-checked and authenticated the facts which form the basis for this book. Rankling at our unfriendly reception and the many garbled versions I heard from friends, I wrote a forthright account which I handed over to the Chief personally. I do not know the fate of my report as I was never again asked to discuss or explain it. It may have touched some sensitive nerves. It was soon apparent that the Army had become the centre of much controversy and that the blame for the 1962 fiasco had been cunningly shifted to its alleged “shortcomings”. What was more alarming were the extravagant claims made by some senior Army Officers, who attained eminence only after the 1962 reshuffles, as to how brilliantly they would have handled the situation and defied the authority of Nehru, Menon and Kaul? This attitude made me despair of whether my country people & my colleagues would ever learn any lessons from India’s first attempt at conducting a modern war and strengthened my resolution to tell my story. 1962 was a National Failure of which every Hindustani is guilty. It was a failure in the Higher Direction of war, a failure of the Opposition, a failure of the General staffs (myself included); it was a failure of Responsible public Opinion and the Press. For the Government of India (including the entire Nehru family & congress), it was a “HIMALAYAN BLUNDER AT ALL LEVELS”. The people of India want to know the truth but have been denied it on the dubious grounds of National security. The result has been an unhealthy amalgam of innuendo, mythology, conjecture, outright calumny and sustained efforts to confuse and conceal the truth. Even the truncated “NEFA” Enquiry had been withheld except for a few paraphrased extracts read out to the Lok Sabha on 2nd September 1963. For some un-disclosed reason, I was not asked to give evidence before this body nor (to the best of my knowledge) my repatriated Commanding Officers. It is thus vitally necessary to trace, without rancour and without malice, the overall causes which resulted in the reverses and which so seriously affected India’s honour. Some of the things that happened in 1962 must never be allowed to happen again. There is a school of thought which advocates a moratorium on the NEFA Affair on the grounds that such “PATRIOTIC RETICENCE” is desirable in the context of the continuing Chinese (and Pakistan) military threats. I do not think that this theory is tenable. The main protagonists of this line played a part in the tragic drama, or belonged to the political party which provided the national leadership and their plea for silence does not spring entire from a sense of patriotism. There are others, mostly barren politicians, who use the Nehru’s legend to buttress their failures or in-venerate hero-worshippers, who express irritation at any adverse reference to Nehru’s long spell as the Prime Minister of India. As was said of Lord Chatham, the British Prime Minister, “his countrymen were so conscious of what they owed him that they did not want to hear about his faults”. But it is impossible to narrate a failure, which historically marked the end of the Nehru saga, without critical, often harsh comments on the principle dramatis personae who held high office and who were revered by the people. The magnitude of our defeat could not have been wrought without Himalayan Blunders at all levels. But this is not a “J Accuse”. India has a near unbroken record of military failures through the ages. Our peasantry has always fought gallantly, but it is an indisputable fact that seldom has this bravery been utilised to win battle-field victories and thus to attain our political objectives, due to inept political or military leadership, or both. Need we follow this tragic path interminably? It had fallen to my lot to be associated with the china problem for over 8 years from 1954 to 1962. I was first connected with the Higher Direction of war, in a modest capacity, as a Lt-Colonel in military Operations Directorate. Later as Brigadier-in-Charge of Administration of the troops on Ladakh, i saw, at first hand, what passed for “logistic support”. Finally as Commander of the key sector of Towang, north-east frontier agency, i was involved in our so-called operational planning to defend our borders. The years of higher planning to defend our borders. The years of higher responsibility were complementary and gave me a personal insight into our National Policy as well as our half-hearted military response to the Chinese challenge. I have tried to tell the story as i saw it unfold, over the years, to add to our knowledge. I have included the politico-military background only because this had a direct bearing on our performance in the military field, in 1962. This is a personal narrative- a narrative of what Infantry Brigade was ordered to do and what happened when they attempted to carry out those orders. In all humility i can claim that only i am in a position to explain many nagging questions that need explaining, facts that are necessary. The theme of this writings is the steadfastness of the Indian soldier in the midst of political wavering and a military leadership which was influenced more by political than military considerations. The book records their valour, resolution and loyalty-qualities which are generally forgotten in the mass of political post-mortems which have been served up to the Indian people. This is a record of the destruction of a Brigade without a formal declaration of war-another central fact that is often overlooked- and which coloured the actions of all the principal participants. I have made every effort not to view things in a retrospective light or with the clarity of hindsight. I have recorded experiences, ideas and feelings as they appeared at the time. I have tried to give an objective account of all that happened, of the people involved and of the decisions they took. My opinions as a participant in the climatic finale of September-October 1962must be subjective. The main essential is to know how the principal participants thought and reacted. As Lord Avon (Sir Anthony Eden) says in the preface to his Memoirs, the Full Circle “This book will expose many wounds, by doing so it may help to heal them”. By this book i express my undying gratitude to my Commanding Officers for their trust and loyalty; to the men of all classes and from all units under my command for their selfless devotion to duty; and to my staff whose dedication sustained me in those harrowing days. This book is the fulfilment of my promise to my people of Hindustan, in all walks of life, to vindicate the reputation of those men i had the honour to command. I hope that i shall have discharged my responsibility to all those who gave their lives in the line of duty and whose sacrifice deserves a permanent, printed memorial. “THE ANNEXATION OF TIBET & INDIA’S CHINA POLICY.” IT IS axiomatic that all international disputes which end in war have a historical background and the Sino-Indian-Tibetan problem was no exception. It was the function of the government and of the appropriate desk in the ministry of External Affairs to constantly review the points of dispute with neighbouring countries, seeking to resolve them amicably if suitable opportunities present themselves, or can be created. Failing this the nation must be alerted for the possibility of war. In-action or wishful thinking is inexcusable. The Sino-Indian border dispute, which resulted in clash of 1962, & its genesis in 1950, when China and India faced each other across a common frontier, for the first time in centuries. On 7th October 1950 the Chinese Liberation Army entered Tibet, although China was preparing to take an active part in Korean War. The Chinese move apparently took India by surprise. Tibet appealed for help but we refused, and advised the Tibetans to negotiate a peaceful settlement. India was in a quandary. The entry of Chinese troops into Tibet had potentially ominous long-term consequences. Tibet had been a buffer zone, and had been vital to British India’s strategic defence. The abrupt removal of this buffer would alter the geo-political balance, and henceforth India would have a live northern border to reckon with. There was a definite possibility that Tibet could be used as a spring-board for aggression against India whenever this suited the Communist regime of china. Professor N.G. Ranga asked, in 1950, “Whether the Prime Minister could be indifferent to the gathering clouds of threats to our safety”. Late Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee had a premonition that India would one day have to fight china in Tibet. Many others expressed similar views and misgivings. Late sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, popularly called India’s iron man, wanted a showdown and a tough line with China, but he did not live long enough to convert his remarkable vision into positive action. The only plausible excuse for direct intervention would have been to defend the rights which we had inherited from the British. Many years later, in 1954, Nehru revealed his mind when he said, “what right does India have to keep a part of its Army in Tibet, whether Tibet is independent or part of China?” Sardar K.M.Panikkar, India’s first Ambassador to China, is reported to have advised Nehru not to oppose the annexation of Tibet. There was considerable confused thinking and hair-splitting about China’s ‘suzerainty’ and ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet. It appeared that we were trying to find some face-saving device for the policy that we had decided to adopt, viz. To allow the Chinese to make Tibet a province of china. We exchanged a few diplomatic notes with china, and expressed our ‘concern, surprise and regret’ at the Chinese move, and ended with the pious hope that china would respect Tibet’s autonomy and settle this problem peacefully. The Chinese promised to be good boys and we let the matter rest at that. At the time, except for a few far-sighted men, the rest of India failed to connect the happenings with their own future and destiny. In fact the average Indian, basking in his new won freedom, could not pin-point Tibet on the map. The officials of the Ministry of External Affairs were preoccupied with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the rest of the World; dealing with the diplomatic problem of steering our Kashmir case in the United Nations; and preparing briefs for Nehru’s increasing popularity of his participation in world affairs. Nehru was then gradually consolidating his position as the elder statement of the India’s sole leader, and was trying to be looked upon as the leading Afro-Asian spokesman against the communists & colonialism. He was busy with the rights of the Muslims in India. The rest of the leaders were busy with the working of constitution which was been adopted on 26th January 1950. “THE CHOLA INCIDENT” While in Sikkim in September 1965, the 7/11 GR (Gorkha Rifles) was put on alert as a result of a Chinese ultimatum to withdraw from certain positions which they claimed to their own. Along with a battalion from the Grenadiers and the 10 J&K (Jammu Kashmir) Riles a defensive position was established 4720 Meters above sea level. For two years nothing happened and then suddenly on 11th September 1967, the Grenadier’s position around Nathu La came under fire. To forestall any infiltration towards Gangtok, the 7/11 Gorkha Rifles occupied battle locations around Manla the next day. The situation firing subsided and the battalion was shortly moved to Karponang, being replaced by the 10 J & K Rifles. In order to enable the J&K Riles to observe their raising day on October 1st, two Companies of the 7/11 GR was ordered to relieve 2 companies from 10 J&K Riles. Accordingly C(2/Lt. M.S Samuel and D (Lt. R.S. Rathore) Companies along with their signals. Mortar, RCL & MMG detachments moved to provide temporary relief on September 28th. C Coy (less two platoons) and the signal detachment was to be based at Twin Huts, south-west of Chola. Two other platoons, along with the MMG detachment were to relieve the 10 J&K Rifles at Point 15181 and the RCL was to be at Chola. D Coy (less 2 platoons) were to be located at Point 15450 (to the west of Chola). One platoon was to be located at Rai Gap (east of Point 15450) and the fourth platoon was in the rear at Tamze along with Mortar section. A day earlier, there had been a minor scuffle between the Sikh sentries of the 10 J&K Rifles & their Chinese counterparts on a flat patch of icy land of about 5 meters on the unmarked boundary. It had a boulder about 30 cm in height in the centre of the narrow crest which marked the dividing line, according to the water seed principle. Three Indians and an equal number of Chinese sentries were positioned on either side of the boulder, 2 meters from each other. During the fisticuffs, a Chinese sentry was roughed up and he lost a tunic button. The Chinese were thus smarting under a temporary reverse. This fact came to Major K.B.Joshi (Battalion CO 7/11 GR) much later. Having reached Twin huts by September 30th, the two companies’ occupied forward positions by October 1st. Major Joshi informed Lt. Rathore that he was on his way to point 15450 and would be there by 0930 hrs on October 1st. THE UNEASY LULL- 1950 TO 1955. The Chinese began to consolidate their hold on Tibet with customary thoroughness. On 9th September 1951 they entered Lhasa “Peacefully”. In political matters they were patient, and did not force the pace of change. They used the existing political system and the immense authority of the Dalai Lama to implement the famous seventeen point Agreement. In the early years, their primary aim appeared to be to build strategic roads and airfields and set up their communications to Sinkiang Province via Rudok, in Tibet.
Posted on: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 11:34:26 +0000
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