Technology:Daawo mar waa faduurad marna waa diyaarad! - TopicsExpress

Technology:Daawo mar waa faduurad marna waa diyaarad! Archives June 2013 May 2013 April 2013 March 2013 February 2013 January 2013 December 2012 November 2012 October 2012 September 2012 August 2012 July 2012 digg icon delicious icon Somalia: War Dances in the Jubbaland Deadlock By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein June 21, 2013 // admin1 // News From late May through the middle of June, the deadlock over the political fate of the deep-southern regions of the territories of post-independence Somalia persisted. The structuring conflict between centralized federalism, championed by the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) and its allies in the southern regions; and decentralized federalism, pressed by the Jubbaland administration, based in Kismayo, and its allies led by Puntland surfaced on the ground with a confrontation between an S.F.G. “reconciliation” delegation that had been dispatched to Kismayo, and the Jubbaland administration; and the first outbreak of violent clashes over the issue. Kenya, which occupies the Lower Jubba region under the imprimatur of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), was drawn into the conflict as a result of its contradictory position of backing Jubbaland for its own strategic reasons and having to act under AMISOM’s mandate of protecting the S.F.G. A flurry of diplomatic activity transpired in Nairobi, as various combinations of the domestic actors met with each other and with the Kenyan government, all supposedly aimed at resolving the conflict, but to no effect. The Western “donor”-powers working through the United Nations abstained from taking sides in the conflict, with the U.N. Security Council issuing a non-binding “presidential statement” in early June that skirted the core political dispute and, in mid-June, a press release expressing concern that the situation in the deep south had “deteriorated,” but taking no measures to break the deadlock. Power Default The cause of the deadlock in the deep south can be traced to the power distributionamong the actors involved in the Jubbaland conflict. The “donor”-powers/U.N. hold the high economic, military, and diplomatic cards, and the regional and domestic actors know that keenly, but they are unable or unwilling to play them. Left without direction and commitment from the “donor”-powers/U.N., the regional actors (Kenya and Ethiopia) and the domestic actors equivocate or harden their positions, attempting to sway the “donor”-powers/U.N. to their respective sides as they wait for decisive action from the former, which is unlikely to come. Were the “donor”-powers/U.N. to let the regional powers and domestic actors try to resolve the conflict themselves, or were the “donor”-powers/U.N. to take responsibility for resolving the conflict, the deadlock might be broken. As it stands, they are doing neither, making a break in the deadlock impossible: the “donor”-powers/U.N. have defaulted on their power, but they will not allow any of the other actors to fill their place. The rhetoric of “African solutions for African problems” and a “Somali-owned process” rings hollow here; it is at least naïve, more likely disingenuous, or perhaps outright cynical. A closed source in East Africa with access to Western thinking reports that “donor”-power support for the S.F.G. only runs as far as maintaining “the illusion of a sovereign government” with which they can sign agreements and their corporations can sign contracts. Any expectation of more robust Western support for the S.F.G. is, according to the source, a “misreading” of Western intentions. Under the condition of defaulted power, the deadlock over Jubbaland has, indeed, “deteriorated,” as the story from late May to mid-June demonstrates. Deteriorated Deadlock The phase of exacerbated deadlock began on May 24 when the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), the Horn of Africa regional organization, issued a communique on the Jubbaland conflict urging “that the Federal Government of Somalia should timely convene and lead a reconciliation conference with the support of IGAD while consulting key stakeholders in the Juba Regions with a view to chart out a roadmap on the establishment of interim administration and formation of a permanent regional administration in accordance with the Provisional Constitution with IGAD playing a supporting role.” I.G.A.D., which is dominated by Kenya and Ethiopia, and has been tasked by the “donor”-powers/U.N. with mediating the Jubbaland conflict, had, in its communique, offered a recommendation/directive that, through its ambiguity, satisfied neither the S.F.G. nor the Jubbaland administration, and impelled both of them to respond to the document according to their respective perceived interests. S.F.G. president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, expressed “whole hearted” support for the communique, but the quickly added a number of complaints and reservations. Hassan complained that AMISOM forces (Kenyan) had hindered the S.F.G. reconciliation delegations from efforts at outreach in Kismayo; said that the process that had established Jubbaland violated the “spirit of the constitution,” was undertaken without “government leadership,” and lacked “inclusivity;” and criticized the International Community for adopting a “culture to be neutral to all groups” when it should be backing the S.F.G. Hassan said that the S.F.G. was “ready and committed to hold a genuine reconciliation conference to key stakeholders.” He was unclear about whether a “genuine” reconciliation conference would include the Jubbaland administration, which his remarks had discredited. Jubbaland president, Ahmed Madobe, immediately replied that the S.F.G. had organized “clan violence” in the southern regions and had sent delegations to Kismayo without informing his administration. He threatened that the “people” in the south would recall their members of the federal parliament and consult on Jubbaland’s future relationship with the S.F.G., adding that the S.F.G. was funding people who had declared themselves “president” of the southern regions after Madobe had been installed by the Jubbaland process. Nevertheless, Madobe pledged allegiance to the S.F.G.; he simply wanted Jubbaland to be “treated like other [regional] states” (the only one that comes to mind is Puntland). In a May 26 statement, the Jubbaland administration backed the “IGAD dialogue,” but only if it was held at a “neutral venue,” which would exclude Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, where the S.F.G. is based. Jubbaland spokesman, Abdinasir Serar, warned the S.F.G. against deploying its forces in Kismayo and said that the S.F.G. had “exaggerated” the I.G.A.D. communique, which had only given the federal government a facilitating and not a directing role in reconciliation. It is clear from the initial responses of the adversaries to the I.G.A.D. communique that the document had not provided guidance for mediating the conflict, but instead had presented a focus around which the contending positions could be crystallized and hardened. One can understand the ambiguity in the communique in terms of I.G.A.D.’s compromised position as a proxy for the “donor”-powers/U.N. and a vehicle for Kenyan and Ethiopian interests, most importantly keeping Somalia divided into their presumptive spheres of influence; as a result of that equivocal position, I.G.A.D. could not place itself on either the S.F.G.’s or Jubbaland’s side, so it defaulted. After May 24, neither open nor closed sources have reported any action by I.G.A.D. on the conflict in the deep south, nor has there been any but halting movement towards a reconciliation conference. In the absence of external direction, the adversaries have been left to do war dances in the deadlock. The first move in the post-communique conflict was made by the supporters of the S.F.G. acting on Hassan’s complaints against the Kenyan-AMISOM forces. On May 25, member of the federal parliament (S.F.P.), Abdirahman Hosh Jibril, accused the Kenyan Defense Forces (K.D.F.) in AMISOM of violating their mandate by failing to provide security for the S.F.G.-S.F.P. outreach delegation in Kismayo. On the same day, the new S.F.G. force commander in the Jubba regions, Col. Salah Makoma Mohamed, said that there were no S.F.G. forces in Kismayo, only clan militias, and that he had met with Madobe, who told him that all security forces in Kismayo were under the Jubbaland administration’s command. On May 26, Abdullahi Jama, chair of the S.F.P.’s committee on economic reforms, said that the S.F.G. needed to take steps against Kenyan “interference” in the south. On the same day, part of the S.F.G.’s “reconciliation mission” in Kismayo left that city for Mogadishu. Shabelle Media reported that Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, said that his government would support the S.F.G.’s efforts to form regional administrations. On May 27, Hassan, speaking at an African Union summit, said that he had “no complaint” against Kenya, but that the K.D.F. in AMISOM had “misbehaved and operated outside their mandate.” Hassan added that he was “satisfied with I.G.A.D.,” but stressed that there was a “wrongly led” group in Kismayo that thought it could “establish its own state.” K.D.F. spokesman, Cyrus Oguna, refused to comment on Kenyan-AMISOM treatment of the S.F.G.’s reconciliation delegation, but insisted that AMISOM was “impartial and neutral” towards the political conflict in the south (earlier Oguna had applauded the successful conclusion of the Jubbaland process). The rhetoric of the S.F.G. and its parliamentary supporters heated up on May 28 when M.P. Suleiman Mohamed Ibrahim accused Madobe’s Ras Kamboni (R.K.) militia, which serves as Jubbaland’s security force, of facilitating Kenyan interests in the south; and criticized Kenya for having a “hidden agenda;” he said that the S.F.G. should dismiss the K.D.F. in the south and rely on the new contingent in AMISOM from Sierra Leone. The S.F.G. took its position more assertively when its prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, said that his government would not accept “unbalanced administrations,” and called on the people in the south to reject administrations that were formed outside the S.F.G.’s authority.The S.F.G.’s foreign minister, Fowzia Yusuf Haji clarified the government’s position, announcing that the S.F.G. would set up “all-inclusive and balanced administrations” in the south that would “represent majority and minority communities.” An S.F.G. delegation led by its defense minister, Abdihakin Mohamed Fiqi, arrived in Kismayo and was not allowed to leave the airport. The S.F.G.’s push went from rhetoric to action on May 30, when M.P. Mohamed Hassan Abullahi told Kenya’s Standard newspaper that he was among a group of parliamentarians preparing a motion against the K.D.F. The Starndard reported sources saying that Hassan’s close ally, Farah Abdikadir, minister of state in the presidency, was spearheading the parliamentary move against the K.D.F. Having been stranded at Kismayo’s airport for three days by Jubbaland authorities, Fiqi and his delegation were permitted by R.K. to enter the city on May 31 under R.K. supervision, but were not allowed to meet local clan elders. Somali commentator Daahir Sheikh, writing in the Raxanreeb website, reported that Madobe had released the S.F.G. delegation after being told to do so by Kenyatta, who was responding to a request from Hassan. On June 4, the parliamentary push against Kenya lost momentum when M.P. Jama Abdullahi, who had written the motion against K.D.F. interference, announced that plans to file it had been suspended, because there had been “calls for caution.” Pro-Jubbaland M.P.s mounted a counter-ofensive, with Abdirashid Hidig telling the Standard that his group would “shoot down” any ani-Kenyan motion; indeed, Hidig observed that a motion should be drawn up against the S.F.G. and Prime Minister Shirdon, and warned that his group “would even look for ways to impeach Hassan.” A new player entered the conflict on June 4 when Puntland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, arrived in Nairobi. Daahir Sheikh reported that Farole had met with Kenyatta, who had assured him that Kenya was committed to a federal state-form for Somalia. On June 6, Farole said that he would meet with Hassan and would urge him to hold reconciliation talks with Madobe. Anti-Jubbaland southern politician Barre Hirale, who had declared himself president of the southern regions after Madobe’s election, warned Farole to stop his “blind interference” in the region’s politics. On June 7, Garoweonline reported that Hassan and Farole had met and had “reached consesnsus on most issues.” Shabelle Media reported that the two presidents had not agreed on how to resolve the Jubbaland conflict, with Farole insisting on Jubbaland’s legitimacy and Hassan insisting that administrations could not be formed independently of the S.F.G. As the war dances in the deadlock went on, with Kenya taking apparently incompatible positions and the S.F.G. and Jubbaland coalitions hardening theirs, the U.N.S.C., on June 6, issued a non-binding presidential statement on Somalia that only paid glancing attention to the Jubbaland conflict. The U.N.S.C. “took note” of the May 24 I.G.A.D. communique, stating that it “shares the concerns of IGAD on the situation in Kismayo, and in that context calls on all parties to refrain from any actions which may threaten the peace and stability of Somalia. Welcoming the S.F.G.’s “commitment … to lead reconciliation efforts in the Juba Regions, with the support of UNSOM [the new U.N. mission in Somalia], IGAD, and other appropriate actors,” the U.N.S.C. expressed “its intention to keep the situation under review.” U.S. representative Jeffrey Delaurentis was more pointed along the same line, stating that the situation in the south was “particularly worrisome,” and that the U.S. was looking to “Somalia’s neighbors to help resolve it.” The statements of the other U.N.S.C. members skirted the Jubbaland conflict. The U.N.S.C.’s unwillingness/inability to put any teeth behind its call for “peace and stability” set the stage for the Jubbaland conflict to take a violent turn. On June 8, thirteen combatants died when R.K. forces clashed with troops guarding self-declared president of the south, Iftin Hassan Basto, who was attempting to meet with Fiqi at a Kismayo hotel. Garoweonline reported that Basto’s guards were members of Fiqi’s retinue. Sporadic confrontations continued through June 9 when, as reported by the Sabahi news service, local elders succeeded in brokering a cease fire. On June 10, A.F.P. reported that R.K. was in control of Kismayo and the opposition had retreated outside the city. Each side blamed the other for the clash. Basto claimed that he had been “ambushed” by R.K. , whereas Madobe said that “people” in the S.F.G. were responsible for the violence. Serar said that the “attack” on Jubbaland forces was “funded from Mogadishu” and had involved the al-Shabaab Islamist insurgents. Pro-Jubbaland sources linked Basto to the S.F.G., noting that he had been an S.F.G. military officer. Basto denied that he was part of the S.F.G. During the dust-up, Farole met with Madobe in Kismayo, their first meeting after Madobe had been named president of Jubbaland. On June 9, Puntland’s vice president, Abdisamad Ali Shire, warned that if the S.F.G. did not adhere to Somalia’s provisional constitution, Puntland “would readjust its position on collaboration” with the S.F.G. On June 11, both sides appeared to temper their rhetoric. Shirdon said that the government would address the “turmoil” in Kismayo through “dialogue and reconciliation,” calling for direct negotiations between the contending sides. Madobe told Kenya’s Star newspaper that he was not seeking to secede from the S.F.G. and was ready to “work out a formula” for Jubbaland’s recognition. Niether side wanted to cross a red line that would put the “donor”-powers/U.N. in the other’s camp. Having failed to make any difference in the Jubbaland conflict by issuing its June 6 presidential statement, the U.N.S.C. released a “Press Statement on Somalia” on June 14, expressing “concern at the deterioration in the security situation in the Juba regions, particularly in Kismayo.” Reiterating the positions that it had taken in its presidential statement, the U.N.S.C. added the U.S. position, inviting “IGAD and neighboring countries to play a strong and positive role in helping to decrease the tension and identify a way forward.” Again, the “donor”-powers/U.N. had defaulted. As one would anticipate, the U.N.S.C.’s press statement did nothing to ameliorate the conflict on the ground. Shabelle Media reported a clash between R.K. and forces allied to the S.F.G. on June 15 in the town of Hosingow in the Lower Jubba region, in which 14 combatants died. Shabelle reported that, during the fire fight, rocket propelled grenades had been fired from a Kenyan-AMISOM base. On June 16, Shabelle reported that R.K. had attacked an S.F.G. official in Kismayo and had been repelled by “government” forces. Garoweonline and Shabelle Media reported on June 18 that close Madobe ally, deputy mayor of Kismayo, Yasin Nur, was injured when his car encountered a roadblock; and that a landmine explosion had destroyed a truck in a Kenyan-AMISOM convoy passing through the center of Kismayo. On June 18, Serar announced from Addis Ababa, where Madobe was meeting with Ethiopian officials to win support for the Jubbaland administration, that Jubbaland would not participate in any reconciliation meeting organized by the S.F.G., reversing the administration’s previous position. On June 19, S.F.G. interior minister and close Hassan ally, Abdikarin Hussein Guled, called on clan elders throughout the southern regions to organize the contending political factions in preparation for a reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, which has yet to be finalized. Were Guled’s proposal to be accepted, Jubbaland would be excluded from formal representation at the S.F.G.-organized reconciliation conference, explaining Jubbaland’s rejection of participation in an S.F.G. conference. Short-Term Forecast Based on the current power distribution of the actors involved in the conjuncture making up the Jubbaland conflict, and a reading of their perceived interests, the highest likelihood is that the deadlock will persist in the short term. The most potentially effective actor(s) in the conjuncture –the “donor”-powers/U.N. – have as their primary interest drawing back from political commitment to Somalia under the pretense of having set Somalia on a course to full statehood by engineering, in 2011 through 2012, a transition to a “permanent” government – the S.F.G. It is intelligible that, from the viewpoint of the Western “donor”-powers, they would like to disembarrass themselves as much as possible of Somalia. They are still suffering the effects of the 2009 financial crisis and have more important and pressing foreign-policy issues in the Middle East and Asia. Somalia has been pushed down their priority list even further than it had been previously. The “donor”-powers cannot, of course, leave Somalia alone; they have an interest in suppressing what they call “terrorism” (revolutionary Salafist jihadism) and in extracting whatever commercial benefits they might be able to derive from the country. They will provide inadequate development and military aid to Somalia, enough so that Somali elites feel that they have to curry the favor of the “donor”-powers. It is the in-and-out position of the “donor”-powers that freezes the other actors in place. They cannot do anything decisive, either on their own or together, for fear that the “donor”-powers will reject their initiatives. That is the consequence of the “donor”-powers’ default – fighting below their weight, but still in the ring. The “donor”-powers’ drawback strategy involves their laying off conflict resolution on regional states and the S.F.G. According to the U.N.S.C.’s presidential statement and press release of June, I.G.A.D. and regional states are to facilitate a reconciliation conference among the adversaries in the Jubbaland conflict, with the S.F.G. taking the lead role in organizing that reconciliation conference. The “donor”-powers shift of responsibility to I.G.A.D. and the regional states (Kenya and Ethiopia) has put the latter in an internally conflicted position. Their basic policy towards Somalia is to divide it into spheres of influence, but they cannot implement that policy to the point that their actions threaten the pretense that the S.F.G. is a “permanent” government of a “sovereign” state; the regional states have been boxed in by the “donor”-powers’ default, but they have not entirely lost their ability to act for their own interests. Far from being honest brokers, they are contradicted reluctant brokers. The leverage of the regional states comes from the “donor”-powers’ dependence on them. Their position – in the southern regions Kenya’s position – draws them into professions of support for the S.F.G. while frequently impeding it. That situation is likely to persist. From the viewpoint of the regional states, they have no reason to surrender their interest in a decentralized Somalia just because of the “donor”-powers’ tepid and toothless support for centralization; the regional states are unreliable proxies, not pawns, of the “donor”-powers. Given the default of the “donor”-powers and the forced default of the regional states, the S.F.G. and its allied anti-Jubbaland southern factions, and Jubbaland and its Puntland ally are left to do war dances in the deadlock, which are likely to continue in the short term, if not well beyond that. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago [email protected]