Tempered desire: the BRICS and the Islamic State crisis What roles have the emerging BRICS powers played throughout the crisis of the Islamic State? Reflecting on this can tell us about the internal and external nature of both the emerging powers and the more multipolar world that has been constantly heralded. - The BRICS constitute an odd grouping. They include both democracies (Brazil, India and South Africa) as well as more authoritarian regimes (Russia and China). Economically, there is considerable disparity: China is the second largest economy in the world while South Africa barely makes the top 30. And yet the BRICS offer a useful representation of rising powers: as a group they make up around 30 percent of the world population and around 20 percent of global GDP (up from 8 percent in 2000). Even though they do not coordinate policies and actions (like the European Union), they have institutionalised their cooperation, through regular annual summits and the recent creation of a development bank in June. - Although some of the BRICS have business interests in Iraq and face the risk of growing radicalisation in their own Muslim populations, it is unlikely that there will be significant change in the way they approach the current crisis. Certainly, the language and activity both of groups like IS and the BRICS states risk polarising the wider global Muslim community more generally. States are likely to label such behaviour and groups as ‘terrorist’, a term which makes dialogue more difficult. At the same time, such labels bring the US and its critics in the BRICS closer together. For example, Russia, which experienced its own ‘Islamic terrorism’ during its struggle against insurgents in the Caucasus, shares Americas opposition to IS. Beijing too, may be as culpable as al-Baghdadi himself in overlooking domestic reasons for the Muslim population’s discontent, branding it as part of a wider issue of international terrorism. However, the likelihood that shared concerns by Washington on one side and Moscow and Beijing on the other, will lead to greater coordination in Iraq is unlikely. Instead what will probably happen is that alongside the rhetorical differences which exist between the US and the BRICS over state intervention and sovereignty respectively, there will be a tacit acceptance and therefore pragmatic consensus over creeping American military intervention – a development which is already reflected in the relative quiet of another US rival in the region, namely Iran. https://opendemocracy.net/guy-burton/tempered-desire-brics-and-islamic-state-crisis
Posted on: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 07:21:05 +0000