The Ikhwan: Some Background The phenomenon of the Egyptian Ikhwan is not widely understood and this is not the place to delve into the intricacies. Some things need to be said, however. First, they are not some old-fashioned, half-crazed, clerical lot. They are socially conservative but their neo-traditionalism is thoroughly modern. Their mass base is, of course, very broad but their cadres are drawn overwhelmingly from the urban, educated, professional and/or mercantile classes. They have been around for some 80 years and had already become a substantial force in Egyptian politics by the 1940s. Since Nasser suppressed them in the 1950s, they have been patronised by a variety of the Gulf kingdoms (primarily by Saudi Arabia for decades, then by Qatar more recently), which means that the organisation itself has had access to billions of dollars and it counts a whole galaxy of billionaires and millionaires among its central and provincial leaders; countless others have made money either in the Gulf or in businesses inside Egypt. The legendary Khairat el-Shater—the recently imprisoned billionaire, second-in-command of the Ikhwan, and a close comrade of Morsy—is of course the most famous of these Rich and Beatific. They are in competition against the Mubarakist bourgeoisie but bourgeois enough themselves; in fact, more inclined towards neoliberalism than the statist bourgeoisie of yore, and certainly more neoliberal than the armed forces who control at least 25 per cent (some analysts say 40 per cent) of the Egyptian economy, thanks, precisely, to their association with the state. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would undoubtedly find the Ikhwan more congenial.
Posted on: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 18:03:24 +0000
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