The Maryland Campaign against McClellan Part II By 5 oclock of the afternoon of September 16th, Jackson had faced his men northward, some 700 yards beyond the Dunker Church, and across the northern edge of the big cornfield, covering both the Hagerstown and the Smoketown Roads. Hood and Law held the right, the latter advanced into the East Woods, the two having 1,700 men in line. The Stonewall Division, under J.R. Jones, with 1,600 men, extended this line across the Hagerstown Road and into the northern end of the West Woods, toward the commanding ridge occupied by Stuart with his Artillery and covering the road leading to a ford of the Potomac on his left. Lawton and Trimble were resting in the woods at the Dunker Church. Just at sunset of this lovely September day, the golden autumn of the famous Appalachian valley, Hooker advanced southward, along the watershed ridge between the Antietam and the Potomac, and pushing forward a Battery, opened on Jacksons left. Poague silenced this in about twenty minutes and it retired. About the same time his skirmishers advanced on Law, in the East Woods, but were soon driven back to its northern edge. Then the two Armies lay on their arms, within speaking distance of each other, through the long autumn night, during which Lawton and Trimble took the place of Hood and Law, whose men had had no cooked rations, except a half ration of beef, for three days, subsisting in the meantime on green corn gathered from the fields. McClellan proposed to join issue with Lee by striking the latters left with the 40,000 men in the three Corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner, which were already in position for attack on the morning of September 17th. If these should be successful, he intended that Burnside should cross at the bridge now known by his name, and with his 13,000 men fall on Lees right, under the command of Longstreet, and then follow up the delivery of these right-handed and left-handed blows with an attack on the center of Lees lines, on the Boonesboro road, by the 25,000 veterans under Porter and Franklin, that were massed in his front and ready to attack when ordered. Numerous Batteries of Artillery lined the bluffs all along the eastern bank of the Antietam, many of them with long range guns that could fire into and even beyond the Confederate lines. McClellan had revealed his plans to Lee by placing his troops in the positions indicated, or very near them, in the afternoon of the 16th. It may be well to repeat the disposition of Lees forces to meet these three threatened attacks. Stuart, with his Cavalry, held the extreme left, where the great bend of the Potomac to the eastward approaches to within a mile of the Hagerstown Turnpike. On Stuarts right was Jacksons command, with its left pivoted amid the giant oaks and the great outcroppings of limestone strata, vertically disposed, where he had placed Early; thence his lines stretched eastwardly, covering the roads converging at the Dunker Church. Nearly at right angles to Jacksons line were the troops of D.H. Hill and Longstreet, prolonged to the southward to opposite the Burnside Bridge. Toombs Brigade, of 600 Georgians, advanced to the front, held the rocky, wooded bluff that overlooked and commanded the Burnside Bridge. On the ridge behind Toombs, at early dawn of the 17th, Lee placed J.G. Walkers 3,200 men, with Batteries on his right and on the higher hill in his rear: while still farther to the right, covering a ford below the Burnside Bridge, was placed another Battery and a portion of Cavalry. Lees entire force, of all arms, at the close of the 16th, was about 25,000 men, with which to oppose McClellans 87,000. Orders of urgency called McLaws and A.P. Hill to promptly bring forward from Harpers Ferry their 10,000 fighting men. As early as 3 oclock on the morning of the 17th, two hours and a half before the rising of the sun, Hooker sent forward his skirmishers in the East Woods, and as the sun looked over the lovely Cumberland Valley from the crest of the South Mountain, he boldly and impetuously urged forward his lines of 12,500 muskets against Jacksons front of but 3,500. Six Confederate Batteries, well disposed in front of Jacksons line, wrought havoc with this advancing host, but its lines closed up and swept forward, their right extending across the Hagerstown Turnpike, their thirty guns answering those of the Confederates, from the high Poffenberger ridge, while twenty long range guns roared in enfilade from across the Antietam. Stuarts cannon made reply from the Nicodemus Ridge, as did Jacksons from the center and S.D. Lees twenty-six from the swell in the open fields in front of the Dunker Church. Lawtons ever-brave Georgians fiercely contended with and held back Hookers left, in the East woods and in the 30-acre cornfield, but the advantages of position enabled the Federals to force back Jacksons Division into the woods, but still hanging to and pivoting on Earlys. There, rallying behind the trees and projecting rocks and facing eastward, it repulsed the attack led by Doubleday. Hays, with his 550 Louisianans, moved to the support of Lawton, in the cornfield, and one of the most stubborn and hotly contested of recorded engagements there took place. The Confederates were forced back, by weight of numbers, but contesting every inch of ground and leaving the big cornfield fairly covered with their dead and wounded and those of the enemy. Hoods courageous Texans, at the moment of peril, rushed forward from the Dunker church, with a wild yell, leaving their breakfast beside their camp-fires, to sustain Lawton and Hays in the unequal contest, while three of D.H. Hills Brigades were hastened by Lee from his center to extend Hoods right and fall upon the flank of Hookers oncoming left. These well-put, right-handed blows forced Hookers battle-broken ranks from the field of combat with great slaughter; nearly one-fourth of his men having fallen under the withering fire of the impetuous Confederates. His routed men found refuge behind their guns and Mansfields Corps, which was advancing, in echelon, on his left. Nearly half of Jacksons men had fallen in their line of battle, in the open and across the cornfield, while hundreds of them, stiff in death, still stood in silent skirmish line along the rail fence on the north front of the big cornfield; but the other half of his war-worn but unconquerable veterans closed up and grimly awaited the second Federal attack, which they saw approaching. Banks old Corps, that Jacksons men had so often met, now under Mansfield, had bivouacked, late in the night of the 16th, about a mile in Hookers rear; and now, at about half-past seven of the morning of the 17th, it became the turn of that Corps to take up the battle, from which, after a three hours contest, Hooker had recoiled in complete defeat. Forming his line near where Hooker had first formed his, with his right resting on the Hagerstown Road and his left extending eastward through the East Woods, Mansfield advanced his two Divisions, and the bloody conflict again raged across the cornfield and in the East and West woods; 3,600 Confederates, under Hood, Ripley, Colquitt and Garland, faced the 7,000 fresh Federals that advanced to the fight, aided by a mere handful of 300 of Hookers Corps who had so. eagerly begun the battle in the early morning. Mansfield fell, on the north side of the East Woods, at the beginning of his advance, and Williams took command. Thinking to avoid again joining issue with Jackson, Williams ordered Greenes Division farther to the left, and, under cover of the low swell in front of the Dunker Church and his Smoketown Road, this Division rushed forward, turned the Confederate right, crossed the Hagerstown Road, and entered the eastern edge of the West Woods; but there its progress was stayed by Jacksons men, in their natural fortress of forest and rocks, and Greene was soon forced to retire and join his retreating comrades that Stuart and Jacksons left, especially Earlys unflinching one thousand, had driven from the field. Thus far Jackson, with his 7,600 veterans, had met and repulsed the 19,500 in the Corps of Hooker and Mansfield and driven them from the field. Although Lee was, by a previous accident, disabled in both his hands, and could only ride with his horse led by a courier, he had intently watched, from a rock, south of the Boonesboro Road, on the summit of the hill east of Sharpsburg, the fierce contests on his left and at the same time had observed the movements of Burnside on his right. His eighty guns, in well chosen and commanding positions, had promptly responded to the still larger number of McClellan beyond the Antietam; his Batteries in front of Sharpsburg commanded the road leading toward Boonsboro and held in check any Federal advance on his center. Seeing that the weight of attack was being concentrated on his left, and knowing that Sumners veteran Corps was following the defeated ones of Hooker and Mansfield, he determined to meet Sumners advance with a bold counterstroke. McLaws and Anderson, by a night march from Maryland heights, had joined him in the early morning of the 17th and were resting near Sharpsburg. He proposed to join with these the forces of Walker and lead them to the assistance of Jackson. At half-past 8 of the morning the advance of Sumners 18,000 veterans, the third of McClellans successive assaulting columns entered the East woods, followed by Sedgwicks Division. The sight was not a reassuring one as Sumners men crossed the field of recent carnage strewn with the dead and wounded of Hooker and Mansfield. Greenes Federal Division still held on near the eastern edge of the West Woods, but did not move against Jacksons naturally fortified line. In a deploy of 6,000 men, in the East woods, Sumner faced the big cornfield, strewn with its fresh-mown harvest of the dead, then, in three lines, moved westward across that field and the Hagerstown Turnpike to the front of the long line of the West Woods. Stuarts guns raked his advance with an enfilade, while Jacksons, from the commanding ridge behind the West woods, raked it at short range. Sumners right soon struck the brave three hundred that alone remained of the famous fighting Stonewall Brigade; but these courageous Virginians flinched not, and from behind the upstanding ledges of rocks and the great oaks of the northern part of the West Woods, they stayed the progress of the Federal advance, helped by the depleted command of the unyielding Early on their left, while Lee and Jackson were moving to set the battle in order to fall on Sumners left flank. Hood had fought his men to a mere wreck, at the Dunker Church, and had sent Colonel S.D. Lee to tell the commanding general that unless immediately reinforced the day was lost. He met the great leader, on his led horse, about a half mile from the Church. He reassured the Chief of Artillery, who had excitedly delivered Hoods message, by quietly saying: Dont be excited about it, Colonel. Go and tell General Hood to hold his ground. Reinforcements are now rapidly approaching and are between Sharpsburg and the ford. Tell him that I am now coming to his support. Just then he turned and saw McLaws Division approaching at a double-quick from Sharpsburg. Jackson had already driven the most of Greenes command from the wood at the Church, by bringing Early around from his left and making an attack from the south on Sumners exposed left flank. To Grigsby, now commanding the Stonewall Division, and to Early, were now joined the 6,500 fresh troops under McLaws, G.T. Anderson and Walker, and a sheeted and unerring fire from these tried veterans, from behind the rocks and oaks of the West woods, poured upon Sumners front, left and rear. Nearly one-third of his 6,500 steady and brave men fell where they stood. His efforts to face his third line to the front were ineffectual. It moved to his right and rear, instead of to his left, and, carrying with it portions of his first and second lines, sought safety behind the Federal Batteries, and soon the whole division melted away before the hot reception of the Confederates. Just then, at a little past 9 oclock, the nearly 6,000 of Frenchs Division of Sumners Corps, moving still further to the Federal left, under shelter of the low ridge above Mummas house, advanced to assault D.H. Hill, on the left of Lees center, and a fierce combat took place along the bloody lane, that turns to the eastward, about halfway between Hagerstown and the Dunker Church, and ascends to the summit of the ridge between the Hagerstown Road and the Antietam. D.H. Hill had sent three of his Brigades against the left flank of Hooker and Mansfield. When he withdrew these, from Sumners advance, he posted two of them, those of Rodes and Colquitt, in this lane, with G.B. Anderson on the right of Rodes. He had but 1,500 muskets and a park of artillery; but on his left, extending to the West woods, were about the same number from the commands of McLaws and Walker. Hills left was along the Hagerstown Turnpike and his right along the bloody lane, so the two wings of his command were placed at right angles to each other. Into these open arms of as brave and steady veterans as ever shouldered a musket, advanced the front brigade of French. From Hills left a terrific fire sent Frenchs men, with heavy loss, to the rear. He then advanced a second line to meet Anderson in the lane, but the musketry from Hills right soon drove these back, behind the shelter of the hill, where the remaining two-thirds of Frenchs Brigade sought safety, having left one-third of their number between the arms of Hills lines. The 6,000 veterans of Richardsons Division, of Sumners Corps, now approached Hills left, along the crest of the ridge above it. At this same hour of 11, Lee, who was eagerly watching his center, hurried R.H. Andersons 3,500 to Hills aid. These he hastened to reinforce his right, but at right angles to it and extending from the bloody lane southward toward the Piper house. From his position, across this partly sunken road, Richardson secured an enfilade fire on Hills men in that road and played havoc with his line. Taking advantage of the confusion he had wrought, Richardson pressed forward, put the Confederates to flight and forced them back to the defensive fences along the Hagerstown Road and to the shelter of the numerous buildings of the Piper farm. Hill soon rallied his men, brought up his Batteries, and drove Richardson back to the cover of the bloody lane. At this juncture Franklins Corps moved into the position that had first been taken by Hooker and afterward by Mansfield, and sought to try a third issue with Jackson on the left. An Artillery battle first took place, then Irwins brigade rushed in a charge against the West Woods, at the Dunker Church, but Jacksons volleys promptly sent this attack in confusion to the rear. Intent upon the battle from his overlooking position in the center, Lee, when he saw the partial success of Richardsons movement against Hill in his left center, promptly ordered Jackson to make counterstroke against the Federal right, in which Walker was to join by charging across from the front of the Dunker Church. Jackson was hastening to obey, and Stuarts guns were moved out to see what impression could be made upon the great park of Artillery in the Poffenberger field; Stuart intending to lead Jacksons movement with his Cavalry by moving up the east bank of the Potomac. It was soon found that the Federal position was too strong to be attacked with any certainty of success; but Lees left and center, just after the turn of the day, stood defiant in its chosen line of defense and ready to meet any forward movement McClellan might again order; but he was content, from the lessons of the forenoon, to merely hold the positions of his right without further advances. Through all the long forenoon Toombs, with his 600 men, dominated the Burnside Bridge and prevented Burnsides big Army Corps from crossing, although he was constantly urged by McClellan so to do and help to carry out his original plan for crushing Lee. With unsurpassed bravery and gallantry, Sturgis advanced upon the bridge, aided by a heavy cannonade from the bluffs above, that, at short range, hurled shot and shell against Toombs Georgians, who, during four hours of fierce contention, drove back four distinct storming parties and held to their position amid the rocks and trees of the bluff overlooking the bridge. Finding he could not carry this by direct assault, Burnside sent Rodmans Division, by a wide detour to his left, to cross a lower ford of the Antietam and fall upon Toombs flank. This forced the Georgians to retire, and at 1 oclock Burnside began crossing the bridge, after relieving the brave Division that had been exhausted in the attempt to carry it by storm. It took Burnside an hour to cross and array his men on the ridges above the bridge. This disposition of a fresh Corps, for assault upon his right, was in full view of Lee from his rock in front of Sharpsburg. Undisturbed by this, he had directed Jackson to assail the Federal right, knowing, by messages from A.P. Hill, that his command was just about crossing the Potomac, coming from Harpers Ferry, and would soon become an important factor on the field in dealing with Burnside. The latter advanced boldly, captured a Confederate Battery, and drove back, to near Sharpsburg, the Division of D.R. Jones, and by 3 oclock his 12,000 were ready to fall upon the 2,000 of Longstreet that were tenaciously holding the immediate front of Sharpsburg and the road leading thence southward toward the Potomac. That same hour brought AP. Hill up from Botelers Ford, and across to the commanding plateau along which runs the road from Sharpsburg to the mouth of the Antietam. His men were wearied by a march of 17 miles, including the fording of the Potomac, in seven hours, but the fiery Hill, who was always ready and impatient to begin a fight, promptly formed his lines, poured a storm of shot and shell from his well-placed Artillery, and then rushed forward his men, with a wild yell, upon the masses of Burnsides troops and forced them to seek safety, in flight, under cover of their guns, beyond the Antietam, after leaving one-third of their number upon the field of carnage. This put an end to the famous battle, the result of which, to McClellan, was defeat and disaster, but to Lee the crown of victory, against a great disparity of numbers, in a series of stubborn combats that had lasted from before daylight until dark. The battles and marches of the preceding months had greatly depleted Lees Army, and his wounded, footsore, and straggling men were strung all along through Virginia from Richmond to the Potomac, so that he could bring but 35,000 wearied, half-clad and half-starved men into the Battle of Sharpsburg; against these, McClellan had hurled 60,000 well-equipped, well-fed and well-cared-for men, while 27,000 more were held in full view and could have been thrown into the contest. Four of his Corps were not only routed, but scattered; and he could not collect them to renew the battle. Sharpsburg was a stand-up, hand-to-hand fight, as brave and furious as any the world ever saw, and the Confederate soldiers had in it proved themselves more than a match, in a fair and open conflict, for their Federal foes. The losses on both sides indicate the nature of the struggle. Of the Southern men, 8,000, one-fourth of Lees Army, lay dead or wounded upon the field; regiments, and even brigades had fought almost to annihilation. McClellans losses were some 12,500. The living of both armies, as the sounds of battle died away, sunk to profound slumber, such as only follows a day of battle, in the very lines where they had fought and amid the horrors of the carnage of the bloody battlefield. At nightfall Lee held the line of the Hagerstown Turnpike and of the road leading south from Sharpsburg, and the line on his left which Jackson had chosen, before the battle, as the one he would hold; and his unconquerable veterans were ready to renew the combat at his word of command. The Federals had really gained and held no advantages of position. Colonel Stephen D. Lee, the Confederate Chief of Artillery, stated, to the writer, that an hour after dark, on the 17th, Lee summoned his Division commanders to meet him at his headquarters in the wood in the rear of Sharpsburg, and as each came up, he quietly asked him: How is it on your part of the line? Longstreet replied, As bad as can be; Hill, My Division is cut to pieces; Hood declared with great emotion, that he had no division left. Colonel Lee asserted that all of these Officers advised that the army should cross the Potomac before daylight, and that Lee, after a profound pause, said: Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac tonight. You will go to your respective commands, strengthen your lines, send two Officers from each Brigade toward the ford to collect your stragglers and bring them up. Many others have come up. I have had the proper steps taken to collect all the men who are in the rear. If McClellan wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle again. Some 5,000 Confederate stragglers joined their commands during the night of the 17th, and the morning of the 18th dawned upon the lines of contending forces, drawn up face to face, at short range, and ready for an anticipated renewal of the mighty struggle; but both stood on the defensive, and not a gun was fired during the livelong day. Lee was not only willing, but eager to renew the battle, in which he was earnestly seconded by Jackson, who suggested that if fifty heavy guns were sent to the Nicodemus Ridge, beyond his left, they could silence the Federal Batteries on the Poffenberger Ridge and open the way for falling on the Federal right. Colonel S.D. Lee accompanied Jackson, at General Lees suggestion, to reconnoiter the chances for success in such an attempt. The Chief of Artillery pronounced the undertaking not only impracticable, but extremely hazardous, and, to the great disappointment of both Lee and Jackson, the movement was abandoned. Learning, during the afternoon of the 18th, that large reinforcements were advancing to McClellan, from both the north and the east, Lee determined to cross into Virginia; and that night, in good order, and leaving nothing behind him but his dead and the wounded who could not be moved, he crossed his army over the Potomac. At the same time Stuart crossed his Cavalry over the river, at a ford on Lees left, went up it to Williamsport and re-crossed, and threatened McClellans right and rear, thus engaging his attention while Lee took his long trains and his army back into Virginia. On the morning of the 19th, when it was discovered that Lee had safely escaped him, McClellan sent three Brigades across the Potomac in pursuit, and these captured four Confederate guns, placed on the bluffs above the ford, which were not sufficiently guarded; but Jackson with A.P. Hill, speedily punished this temerity and drove the Federals back, across the Potomac. With the great river between them, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia now rested and recuperated during the bracing autumn days that characterize the great Appalachian Valley. McClellan called for reinforcements, declaring that his ranks were being weakened by straggling and desertion, while Lee called upon his government for shoes and clothes for his well-nigh half-clad Army. In a letter to his wife, General Lee wrote: My hands are improving slowly; with my right hand I am able to dress and undress myself, which is a great comfort. My left is becoming of some assistance, too, though it is still swollen and sometimes painful. The bandages have been removed. I am now able to sign my name. It has been six weeks today since I was injured, and I have at last discarded the sling. From his headquarters in the vicinity of Winchester, on the 2nd of October, Lee issued an address to his soldiers, in which he said: In reviewing the achievements of the Army during the present campaign, the commanding general cannot withhold the expression of his admiration of the indomitable courage displayed in battle and its cheerful endurance of privation and hardship on the march. Since your great victories around Richmond, you have defeated the enemy at Cedar Mountain, expelled him from the Rappahannock, and after a conflict of three days, utterly repulsed him on the plains of Manassas, and forced him to take shelter within the fortifications around his capital. Without halting for repose, you crossed the Potomac, stormed the heights of Harpers Ferry, made prisoners of more than 11,000 men, and captured upward of seventy-five pieces of Artillery, all their small-arms and other munitions of war. While one corps of the army was thus engaged, the other insured its success by arresting at Boonesboro the combined armies of the enemy, advancing under their favorite General to the relief of their beleaguered comrades. On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one-third his numbers, you resisted from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every attack along his entire front of more than four miles in extent. The whole of the following day you stood prepared to renew the conflict on the same ground, and retired next morning without molestation across the Potomac. Two attempts subsequently made by the enemy to follow you across the river have resulted in his complete discomfiture and being driven back with loss. Achievements such as these demanded much valor and patriotism. History records few examples of greater fortitude and endurance than this Army has exhibited, and I am commissioned by the President to thank you in the name of the Confederate States for the undying fame you have won for their arms. Much as you have done, much more remains to be accomplished. The enemy again threatens with invasion, and to your tried valor and patriotism the country looks with confidence for deliverance and safety. Your past exploits give assurance that this confidence is not misplaced. Source: Confederate Military History (Conclusion)
Posted on: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 12:44:30 +0000
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