• The Murtala regime correctly identified foreign policy as very important because the most fundamental domestic problems relating to security, the economy, even national identity and unity cannot be tackled only domestically. They feature prominently in the external environment, and foreign policy is actually about the determination of the external environment of a country. Its purpose should not be anything else but the determination of this environment in ways which foster short- and long- term national objectives. The period of the Murtala administration coincided with the peak period of the decolonisation process and the liberation struggle of the African countries that were still under foreign rule. Accordingly, Gen. Murtala’s regime became unapologetically committed to the liberation of Africa from racial and colonial subjugation. He gave effective meaning to the Africa-centred foreign policy of Nigeria. He gave moral, diplomatic and material support to the liberation movements across Africa. He recognised the MPLA as the authentic representative movement of the Angolan people in their struggle against Portuguese colonialism and hastened the process of freeing the Africans in Angola. In words and deeds, Gen. Murtala woke up the whole continent and Nigeria was respected everywhere. But what can we say about Nigeria’s foreign policy now. To assess the success or failure of any policy, it is necessary to establish, first, its objectives. Among the objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy are to protect the dignity of Africans, establish a self-reliant economy, and to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Nigeria. It is not possible to assess the degree to which these objectives have been attained by simply going into state visits, statements, conferences and communiqués. This can only be done by going into the way the position of the country in the structure of the international system has changed and into whether this process of change has been toward or away from the stated objectives as many analysts attest. With the successful conclusion of African political liberation, the economic liberation of the continent ought to have been the next natural thing to pursue. When we examine the economic aspect of Nigeria’s Africa policy, we see a gross contradiction between declared intention and practical achievements. For, while the signing of trade agreements, air service agreements and the establishment of regional commissions create the form in which integration can take place, the basic prerequisite for genuine integration is intra-African trade, free movements of goods and people across Africa, patronising African companies and training of skilled African manpower so that Africans can truly be in charge of African resources and ultimate destiny of the continent. There is also the need to systematically eliminate foreign control of the commanding heights of the economy such as oil and gas, shipping, insurance, aviation and needed technology, among others. A policy aimed at achieving some measure of economic integration in Africa must have as its primary goal the transformation (real transformation, not slogan) of the economies of the various countries. In Nigeria, this would involve giving priority to agriculture for food security and employment generation. It entails real agricultural revolution, not the ridiculous policy of buying handsets for rural farmers or giving undue priority to only one crop – cassava — as if it is the only crop growing in Nigeria. It involves practical experience of farming and animal husbandry and not the current textbook approach of Brettonwoods-trained “technocrats”. This can only be possible if an industrial policy aimed at creating light and heavy industries complementary to a self-reliant agricultural base is pursued, and not just announced. About 38 years ago, Ambassador Charles Martin Le Quesnes, the then British high commissioner to Nigeria, in an interview with Times International of April 21, 1975, had this to say: “It is difficult to think of any field in which we are not connected with Nigerian affairs. We are connected with your churches, universities, legal system, education and the armed forces. With regard to the armed forces, we supply you with basic military equipment and help in training your personnel in British institutions…” Almost four decades later, what has really changed with regards to what he said, particularly the armed forces? Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa. Nigeria is also the largest country in the Gulf of Guinea. But even to patrol Nigeria’s and the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime waters, it is the French that does that for us. In neighboring Mali, it is the French that came in and asked us to join, even though this is within our immediate sub-region of ECOWAS. Where is the independence if we do not have the capacity to even defend our immediate territories? Compare that with what South Africa is doing: it is effectively defending its large maritime zone and recently sent 400 troops to join an all-Africa force to bring stability in the Central Africa Republic. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) in section 19 provides the fundamental objective of Nigerias foreign policy as follows: a. Promotion and protection of the national interest. b. Promotion of African integration and support for African unity c. Promotion of international co- operation for consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among nations and elimination of discrimination in all ramifications. d. Respect for international law and treaty organization as well as the seeking of settlement of international dispute; negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication and promotion of just world order. Bearing in mind that the second schedule to section four of the constitution places foreign policy institutions such as diplomatic, consular and trade representations as well as external affairs on the exclusive legislative list, the question, we then ask is, what are the strategic instruments for realizing these foreign policy objectives. However, it follows, that the foregoing outlay of Nigerias foreign policy objectives and explanations aforementioned, makes one feel that a realistic foreign policy of Nigeria, especially in terms of her foreign policy objective of promoting national interest should be anchored on efforts and activities that would enhance, protect, project her national interest. Thus, within the purview of the above postulation, we argue that the foremost economic goal of Nigeria should be to feed her population and provide other basic necessities of life such as shelter, affordable medicine, quality education, clean water, not of course neglecting sustainable peace in the country. This is because he who fights outside with wide reputation outside without harmony at home is not yet safe. 1 MURTALA/OBASANJO FOREIGN POLICY (1975-1979) The period of Murtala-Obasanjo regime can be described as a period that had a shift in paradigm, a period known as diplomatic soldering. The way Nigeria handled the crises in Angola projected her into global relevance. Angola as Sotunbi (1990:7-12) noted, was a Portuguese colony. Her nationalists were determined to cause Portuguese to grant them independence. These main movements were involved in the struggle. They were the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. While each claimed to have more popularity than the other, there were differences on ethnic, religion, ideological and personality grounds. Much more, though concerned in leaving power to Angola, there was a military coup in Portugal and the new regime was bent on granting independence to Angola. But it was apparent that with the hostile scenario there was likely not going to be an orderly transfer of power. The organization of African Unity recognizing this scenario and its conflict potential favoured a government of national unity in the country, comprising the three major liberation movements. Oyediran (1978:14-15) notes that it was the above stand of the OAU summit at Kampala Uganda in July 1975, which Gowon was attending, when his government at home was toppled. Infact, in May 1975 preceding the OAU summit. Gowon has in recognition of a provisional government of Angola by the OAU written to the three movements that: We in Nigeria rejoice with you on this happy occasion and salute your wisdom, patriotism, statesmanship and realism in reaching agreement for the common good of your fatherland. The event you are celebrating today is of great importance not only to the Angola people who have sacrifice so much but also to Africa and indeed all lovers of freedom and justice and human dignity through, out the world. It was on this ground, Murtala regime took over from the Angolan crisis Fawole (2003). In this direction he notes that Murtala had described a letter which Americas president Ford had written to most African leaders at the eve of an OAUs Extra ordinary meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 1976 as a most intolerable presumption and a flagrant insult on the indulgence of African rulers. Unfortunately regrettably, Joe Garba who was at the centre stage at Nigerias external affairs commissioner then observes that despite all Nigeria did for Angola Nigerias name was conspicuously absent from the list of countries that Angola paid tribute for assisting them in their independence struggle in their first appearance at the OAU summit at Mauritania in July 1976. to cap it all, after Murtala death, it took Angola the whole of three weeks to express their condolence over the death of their benefactors. When eventually a message and arrive from Angola, only its first three sentences made any reference to our tragic loss. Garba (1991:12) 1 MURTALA/OBASANJO FOREIGN POLICY (1975-1979) The period of Murtala-Obasanjo regime can be described as a period that had a shift in paradigm, a period known as diplomatic soldering. The way Nigeria handled the crises in Angola projected her into global relevance. Angola as Sotunbi (1990:7-12) noted, was a Portuguese colony. Her nationalists were determined to cause Portuguese to grant them independence. These main movements were involved in the struggle. They were the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. While each claimed to have more popularity than the other, there were differences on ethnic, religion, ideological and personality grounds. Much more, though concerned in leaving power to Angola, there was a military coup in Portugal and the new regime was bent on granting independence to Angola. But it was apparent that with the hostile scenario there was likely not going to be an orderly transfer of power. The organization of African Unity recognizing this scenario and its conflict potential favoured a government of national unity in the country, comprising the three major liberation movements. Oyediran (1978:14-15) notes that it was the above stand of the OAU summit at Kampala Uganda in July 1975, which Gowon was attending, when his government at home was toppled. Infact, in May 1975 preceding the OAU summit. Gowon has in recognition of a provisional government of Angola by the OAU written to the three movements that: We in Nigeria rejoice with you on this happy occasion and salute your wisdom, patriotism, statesmanship and realism in reaching agreement for the common good of your fatherland. The event you are celebrating today is of great importance not only to the Angola people who have sacrifice so much but also to Africa and indeed all lovers of freedom and justice and human dignity through, out the world. It was on this ground, Murtala regime took over from the Angolan crisis Fawole (2003). In this direction he notes that Murtala had described a letter which Americas president Ford had written to most African leaders at the eve of an OAUs Extra ordinary meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 1976 as a most intolerable presumption and a flagrant insult on the indulgence of African rulers. Unfortunately regrettably, Joe Garba who was at the centre stage at Nigerias external affairs commissioner then observes that despite all Nigeria did for Angola Nigerias name was conspicuously absent from the list of countries that Angola paid tribute for assisting them in their independence struggle in their first appearance at the OAU summit at Mauritania in July 1976. to cap it all, after Murtala death, it took Angola the whole of three weeks to express their condolence over the death of their benefactors. When eventually a message and arrive from Angola, only its first three sentences made any reference to our tragic loss. Garba (1991:12) Despite Angolan crises experience, Nigeria was unwavering in ending South African Apartheid and also in Bodesian-Zimbabwe crises. In May 1978, the Nigerian government under his leadership (arrested the S.K Kuku, a tanker owned by the South African maritime CO-operation of cape town, but flying the flag of the Panama Republic, which was on charter to British petroleum (Bp) to lift crude oil from Bonny oil terminal to Holland, after the arrest government, decided against selling the 1,616,636 barrels of oil in the tanker to Bp and also decided to reduce to about a third Bps take of Nigerian crude with effect from 1st August 1979. the government also in may 1979 barred British firms from tendering for contracts in Nigeria. The British government clarified its position on Zimbabwe. Aluko (1990:112-123). Also within this period, Nigerias relationship with great powers was non alignment. She did not discriminate against the eastern block, neither did she treat the Western powers as scared cows or demi-gods that should never be offended. On the Angolan crises, Nigeria was stern. This was obvious as shown in Nigeria response to a letter written by USA President Gerald Ford in 1976 to most African leaders. Joe Garba said thus: Its tone was patronizing, its theme anti-soviet, it disclaimed any knowledge of or responsibility for South-Africas actions and urges another round of negotiations among the Angolan groups. It concluded by saying, we cannot however stand idly by, if the soviet and Cuban intervention persist and hoped to continue to exchange views on this Same day, Murtala Muhammed is noted to have issued a press release in response to the letter issue which it labeled gross insult and according to Garba (1991) in sum telling the Americans to go to hell. Nigerias relation with Britain, from the inception of the Obasanjo regime took a dive downwards. The problem started form Nigerias accusation of British complicity in the attempted coup which cost the nation her most cherished Head of State. This suspicion was because on the 13th of February 1976, the abortive coup leader Suka Buka Dimka immediately after assassinating Murtala Muhammed went to the British High Commission in Lagos, ostensibly to contact Gowon, who was in exile in London. Some angry students and youths, who felt extremely aggrieved at the death of Muhammed and the alleged involvement of Britain and America in the failed coup descended on their embassys and caused some damages before they were dispersed by the police. Britain-Nigeria relationship continued in hostility as a prelude to the damage in Britain embassy, the then British High Commissioner in Nigeria, Sir Martin, presented a verbal note whose content stated that: The High Commission cannot but express its extreme surprise and disappointment at the failure of the Nigerias government to effectively protect its building and property not withstanding that it had ample warning that they were likely to be subject to a threat of damage and not withstanding that the government clearly had the means available to afford adequate protection had it wished to use them in these circumstance, the High commission formally and finally reserve the right of her majestys government to claim full compensation for the damage suffered The Nigerias external affairs commissioner was highly amazed at Sir Matins insensitivity to the timing and language of his complaint. He subsequently gave him a strong verbal attack and ordered him out of his office. The next day, he requested for Sir Martins recall by the British government which they immediately did. Further deterioration in Britain- Nigeria relations followed the trial of Gowon in Nigeria, following his implications by perpetrators of the coup. The British refusal was hinged on the argument that Nigeria had no extradition treaty with Britain and that in the prevailing circumstance there was no guarantee that Gowon would have received a fair trail. Nigeria was angered by this and broke diplomatic relations with Britain. What would however be describe as the height of Nigerias thawed relations with Britain during this era was the nationalist of the British petroleum (Bp) which the Guardian of London described as crude bullying. It is on record that Obasanjo never visited Britain throughout his regime and even discouraged his officials form doing so, except when absolutely necessary. The Murtala Mohammed administration set about to revitalise government, the economy and the moral fabric of the society. In the political sphere, government was re- structured to induce greater efficiency and central control by enhancing the roles of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, and the Cabinet Office, and limiting the influence of the State Governors. These became members of a National Council of State and not of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the highest policy-making body. Panels were appointed to consider the creation of more states and the establishment of a new Federal Capital. In the end, seven more States were created in February 1976, bringing the total number of States to nineteen, and Abuja was selected as the new Federal Capital to which movement would begin in 1986., A programme to return the nation to civilian rule was promulgated and vigorously implemented. A 49 member Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). appointed in October 1975, produced a draft which was later debated and amended by a partially-elected Constituent Assembly. In the social sphere, massive purges were effected in the Civil Service, the Judiciary and the Universities, purportedly to remove corrupt, unproductive and/or ageing officials. While the purges might have improved productivity instantly, some were malicious and unjustified. Indeed, on the long run, the purges apparently considerably lowered workers morale and produced insecurity in the Civil Service previously reputed to provide durable tenure to employees The hallmark of the Mohammed administration was typified by its dynamic foreign policy, prompt recognition of the MPLA regime in Angola. Although too brief for meaningful assessment, the administration was undoubtedly popular and purposeful. It made considerable achievements before Mohammed was assassinated in an abortive military coup on February 13, 1976. Mohammeds successor, Lt. General 0. Obasanjo, more or less continued Mohammeds dynamic programmes. These included the war against corruption which Obasanjo strongly denounced in his famous Jaji Address of September 1977. For fighting this war, a Corrupt Practices Bureau, an Assets Panel, and a Public Complaints Commission were established. Gambling by casino and pools-betting were banned. The difference between public servants and public officers was entrenched in the constitution of 1979. As it transpired, however, these laudable measures could not uproot the cancer of corruption. In pursuit of the return to civilian rule, Local Government Reform, described as one of the most important legacies of the First Military Era was instituted in August 1976. It made Local Governments the third tier of government (after the Federal and State Governments) and brought government nearer to the people. Local Government elections held the following December partly prepared the Nigerian people for political participation after ten years of military dictatorship. Further measures to promote the return of civilian rule included the appointment of an Electoral Commission in October 1976 to conduct the state and federal elections, the Constituent Assembly which met from October 1977 to August 1979, and the promulgation of a new constitution, based on the American presidential system, into law in September 1978. The Constitution came into effect on October 1, 1979. Several sensitive issues debated by the Constituent Assembly included demand for the entrenchment of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the Constitution and a Revenue Allocation Formula. Following nation-wide elections in 1979, on multi-party basis, the new state and national legislatures met in October 1979, and returned Nigeria to civilian rule under President Shehu Shagari. The hand-over to civilian rule was one of the political successes of the Mohammed - Obasanjo Administration. The Administrations economic basis rested on the Third National Development Plan (1975 - 1980) earlier launched by General Gowon in March 1975, and subsequently modified by the MurtalaObasanjo Administration. The Plan sought to achieve annual real growth rate of 9.6 per cent, and provided for expansion of agriculture, heavy and petrochemical industries, infrastructure, housing and education. Agricultural policies and programmes to boost declining food production included the Accelerated Food Production Programme begun in 1974; various World Bank-assisted Agricultural Development Projects (ADP) begun in the mid 1970s; River Basin Development Authority Schemes and the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) begun by General Obasanjo in 1976. Others were an Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme particularly to smallscale farmers, the promulgation of a Land Use Decree in 1978 which nationalised all land, and the establishment of new Commodity Boards. Poor execution of these programmes, a relatively high population growth rate (3 per cent per annum compared with 2 per cent for food), and the premium placed on petroleum exports seriously detracted from the agricultural effort and output. Not only did traditional agricultural exports like palm produce, cotton, groundnut and cocoa decline, but also Nigerias food imports steadily rose; including imports of palm produce, which Nigeria had been a major world producer and exporter until the late 1960s. Major industrial and infrastructure developments included steel development, notably at Aladja, Oshogbo and Ajaokuta; new oil refineries built at Warri and Kaduna in 1978 and 1980, respectively, and new port and airport complexes, notably the Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Ikeja, which was opened in April, 1979. Although increasingly contributing to the GDP, industrialisation generally focused on import-substitution and assembly, using mostly foreign technical and managerial expertise despite Governments Indigenisation Policy. Impressive developments occurred in education and culture. Between 1976 and 1978, the Federal Government introduced Universal Free Primary Education (UPE), assumed responsibility for all the nations universities, and established a Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) which conducted its first university admissions in 1978 for the 1978/79 Session. The Federal Government also promulgated a new National Policy on Education known as the 6-3-3-4 designed to promote scientific, technical and vocational education and self- employment. To reduce regional imbalances in education, the Federal Nation-states all over the world design and implement foreign policies in order to guide their external relations as well as protect, promote and defend their vital national interests in areas such as defense of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests and whatever a country might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore naturally expected that Nigeria ’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or inaction in the international relations. Since the first republic, Nigeria ’s foreign policy had been largely Afro- centric in posture. In an official statement just before independence, on August 20, 1960, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa at the Federal House of Assembly stated that Nigeria was, “adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa ; it will be our aim to assist any country to find solution to its problem”. Similarly, one significant event that took place under late General Ironsi’s regime was the June 1966 Ambassadors’ Conference held in Lagos to re- examine the premises and directions of Nigeria ’s foreign policy. Among many other things, the conference re-dedicated Nigeria to the total emancipation of all African territories still under colonial tutelage and racial discrimination. This position was further reinforced when General Ironsi stated that, “in the whole sphere of external relations, the Government attaches greatest importance to our African policy”. It is under the above foreign policy directions, among others, that Nigeria ventured in to the complex theatre of international relations. This position could be appreciated when we consider the fact that successive regimes in Nigeria accorded significant attention to Africa as the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy. However, a cursory look at the various engagements made by Nigeria towards an African agenda in areas such peace keeping missions, decolonization of the continent as well as other bilateral and multilateral aid she rendered in the continent, would to a very large extent show that the omnibus nature of the principle of African centeredness in the Nigerian foreign policy does not appear to be well aligned to the country’s national interests or has not served the national interest in a commensurate measure. Nigeria has been in the forefront in the establishment and sustaining various continental and regional organizations. For instance, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established on May 25, 1963, was primarily aimed at achieving two important objectives, namely: to ensure the quick decolonization of the remaining colonies in Africa and secondly to facilitate the rapid socio-economic growth and development of African states. In this respect, Nigeria did a lot in ensuring the implementation of the primary objectives upon which OAU was founded. For instance, in 1975, Nigeria granted the sum of N 13.5 million and military assistance to Angola ’s MPLA and also enlisted diplomatic support for the Angolan government within the O.A.U.; this had greatly accorded recognition to the Angolan government by many African states who were hitherto unwilling to give such recognition. In addition to this, Nigeria contributed enormously to several liberation movements in the continent. This had therefore greatly contributed towards the political independence of most African countries. For instance, on February 13, 1976, Nigeria donated the sum of two million dollars $2m to South Africa ’s Africa National Congress, ANC, and 500,000 dollars to Namibia ’s South West African People’s Organization, SWAPO. SWAPO was later granted permission to open office in Lagos . At about the same time, the Federal Ministry of Information inaugurated a committee for dissemination of information about the evils of Apartheid. Fundamentally, the committee was to intimate the government with current news and activities of the racist regime in South Africa and advise the government on the best way to approach her anti- Apartheid policies as well as enlighten the public on the situation in South Africa . That is not all, as the federal government nationalized British assets in Nigeria when the latter chose to continue conducting business with South Africa . Consequently, in March 1978, the federal government directed all its ministries and parastatals to stop dealing with Barclays Bank, owned by Britain . In the same vein, the British Petroleum company (BP) was also nationalized in July 1979. In addition to all these, Lt. General Obasanjo, in December 1976 launched the Southern African Relief Fund. The money collected was sent to Angola , Namibia and South Africa ’s liberation forces. Similarly, taking into cognizance fundamental role of economic integration among contiguous states and given the very small nature of many West African states in terms of population and economic output, Nigeria , under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon spearheaded the formation of a 16-member regional integration body – ECOWAS - the treaty of which was signed on May 28, 1975. It is therefore essential to note that the phenomenal contributions made by Nigeria in the two organizations mentioned above have greatly contributed to the economic “prosperity” and political independence of many African countries. Nigeria ’s deep involvement in African affairs, a pursuit that had cost the country huge financial and human resources could be seen from other endeavors undertaken by the country in other African states. Let’s take for example Nigeria ’s involvement in the ECOWAS military intervention group, ECOMOG. As desirable as it was to bring peace and stability to the West African sub-region, the venture had cost the nation enormous financial recourses and unspecified number of troops who lost their lives. The above scenario was succinctly captured by Ambassador F. George who stated that, “The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional peace missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leon which cost the country the whooping sum US$ 10 billion, not to mention the gallant men and women of • Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace, are hardly acknowledged by the international community.” He further emphasized that this does include the sum of about US$ 90 billion that Nigeria single-handedly incurred in the OAU Peace Keeping Force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s.This is in addition to the sum of US$ 800 million Nigeria Trust Fund established under African Development Bank, ADB, to assist African countries obtain soft loan to execute vital projects. Surprisingly, it is with connivance of some of these African states that Nigeria was denied the presidency of ADB in an election that was held right on Nigerian soil. What a back-stab. Lately, the regime of President Obasanjo intended to refocus Nigeria’s foreign policy in order to de-emphasize the overly African bias when he announced to newly appointed ambassadors in 1999 that, “Nigeria’s foreign policy today extend, however, far beyond our concern for the well being of our continent, Africa”. He further pointed that, “The debt burden, for instance, is not an exclusively African predicament. Many countries in Asia, the Caribbean and the South America are facing similar problems. It is imperative therefore, that these regions harmonize their efforts in the search for a fairer deal from the industrialized nations of the west; and this requires of us a more global approach to world affairs than was previously the case”. The above statement spurred great expectations from various foreign policy experts, hoping that Nigeria would now enunciate and articulate more global vision in her foreign policy pursuit. Paradoxically, the nation became more involved in the African agenda. It could therefore be noted that Nigeria ’s role and initiative in drawing up the Constitutive Act of African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa ’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism have greatly engrossed the country even more deeply in African Affairs. Also under NEPAD, Nigeria initiated Joint Africa/G8 plan to enhance Africa ’s capability to undertake Peace Support Operations. In addition to the above endeavors, Nigeria’s high profile engagement in the continent continued with several summits and conferences such as the Roll-Back Malaria Summit held in Abuja on 24 th August, 2000; it was closely followed by the HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Summit also held in Abuja in 2001. While these engagements are worthy undertakings, they however tend to suck Nigeria intimately into the un- ending African problems. Nigeria ’s enviable commitment towards solving African problems could also be seen in various peace and mediation talks she hosted; these include hosting of mediation talks between Sudanese government and Darfurian rebel factions. She also mediated severally between various rebel factions in the Liberian crisis and eventually granted asylum to the former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to end crisis in that country. Before this, Somalia ’s Siad Barre was granted asylum here in Nigeria . Yormie Johnson of Liberia also found a home in this place. Further to this, the restoration to power of the President of Sao Tome and Principe, Mr. Frederique Menezes, after military take-over in July 2003 was largely credited to Nigeria under the leadership of President Obasanjo. In a similar vein, Nigeria succeeded in ensuring that due constitutional process was followed in installing democratically elected government in Togo , after the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in February, 2005. Further to all these peaceful diplomatic engagements which were aimed at solving other African nations problems, Nigeria recently lost about 44 soldiers in a ghastly motor accident along Gombe- Potiskum road. It could be recalled that the soldiers were just back from peace- keeping operations in Darfur . What a national tragedy in an attempt to keep peace in a sister African country. Recent xenophobic violence in South Africa where Nigerians were brutalized tempted one to ask if Nigerians deserve such brutality taking into consideration the fundamental role played by the country in dismantling apartheid. Also, the torture of a Nigerian, Mr. Adumekwe, by the Gabonese security agents who were said to have set his back on fire for 20 minutes is a big slap to Nigeria . This kind of inhuman treatment should have elicited very serious diplomatic action akin to that which followed the death of a Nigerian who died in the hands of Spanish officials while being deported. Certainly, the Gabonese security operatives may eventually do worse considering the way the case was treated by Nigeria . Therefore, taking into cognizance the contributions made by Nigeria towards African peace and development, one fundamental question that needs to be raised is, upon all these enviable roles and contributions which Nigeria made in the continent, can the nation afford to continue pursuing an African agenda at such a monumental cost without visible tangible benefits to the country and the country’s national interest? It seems that there is apparent disconnect between national interest and Nigeria-Africa relations. It is apparent that the nation is doing too much in the African continent without corresponding positive outcome. This phenomenon had attracted several comments by commentators on Nigeria ’s external relations. For instance, a policy and economic affairs analyst, Dr. Obadiah Mailafiya while commenting on the Nigerian foreign policy framework, graphically captures the above scenario when he says that “ the centerpiece of any country’s foreign policy ought to be that country itself if it seriously considers itself a rational actor on the world stage… Every single action shall be adjudged by how much it advances our national power and influence and how much it advances our interests, objectives, and purposes”. Similarly, another international relations expert, Professor Inno Ukaeje, while commenting on Nigerian foreign policy has this to say: “Our false generosity abroad and penury at home are proof that we are pretending to be what we are not, because in reality we have been overstretching ourselves”. One seems to agree with the above assertions, taking into consideration the enormous funds the nation expends in trying to solve various problems in Africa while internally, almost all the sectors in the country are yearning for massive injection of funds and above all the standard of living has been grossly low. Although Nigeria is rich in strategic mineral resources through which the nation earned excessive wealth with which it funds several activities towards solving other African problems, the scale of such expenditure greatly hurts our domestic aspirations. Our attention should be more focused towards achieving our vital national interests such as socio- economic growth and development so as to improve the standard of living of the populace. In this respect, Africa should no longer be the only reason for the existence of our external relations. We may wish to note that none of the developed nations build their foreign policy on one pillar/continent; they attach more premiums to their sense of national interest and pride which are anchored on socio- economic development of their nations and uplifting of their citizens’ standard of living. Nigeria shouldn’t be an exception in this regard, if it is to play meaningful role the in current global diplomatic scene. We need to pay significant premium in developing diplomatic relations with countries such as China , Singapore , Malaysia , among others. The belief is that these countries would benefit us more. In addition to this, our foreign policy as current Foreign Affairs Minister, Ojo Maduekwe said, should be citizen- centered; the government must be ready to defend Nigerians anywhere in the world. Their rights as human beings should not be violated and should be prosecuted in the court of law if they commit any crime. Lastly, there is an urgent need for the government to convene a foreign policy summit to, among others, address issues such as re- defining our national interest, refocusing our foreign policy in such a way that we will minimize loss and increase gains as well as tying it to the socio-economic growth and development of our great country. Nigeria’s fundamental principles of foreign policy have been fairly consistent since they were first espoused shortly after independence in October 1960. Yet the specific interests, priorities and emphasis of Nigeria’s foreign policy have continued to change and evolve in the context of the domestic and international environment. Introduction Since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, there have been a plethora of conceptual ideological transitions in the Nigeria foreign policy machinery. Essentially, they all strive towards an epistemological construction and definition of the thrust of Nigerias foreign policy. These conceptualizations are often regime specific and borne out of a psychological hunger to carve a regime identity that will create and leave lasting impressions on the minds of Nigerians. They are not necessarily products of deep and profound philosophical reflections. This crisis of myownism (regime identity) is one of the major causative agencies of project abandonment and public policy failure in Nigeria. The concepts that have bestraddle foreign policy thought in Nigeria, in both official and non-official parlance are: national consensus in foreign policy, dynamic foreign policy, Africa as the centre piece of Nigerias foreign policy, concentric cycles, concert of medium powers, economic diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy among many others. These conceptual mutations in Nigerian foreign policy engineering, we contend, lack any ideological consistency, operationally barren, philosophically vague, and such, an exercise in conceptual confusion and groping in the dark. We will assess some of these concepts one after the other in what follows. Conclusion We have demonstrated that since independence to date, although there have been conceptual and doctrinal transitions in Nigeria foreign policy, in reality they are not grounded in deep philosophical thought, visionary imagination and broad based considerations of long lasting benefits to the national interests. Basically, there are borne out of pragmatic exigencies, political faddism, conceptual elegance and regime identity. As a result, Nigerias foreign policy fifty one years down the road can be summed up to be change and continuity, motion without movement, dynamism without surge. What Nigeria need therefore is a foreign policy that will contain the crisis of underdevelopment, the challenges of poverty, leadership, political development, and a host of other maladies and launch her as a modern state in the twenty first century in order to realize her full potentials and cravings for continental and global leadership.
Posted on: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 11:28:10 +0000
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