The Relationship of Church and State, Part II - In the previous post (see Part I) we reviewed the religious nature of the early history of our Republic. We will now examine the evolution of the court’s position on the First Amendment. The early courts clearly understood the purpose of the First Amendment and their understanding is reflected in their decisions. [It is important to note at this time that state supreme courts were regarded as having greater authority in the early history of this country then now and that the United States Supreme Court only handled cases of unusual circumstances. (Barton, 1993, p.51)] In a case before the Supreme Court of New York in 1811, a defendant appealed a conviction of blasphemy by a local court. As a result of saying, “Jesus was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore,” the man was sentenced by the court to be imprisoned for three months and to pay a fine on $500. [People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns 545 Sup. Ct. N.Y. 91811)] Among other comments, Chief Justice James Kent stated: “Such words uttered with such a disposition were an offense at common law. …that Christianity was parcel of the law, and to cast continuous reproaches upon it, tended to weaken the foundation of moral obligation, and that the efficacy of oaths… that whatever strikes at the root of Christianity tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil government. The authorities show that blasphemy against God and … profane ridicule of Christ or the Holy Scriptures (which are equally treated as blasphemy), are offense punishable at common law, whether uttered by words or writings… because it tends to corrupt the morals of people and to destroy good order. Such offenses have always been considered independent of any religious establishment or rights of the Church. They are treated as affecting the essential interests of civil society…” (Ruggles, 1811) In an 1844 case before the United States Supreme Court, the probate of the will of the French native, Stephen Girard, was brought to question. In his will he bequeathed over seven million dollars in personal property to the city of Philadelphia to be used for an orphanage and college. Girard’s heirs argued that a trust could only be given to an individual and not a city. The actual suit centered on who would take control on the estate. The court ruled in favor of the city of Philadelphia, but an ancillary issue concerning religion was raised during the trial. The institutions were to be constructed and operated according to Girard’s specific instructions. He stipulated: “…no ecclesiastic, missionary , or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty in said college; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within its premises… My desire is, that all of the instructors and teachers in the college shall take pains to instill into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality.” [Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. 126,132 (1844)] The lawyers for the plaintiffs argued and the city’s attorneys agreed that, “The plan of education proposed is anti-Christian and, therefore, repugnant to the law.” (Vidal, 1844) The city’s attorneys’ further noted that: “The purest principles of morality are to be taught. Where are they found? Whoever searches for them must go to the source from which a Christian man derives his faith – the Bible… There is an obligation to teach what the Bible alone can teach, viz. a pure system of morality.” (Vidal, 1844) The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court was given by Justice Joseph Story: “Why may not a layman instruct in the general principles of Christianity as well as ecclesiastics… And we cannot overlook the blessings, which such [persons] by their conduct, as well as their instruction, may, nay, must implant to youthful pupils. Why may not the Bible, and especially the New Testament, without note or comment, be read and taught as a divine revelation in the [school], its general precepts expounded, its evidences explained, and its glorious principles of morality inculcated? Where can the purest principles of morality be learned so clearly or so perfectly as from the New Testament?” (Vidal, 1844) Upon this issue, all of the parties agreed. These are but a couple of the cases that illustrate the courts’ attitude, both at the state and federal level, toward religion in general and Christianity in particular. The United States Supreme court as late as 1931, and in a case involving the naturalization of a prospective citizen, stated: “We are a Christian people…according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God.” [United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,625 (1931)] The attitude of the United State Supreme Court took a dramatic turn in 1947 in the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education. [330 U.S. 1 67. S. Ct. 504 (1947)] The Court ruled that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the spending of tax dollars to pay bus fares for parochial school students. Significant in this case is that for the first time the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to apply the First Amendment against the states. It was also in this case that the argument was first used which declared that: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve of the slightest breech. (Everson, 1947)” It was in Everson that the Court took the position that neither the state nor the federal government could pass laws which aid one religion over another. The philosophy is a definite departure from the attitude of the Court in 1799. In Runkel v. Winemiller, [4 Harris & McHenry 276, 288 sup. Ct. Md. (1799) the Court stated: “By our form of government, the Christian religion is the established religion; and all sects and denominations of Christians are placed upon the same equal footing.” (Runkel, 1799) One of the United States Supreme Court’s most controversial decisions came in 1962. The issue centered upon a longstanding tradition of New York students to offer this simple prayer: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country.” [Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S 421, 422 (1962)] The court declared the use of this prayer to be unconstitutional, commenting that this activity was against the will and design of the Founding Fathers. The schools did not compel any student to participate if his parents objected and the prayer was nondenominational. However, the Court specifically ruled that: “[The prayer] ignores the essential nature of the program’s defects…Prayer in its public school system breaches the constitutional wall of separation of church and state…A union of government and religion tends to destroy and to degrade religion.” (Vitale, 1962) The terminology, “a wall between church and state,” as was earlier noted, first appeared in Everson and was used in respect to the First Amendment. Here again the words, “a constitutional wall of separation of church and state,” is used. The wording does not appear in the Constitution of the United States. It is found in a letter written by Thomas Jefferson on January 1, 1802 to the Danbury Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut. The Danbury Baptists had expressed a fear that a particular denomination could become the official church of the country. Jefferson’s letter was written to assure these individuals that the government would not establish any single denomination of Christianity as the national denomination. Jefferson’s intent was to show this denomination that the church would be protected from the state and not the reverse of this position. (Barton, 1993, p.41) The phrase was not used in any recorded discussions at the Constitutional Convention or in the development of the Bill of Rights. It is interesting how the United States Supreme Court, whose purpose is to interpret laws in light of the Constitution, would use a personal letter written in 1802 to justify a reversal of 150 years of court precedent. The Court continued in this direction with such decisions as those entered in Lemon v. Kurtzman. [403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, (1971)] Here the Court decided that state aid to parochial schools through salary supplements and purchase of services was in violation of the First Amendment. It was in this case that the Court established what became known as the Lemon Test. In this test the Court decided that a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that a statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. (Lemon, 1971) The Lemon Test has been used in subsequent decisions, one of the most notable being Wallace v. Jaffree. [472 U.S. 38 S. Ct. (1985)] In the Jaffree case, the Lemon Test was used to overrule a Texas statute authorizing a period of voluntary prayer or meditation in the public school. Although the Court ruled the statute to be unconstitutional, the dissenting opinion, given by Chief Justice Rehnquist, may form the groundwork for a change of direction in the future. In his opinion, the Chief Justice calls for an end to the Lemon Test and, through an historical review of the relationship of church and state in this country, appeals to a more favorable attitude of the Court toward the church. The direction that the Court takes in the matter of church and state will probably be determined by future appointments to the court made by the president. Unfortunately, this has become a political issue in the country. In selecting jurists on the basis of their political affiliation rather than their judicial qualifications, the Court has become more activist and less objective in its interpretation of law. A political court can create more mischief than it solves, as can be seen in the church and state argument.
Posted on: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 11:15:29 +0000