The Riyadh Narrative The 9/11 attacks undermined the Saudi regime’s ability to keep Ameri- cans and their government believing the Kingdom was a true, depend- able ally. With fifteen Saudi nationals among the nineteen mujahedin who committed the attacks, suspicions naturally and quickly formed in American minds and, to some extent, across the Western world. That idea that our Saudi friends might be duplicitous was reinforced when the Bush administration authorized the evacuation of bin Laden family members from the United States before they could be ques- tioned, probably because they were carrying Saudi diplomatic pass- ports that afforded immunity. The Saudis, then, had to keep their image of being a U.S. ally alive in the wake of seemingly definitive proof to the contrary. Fortunately for Riyadh, its damage-control effort was focused on an audience—the Bush administration—that wanted to believe the King- dom was a friend. While constructing the “good-Saudi-boy-led-astray- by-evil-Egyptians” narrative, the Saudis could rely on the bipartisan goodwill of most of official Washington; on U.S. media willingness to sell as much media air time as Saudis wanted to spread their Madison- Avenue-slick, pro-American propaganda commercials; on the willing- ness of journalists to lap up what high-ranking Saudis—especially Prince Turki al-Faisal—said about bin Laden; and on the pro-Saudi lobbying of Congress by U.S. arms makers who profit from Riyadh’s outsized military spending. Despite the willingness of its audience to be manipulated, the Saudis had to take care not to offend their domestic religious estab- lishment and its rough-hewn Afghan offspring, the Taleban. (It should be noted that the official breaking of ties between two Middle East entities—such as the post-9/11 Saudi-Taleban break—often means little or nothing substantively.) Were Osama bin Laden perceived as evil as opposed to misled by outsiders, the Saudi clerics and the edu- cational system they ran would be seen as blameworthy, deliberately producing evil Muslims at home as well as abroad, in the form of the 9/11 hijackers, Mullah Omar’s regime, and other Sunni Islamist groups. Such a portrait would offend Saudi religious leaders, increase domes- tic dissent and instability, and handicap the Saudi royals’ ability to ultimately restore a Taleban-like government in Kabul, their consis- tent foreign-policy goal for Afghanistan. Looked at in this context, the Saudis’ first propaganda initiative was a misstep. They identified Osama bin Laden’s mother as a Syrian- born outsider and the least favored of Muhammad bin Laden’s wives, and her son as a teenage wastrel renowned for brawling, drunkenness, and whoring in the bars of Beirut.33 Neither portrayal would wash, because neither was true. Osama’s mother, Allia, was well liked by the OSAMA BIN LADEN AS SUBJECT | 9 10 | OSAMA BIN LADEN large bin Laden family, and Osama’s reputation for piety and asceti- cism was untarnished. Only naïve or pro-Saudi Americans bought the story, and, more troubling for the regime, it reflected poorly on Saudi society, picturing it not as a pious society but as one characterized by bad marriages and roistering youth. Having failed in this first effort, the Saudi regime next crafted what has proven to be remarkably effective propaganda. It worked by dividing bin Laden’s life into two parts. In the first part—from childhood until the 1990–1991 Gulf War and its aftermath—Osama is portrayed as a well-mannered, family-oriented, hard working, and thoroughly pious son of one of the country’s most important, accomplished, and loyal families. The pre-1991 Osama loved his family, worked hard in school, and labored in his father’s company. (I have used “Osama” in parts of chapters 1–3 not for the sake of familiarity, but to avoid con- fusing him with other bin Ladens.) Like all good Saudi boys, he was educated in a faith that was nonviolent unless called to defend itself, as in Afghanistan. Then, again like all good Saudi boys, he shouldered his musket and went off to fight the Red Army. In the Riyadh scenario, no Sunni Muslim is an extremist or terrorist unless and until he becomes anti-al-Saud. This remains the case today. As a coda to bin Laden’s pre-1991 life, a number of significant Saudi figures—close boyhood friends, mujahedin, relatives, and regime princes, officials, and clerics—were wheeled out after 9/11 to express shock at what bin Laden stood accused of. Each explained that bin Laden was not at all worldly, and that as a young man he had shown neither leadership skills nor any desire for a leadership posi- tion. “What caused such a good Saudi boy to go bad?” The Saudi thes- pians who asked and answered the question were eagerly listened to and believed by credulous Westerners, and especially American jour- nalists. The key Saudi cast members follow.
Posted on: Mon, 26 Jan 2015 14:49:59 +0000
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