The contest over public resources is particularly severe because the early beneficiaries of these contests are winners in a game of class evolution that is likely to have consequences for generations to come. [...] Given the inherent unfairness involved in these processes it has been relatively easy to organize opposition [...] Opposition has typically been organized by members of the emerging middle class groups who have been left behind [...] Paradoxically, the opposition of these groups has often resulted in a second set of structural pressures generating high levels of corruption [...]. The opposition of organized groups has often had to be bought off by payoffs [...] to the most troublesome or vociferous opponents in an attempt to purchase support or legitimacy. [...] Here the state allocates resources to those with the greatest ability to create political problems... Mushtaq Khan, Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia, in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston Political Corruption. Concepts and Contexts, 3rd edition, 2007
Posted on: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 08:03:13 +0000
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