The process of interpreting and applying a statute must begin with the assumption that the purpose and meaning of the legislature are correctly and definitely expressed by the language employed in the act ; and the intention of the law-making body is first of all to be sought in the words of the statute, taking them in their natural and ordinary sense—words of common use in their commonly accepted signification and technical terms in their proper technical sense—and if, as thus read, they convey a clear and definite meaning, there is neither necessity nor justification for re- sorting to any extraneous considerations nor for supposing that the legislature may have intended something different from what it has thus expressed. It is beyond question the duty of courts, in construing statutes, to give effect to the intent of the law-making power, and to seek for that intent in every legitimate way. But in the construction, both of statutes and contracts, the intent of the framers and parties is to be sought, first of all, in the words employed, and if the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and, when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes and contracts should be read and understood according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. Courts cannot correct supposed errors, Omissions, or defects in legislation, or vary, by construction, the contracts of parties. The object of interpretation is to bring sense out of the words used, and not to bring a sense into them. When an act is expressed in clear and concise terms, and the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there can be no reason not to adopt the sense which it naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in order to find a different meaning, is not so much to interpret the statute as to elude it. When the words of an act are doubtful and uncertain, it was proper to inquire what was the intent of the legislature; but it is very dangerous for judges to launch out too far in searching into the intent of the legislature when they have expressed themselves in clear and plain words. So, in Edrichs Case, the judges said that they ought not to make any construction against the express letter of the statute; for nothing can so express the meaning of the makers of the act as their own direct words, for index animi sermo. And it would be dangerous to give scope to make a construction in any case against the express words, when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the contrary, and when no inconvenience will thereupon follow; and therefore in such cases a verbis legis non est recedendum. Although the spirit of an instrument, especially of the Constitution, says the Supreme Court of the United States, is to be respected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words. It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances that a case for which the words of the instrument expressly provided shall be exempted from its operation. Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of the instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable. But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of the instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a definite and sensible meaning, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the obvious meaning, of the words employed, without attempting to change it by adopting i. different construction, based upon some supposed policy of the legislature with reference to the subject-matter, or upon considerations of injustice or inconvenience resulting from the literal interpretation of the statute, or even to give the law that efficiency and due effect which it will lack when taken literally as it stands. In the case supposed, where the language of the statute is free from ambiguity and conveys a definite and sensible meaning, the courts should not hesitate to give it a literal interpretation merely because they have doubts as to the wisdom or expediency of the enactment. In such a case, these are not pertinent inquiries for the judicial tribunals. If there be any unwisdom in the law, it is for the legisla- ture to remedy it. For the courts the only rule is ita lex scripta est. Neither have the judges any authority, in such a case, to put upon the statute a construction different from its natural and obvious meaning in consideration of the consequences which may result from it. Any evil consequences to the public which may flow from the statute may be considered when its meaning is doubtful, in order to give it a more beneficial construction, but when the legislative intent is clearly expressed, such consequences cannot be at all considered. And it has been said: If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the functions of iegis lators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning. Even if the court is fully persuaded that the legislature really meant and intended something entirely different from what it actually enacted, and that the failure to convey the real meaning was due to inadvertence or mistake in the use of language, yet, if the words chosen by the legislature are not obscure or ambiguous, but convey a precise and sensible meaning (excluding the case of obvious clerical errors or elliptical forms of expression), then the court must take the law as it finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being influenced by the probable legislative meaning lying back of the words. In that event, the presumption that the legislature meant what it said, though it be contrary to the evident fact, is conclusive. A good illustration of this rule is found in the case of Woodbury v. Berry. It appeared that a section of the code of Ohio provided that when a motion was made to amerce a sheriff or other officer for neglect of duty, he should have two days written notice thereof. A subsequent section, which was copied from an earlier statute, provided that in all cases of a motion to amerce a sheriff or other officer of any county from which the execution issued, he should have a much longer notice. The court said: It certainly is difficult, if not impossible, to find any reason why an officer sought to be amerced by motion in the court of his own county should be thus favored in the matter of notice, while, on the other hand, the circumstances of the case to be provided for seem to require that the nonresident officer ought to be thus favored. These considerations, and a comparison of the provisions of these sections of the statute, as they stand, with those of the statute which was superseded and repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure, not only suggest the conjecture, but convince us of the fact, that the words other than the county, or some equivalent phrase, must have been, by accident or oversight of the draftsman of the bill to establish a Code of Civil Procedure, or of the clerk who engrossed it, omitted before the words from which the execution issued in section 455. But notwithstainding all this, ita lex scripta est. The language as it stands is clear, explicit, and unequivocal. It leaves no room for interpretation, for nothing in the language employed is doubtful. We are satisfied, by considerations outside the language, that the legislature intended to enact something very different from what it did enact. But it did not carry out its intention, and we cannot take the will for the deed. It is our legitimate function to interpret legislation, but not to supply its omissions. On the same principle, the literal interpretation cannot be refused, where there is no ambiguity or want of sense, even though the result should be to defeat the very .object and purpose of the enactment. Lord Tenterden once said : Our decision may perhaps, in this particular case, operate to defeat the object of the statute; but it is better to abide by this consequence than to put upon it a construction not warranted by the words of the act, in order to give effect to what we may suppose to have been the intention of the legislature. And though the literal interpretation should permit evasions of the statute, yet, if there is no ambiguity in the law, this consideration cannot be allowed to modify the construction to be put upon it. For example, in an English case,^° it appeared that a bill of sale had been given by one Price to the plaintiff, but, instead of its being registered before the expiration of the twenty-one days allowed for that purpose by the statute of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, another bill of sale was given by Price to the plaintiff in exchange for the first. This was done many successive times, and ultimately the bill of sale last given was registered before the expiration of twenty-one days from the day on which that bill (the last) had been given. Defendant took Prices goods in execution, and plaintiff brought suit. In defense, it was charged that the transactions and course of dealing between Price and the, plaintiff were fraudulent. This was unquestionably true. Yet the court was constrained to hold that the plain terms of the law had been literally complied with, and the bill of sale must be held valid. Although the spirit and purpose of the act had thus been successfully evaded, yet its language being free from ambiguity, it could not be construed to cover the case in hand. But if the statute is ambiguous, so as to be fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation, then the courts may rightfully exercise the power of controlling its language, so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature, as the same shall be ascertained and determined from pertinent and admissible considerations. But it is necessary to remember that the intention of the law-making power is to be ascertained by a reasonable construction to be given to the provisions of the act, and not one founded on mere arbitrary conjecture. And it is always the actual meaning of the legislature which must be sought out and followed, and not the judges own ideas as to what the law should be. It must be borne in mind that it is not competent to a judge to modify the language of an act of parliament in order to bring it into accordance with his own views as to what is right or reasonable. Finally, although every law must be construed according to the intention of the makers, that intention is never resorted to for any other purpose than to ascertain what they in fact intended to do, and not for the purpose of ascertaining what they have done; that is, the object is to ascertain what the legislature intended to enact, but not to ascertain what is the legal consequence and effect of what they did enact. Black
Posted on: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 00:24:19 +0000
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