The question of what approach does work when thinking about how to counter insurgents once pushed a West Point graduate and veteran to pursue a PhD at Princeton. His thesis—”The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam,”—would go on to become the U.S. Military Doctrine of Counterinsurgency, or COIN, and would be implemented by this same person in the U.S. Military’s post-war efforts to quell insurgencies in Iraq—which included suicide bombings and the targeting of civilians. This person is General David Petraeus. The main thesis of COIN is surprisingly simple, almost obvious: An insurgency cannot be defeated exclusively with military force. Rather, military tactics must be combined with a campaign to win over the occupied territory’s population, depriving the insurgents of their crucial support—financial, territorial, moral. This is called the “hearts and minds” approach, for its focus on political, psychological, and economic change in the local population, rather than on simply eliminating insurgents. “Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the Host Nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (though, again, killing clearly will often be necessary),” states the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written by Gen. Petraeus and issued in 2006. “Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds… While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when “money is ammunition.” Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel.” In the same vein, Petraeus points out that, “As important as they are in achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in COIN.” The Field Manual is surprisingly common-sensical, and includes a set of “paradoxes,” such as, “Sometimes, the More Force is Used, the Less Effective It Is” and “Sometimes Doing Nothing is the Best Reaction.” It also states that “[a]ny use of force generates a series of reactions,” and “[t]here may be times when overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace.” However, the Manual goes on, “[a]n operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more insurgents.”
Posted on: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 09:16:52 +0000
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