The Tractatus ————————————————————————————————————– tractātus (noun); touching, handling, working management, treatment treatise, tract sermon, homily The purpose of this work is create a unified philosophical system to equip professional philosophers and theologians with the tools needed to refute many of the deeply influential errors that define the intellectual climate of our time. These errors affect the thinking of atheists and those critical of Christian claims, but many errors are endemic to the vast majority of Christian apologetics efforts, and these mistakes give rise to a justifiable skepticism of Christian thought by the culture at large. We intend that the premises used in developing this reasoning will be shared by the vast majority of philosophers whether they are atheists or devout Catholics. Principles such as logical truth, scientific method, and non-controversially valid modes of inference will be the sole basis for argumentation. Few epistemological commitments beyond these essential givens are required. In view of its immediate interest to our readers, the developing content will be posted here as it is being written regardless of whether it is visibly incomplete, conceptually imperfect, in need of editing, or not fully understandable. The work will be under a continual process of ongoing refinement, especially in response to the questions and criticisms submitted by others. Those interested in submitting a response may do so through the “email us” link at the bottom of any page on this site. The dialectic method evinced in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica with be the chosen format because of its elegance and utility. We hope this work will be of assistance to anyone seeking truth. —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— THE TRACTATUS (copyright 2012-2013, NewApologetics) —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————– PART I: REASONING CONCERNING METAPHILOSOPHY, THE FAILURE OF ARGUMENTS FROM EVIL, THE LOGICAL NECESSITY OF GOD, AND THE NATURE OF TRUE THEODICY Article 1: WHETHER THE QUESTION OF GOD’S EXISTENCE IS TO BE DECIDED ACCORDING TO ORDINARY RULES OF EVIDENCE Objection 1. It seems that ordinary rules of evidence need, of necessity, be applied to the question of whether or not God exists. For, if evidentiary considerations are to be ignored, then persons of honest inquiry have no means to distinguish truth from falsehood in this most important of all questions. Objection 2. Further, rules of evidence are established in man’s quest for knowledge specifically because of their demonstrated reliability in minimizing unnecessary error. It follows that if no superior methodology is available, then the most reliable known methodology should prevail. Objection 3. Further, reason demands that extraordinary claims (such as those of the religious believer), require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, not only does the question of God’s existence require deference to the rules of evidence, but it does so in a way that must be supported well beyond the evidence sought for ordinary claims. On the contrary, It has long been established without controversy among logicians (regardless of their theistic or atheist persuasions) and well-informed philosophers that modal logic shows that the answer to the question of God’s existence is determined prior to evidentiary considerations. I answer that, Within the system of S5 modal logic it is provable that (because of God’s purported modal status as a necessary being), that “If it is logically possible that God exists, then it is logically necessary that God exists.” The proof is as follows: “q” = There is a perfect being, “N” = It is logically necessary that, “~” = It is not the case that, “v” = or, and “p -> q” = p strictly implies q: (1) q -> Nq (Anselm’s principle) (2) Nq v ~Nq (excluded middle) (3) ~Nq -> N~Nq (Becker’s postulate) (4) Nq v N~Nq (from 2 and 3) (5) N~Nq -> N~q (from 1) (6) Nq v N~q (from 4 and 5) (7) ~N~q (intuitive postulate) (8) Nq (from 6 and 7) (9) Nq -> q (modal axiom) (10) q (from 8 and 9) As a consequence of this, the question of the existence of God is settled entirely at the level of whether or not logical possibility (or the mere admission of the coherence of the concept of God) is granted. Because all considerations of evidence presuppose the logical possibility of what is being investigated, and cannot demonstrate it, it then follows that the question of God’s existence is determined epistemically prior to any rules of evidence being applied to the matter. Response to Objection 1. It is not the case that rules of evidence are ignored with regard to the question of God, but that they are superseded by the more epistemically basic laws of logic itself. Because well established logical truths are known to entail the proposition “God necessarily exists” once the logical possibility of that proposition is granted, no evidence can possibly provide a surer basis for the conclusion. Response to Objection 2. It is well known among logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, and scientists that the truths of logic and math are more reliable and rationally basic than the rules of evidence which presuppose these most fundamental necessary truths. Response to Objection 3. The modal ontological proof in S5 shows definitively that once the logical possibility of God is granted, then the actuality of God is a logically necessary conclusion. This conclusion follows inescapably much as 2+2=4, regardless of how extraordinary, improbable, or repugnant one considers it to be. Article 1.1: WHETHER SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE CAN POSSIBLY PROVIDE EVIDENCE FOR OR AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Article 1.2: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 IS A PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD ANY MORE THAN IT IS A PROOF FOR ATHEISM Article 1.3: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 IS A PROOF OF ATHEISM ONCE THE WORK OF SCIENTIFIC APOLOGETICS IS ASSUMED TO BE LEGITIMATE Article 1.4: WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY PREMISE OF THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 CAN BE SUPPORTED MORE PLAUSIBLY THAN ITS NEGATION Article 1.5: WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY PREMISE OF THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 CAN BE PROVEN INDEPENDENTLY OF THEISTIC ASSUMPTIONS Article 1.6: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 IS A TAUTOLOGY BECAUSE IT IS A PROOF FROM PURE LOGIC WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY EMPIRICAL DATA Article 1.7: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 IS SUBJECT TO THE KANTIAN CRITICISM OF THE CARTESIAN ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT Article 1.8: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM S5 IS A PECULIARITY OF S5 LOGIC AND CANNOT BE SOUNDLY STATED IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE APART FROM THE ASSUMPTIONS OF S5 —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— Article 2: WHETHER ARGUMENTS FROM EVIL IN ANY FORM CAN BE USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOD OF CHRISTIAN THEISM Objection 1, It seems that arguments from evil can be used to conclusively disprove the existence of the God of Christian theism. It is known with certainty that no logically impossible situation can actually obtain. We also know that the existence of a God who is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing is logically incompatible with the existence of evil of any kind. Consider the words of Epicurus: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” Because we do know that there is evil, we can conclude with certainty that there is no God. Objection 2, Further, even if it were granted that the existence of God is logically compatible with certain kinds of evil (viz., those evils which can be used to develop stoic virtue), it is not the case that the existence of God is compatible with the number and kinds of evils that actually occur. While some evils may be potentially instructive, there are horrendous evils which have no possible instructive purpose and cannot be reconciled with the existence of an all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing God. Objection 3, Further, assuming broadly that it were logically possible for God and evil (in all of its possible forms) to coexist without direct logical contradiction, it remains the case that very strong inductive arguments against the existence of God can be formulated. Consider that if there were an orphanage which was daily pillaged by marauders, it would be unreasonable to conclude that there were hundreds of expertly competent guards of goodwill vigilantly seeing to the welfare of the children. The warrant for this conclusion is especially obvious if those unlikely guards cannot be seen or verified by any empirical method. Though it is (trivially) logically possible that such guards are on duty, a reasonable person would conclude (through inductive inference of the strongest kind) that security measures at the orphanage are probably inadequate. Similarly, because of the evil in the world, reasonable people must conclude that it is unlikely that there is an omnipotent, omniscient God who loves humanity and seeks to defend us from evil. On the contrary, Reason alone can demonstrate with certainty that arguments from evil (regardless of their form) cannot be used as evidence against the existence of the God of Christian theism. I answer that, The demonstration must be made in two parts. The first part refutes all deductive arguments from evil in principle, and the second refutes all inductive arguments from evil in principle. Given that all reasoning must proceed from either a deductive or inductive basis for inference, it is thus shown that no argument from evil can be successful. The two parts now follow: Part 1: The Limited Knowledge Defense (LKD) in Refutation of all Deductive Arguments from Evil: 1) If some deductive argument from evil is sound, then there is a logical incompatibility between the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence and the existence of some evil state of affairs. 2) It is not the case that there is a logical incompatibility between the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence and the existence of any evil state of affairs. [Limits of human knowledge must be admitted in that there logically possibly could be a morally exonerating reason for God’s non-prevention of even horrendous evils even if we do not know what that reason is, and this is true even if we have no viable hypothesis as to what it could possibly be. In order to prove this premise, one simply has to recognize that it is coherent to suppose that there could be limits to human knowledge on this topic. Provided there is possibly an unknown morally exonerating reason for God’s non-prevention of evil, there is no logical contradiction between the divine attributes and the existence of evil of any form.] 3) It is not the case that any deductive argument from evil is sound. [From 1 and 2 modus tollens] Part 2: The Expectations Defense (ED) in Refutation of all Inductive Arguments from Evil: 1) If some form of an inductive argument from evil can provide evidence against the existence of the God of Christian theism, then one should not expect evil (of whatever form referenced by the particular argument in question) to exist if the God of Christian theism exists. [This expectation of the improbability of the coexistence of the God of Christian theism with a given kind of evil is the only possible basis for any inductive judgment that the reality of a particular type of evil makes the existence of the Christian God improbable.] 2) One should expect there to be evils (of every kind to be potentially referenced by any inductive argument from evil) if the God of Christian theism exists. [If it is the case that the God of Christian theism exists, then at least certain aspects of the Bible are generally historically accurate. In these parts of the Bible, there are evils of all types corresponding to a realistic description of the human condition concerning the experience of moral evil, suffering, and death. Furthermore the existence of these evils is explicitly guaranteed up until the return of Christ at the end of the world.] 3) No inductive argument from evil can provide evidence against the existence of the God of Christian theism. [from 1 and 2 modus tollens] Response to Objection 1. LKD shows that this argument is invalid. If it is logically possible that there is a morally exonerating reason for a good God to not prevent evil, then there is simply no logical incompatibility between the divine attributes and the existence of evil of any kind. Response to Objection 2. LKD shows that this argument is invalid. It is, admittedly, prima facie impossible that there be a purpose in horrendous evils, but this absence of intrinsic purpose says nothing about whether or not there is a possible morally exonerating reason for God’s non-prevention of them. Horrendous evils need not be permitted because of any “means to an end” purpose to be found in the evils themselves. Indeed, there may be deep implications concerning the morality of divine intervention in the world which have not been explored in known theological discourse. Recognition of the limits of human knowledge is enough to establish the logical possibility that there is a morally exonerating reason for God’s non-prevention of even horrendous evils despite their prima facie uselessness for any hypothetical purpose. Response to Objection 3. ED shows that arguments of this type fail definitively because we should expect there to be evils of all humanly experienced types until the end of the world if the God of Christian theism exists. Given that we should expect these evils if God exists, they cannot be used as evidence to show that the existence of God is improbable. Article 2.1: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE OR THE EXPECTATIONS DEFENSE DEPENDS ON ANY ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVITY OF GOOD AND EVIL Article 2.2: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE ENTAILS “SKEPTICAL THEISM” Article 2.3: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE OR THE EXPECTATIONS DEFENSE ENTAILS ANY THEODICICAL CONCLUSIONS Article 2.4: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE OR THE EXPECTATIONS DEFENSE ENTAILS THAT HUMAN SUFFERING AND DEATH ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED PERFECTLY OFFENSIVE TO THE HUMAN PERSON Article 2.5: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE OR THE EXPECTATIONS DEFENSE ENTAILS THAT HUMAN SUFFERING AND DEATH ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED INFINITELY OFFENSIVE TO GOD Article 2.6: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE IS CONCEPTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE “UNKNOWN PURPOSE DEFENSE” Article 2.7: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN THEISM ENTAILS THAT THERE ARE SOME EVILS THAT ARE NON-GRATUITOUS Article 2.8: WHETHER THE CONCLUSION THAT ALL EVILS ARE GRATUITOUS IN AND OF THEMSELVES EXCLUDES THE POSSIBILITY THAT GOD DRAWS GREATER GOOD OUT OF EVERY EVIL Article 2.9: WHETHER THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE AND THE EXPECTATIONS DEFENSE CAN BE GENERALIZED TO SOUNDLY REFUTE ALL VARIANTS OF ARGUMENTS FROM NON-BELIEF AND CONFUSION ——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————- Article 3: WHETHER THERE EXISTS A LOGICALLY NECESSARY GUARANTOR OF PERFECT JUSTICE Objection 1. It seems that the existence of a guarantor of perfect justice is impossible. If such a being were to exist, then there would be no reasonable and informed persons in despair of there being perfect justice because it would be unjust that their situation proceed without intervention. But there are many reasonable and informed people who are in despair of perfect justice. Therefore, a guarantor of perfect justice cannot exist. Objection 2. Further, perfect justice is a concept that is at least partially subjective. What seems perfectly just to one person may not be so according to the evaluative standard of another. Hence, a guarantor of perfect justice cannot exist because there is no objective meaning to the term “perfect justice.” Objection 3. Further, if there were a guarantor of perfect justice, then no unjust situations would obtain. However, there are many situations which are, in the assessment of all reasonable people, entirely unjust. Since these situations do obtain, it follows that a guarantor of perfect justice cannot exist. Objection 4. Further, it can easily be shown that it is logically impossible for any being (regardless of its power) to make just any situation that was once unjust. Consider that it is necessarily true that no perfectly just situation can come from a standpoint of “what ought not to have been” because the purportedly “just” end situation is degraded by the diminishment of its unjust origination point. It therefore follows that it is logically impossible for any being to cause an unjust situation to be perfectly just again regardless of the power brought to bear upon that situation. This logical impossibility, combined with the fact that there are many unjust situations, allows us to conclude that no guarantor of perfect justice can exist. On the contrary, The Catechism of the Catholic Church, quoting Julian of Norwich, states: “Here I was taught by the grace of God that I should steadfastly keep me in the faith… and that at the same time I should take my stand on and earnestly believe in what our Lord shewed in this time – that “all manner [of] thing shall be well.” (CCC, paragraph 313) I answer that, The existence of a logically necessary guarantor of perfect justice can be demonstrated by means of the following modal ontological argument: The Modal Ontological Argument from Divine Justice Axiom 1: If a given property “a” is not compatible with some other property “b”, then it is compatible with its complement, “non-b.” [Let “a” equal any property and let “b” equal any other property. For any property “a”, necessarily one of the following is true: 1) Property “a” is compatible with either property “b” or its complement, “non-b.” 2) Property “a” is compatible with both property “b” and its complement, “non-b.” For example, “being blue” (a) is compatible with “being colored” (b), but is not compatible with “not being colored” (non-b). Further, “being blue” (a) is compatible with “being a crayon” (b) and “not being a crayon” (non-b). However, it is not possible that the property “being blue” is compatible with neither property “b” nor its complement, “non-b” regardless of what those properties are. Definition 1: A given situation is unjust iff it can possibly be considered to be lacking some due good by some coherent evaluative standard. Axiom 2: No unjust situation can be logically necessary. [For any instance of injustice, there is a logically possible situation in which a just state of affairs replaces the unjust one. For example, if a guilty man is unjustly acquitted, there is a logically possible situation in which he is found guilty. If an innocent man is unjustly condemned, there is a logically possible situation in which he is never accused. A given situation is unjust only in contrast to a logically possible just version of that situation.] Definition 2: A given property is “situationally necessary” iff it is exemplified in every possible situation. [Some examples of situationally necessary properties are “being self- consistent”, “not being self-contradictory”, “being a situation”, “being something”, “being such that 2+2=4”, and so on.] Axiom 3: If it is possible that a given property is situationally necessary, then it is situationally necessary. [The conclusion that “If it is possible that x is necessary, then x is necessary” is an established theorem of S5 modal logic. By the same logic, we know that if it is possible that a given property is exemplified in every possible situation, then it is necessary that that property is exemplified in every possible situation.] The Argument: If the property of “being situationally necessary” is not compatible with another given property, then it is compatible with the complement of that property. [from Axiom 1] The property of “being situationally necessary” is not compatible with the property “being an unjust situation.” [From Axiom 2] The property of “being situationally necessary” is compatible with “not being an unjust situation” [from Axiom 1 and premise 2] If the property of “being situationally necessary” is compatible with “not being an unjust situation”, then the property of “not being an unjust situation” is situationally necessary. [from Axiom 3 and premise 3] The property of “not being an unjust situation” is situationally necessary. [from 3 and 4 modus ponens] Since “not being an unjust situation” is situationally necessary, either there is no sense to the concept of “injustice”, or there is an infallible justice-making power which is also situationally necessary. The action of this power “redeems” and transforms unjust situations reconciling them to perfect justice. Such a reconciliation would have to be metaphysically coextensive with the commission of the injustice itself such that every situation is transubstantiated to be exactly the right thing at the right time, otherwise “not being an unjust situation” could not be situationally necessary. It is not the case that there is no sense to the concept of injustice. There is a situationally necessary justice-making power. [from 6 and 7 modus tollendo ponens] Response to Objection 1. Provided that it is logically possible for there to be an unknown morally exonerating reason why it cannot be inescapably shown (beyond the possibility of doubt) to suffering people that there is a guarantor of perfect justice, then this objection does not hold. It is logically possible that there is an unknown morally exonerating reason for such a lack of direct incontrovertible intervention. Therefore, Objection 1 does not hold. It need not be that the unknown reason remains unknown nor that it be intrinsically unknowable. However, the mere logical possibility of positing the existence of such an unknown reason is enough to refute objection 1. [Note: The presently unknown reason will be discussed in a separate article specifically dedicated to its explication.] Response to Objection 2. The fact of there being some subjectivity to perceptions of justice does not in any way exclude the possibility of there being an objectively perfectly just situation which meets or superabundantly exceeds all of these subjective evaluative variations. It may be the case that many standards of evaluation are themselves conditioned by injustice and in need of remediation. The mere logical possibility that this is so is enough to refute Objection 2. Response to Objection 3. This objection fails because it is logically possible that there is a morally exonerating reason why a guarantor of perfect justice does not prevent unjust situations from happening, but rather somehow “redeems” them by making them consistent with perfect justice. As with Objection 1, it need not be that the morally exonerating reason remains unknown nor must it be intrinsically unknowable. However, the logical possibility of positing the existence of such an unknown reason is enough to refute objection 3. [Note: The presently unknown reason for "redeeming" rather than preventing injustices will be discussed in a separate article specifically dedicated to its explication.] Response to Objection 4. This objection is legitimate only if there is some point in time at which a situation is unjust, and then at a later time it is rendered just. However, it is logically possible that the reconciliation of an unjust situation to perfect justice is not a temporal transition, but an atemporal transformation which is metaphysically coextensive with every point in space and time. On such a model, there would never be a time in which a bad situation was not reconciled to perfect justice, but it would be true that through the redemptive action of the guarantor of perfect justice, “the facts ought to be the case” at all times regardless of their appearance. As Julian of Norwich says: “And therefore when the judgment is given, and we are all brought up above, we shall then clearly see in God the mysteries which are now hidden from us. And then shall none of us be moved to say in any manner: Lord, if it had been so, it would have been well. But we shall all say with one voice: Lord, blessed may you be, because it is so, it is well; and now we see truly that everything is done as it was ordained by you before anything was made.” Article 3.1: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE JUSTICE DEPENDS ON UNSTATED PREMISES CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL VALUES Article 3.2: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE JUSTICE DEPENDS ON UNSTATED PREMISES CONCERNING THE COHERENCE OF A PARTICULAR CONCEPT OF GOD Article 3.3: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE JUSTICE ENTAILS MORAL RELATIVISM GIVEN ITS AFFIRMATION OF THE NOTION OF SUBJECTIVE JUSTICE Article 3.4: WHETHER MORAL VALUES ARE OBJECTIVE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE TRUTH OF THEISM Article 3.5: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE JUSTICE IS A PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD WHEN GOD IS DEFINED AS “THAT THAN WHICH NONE GREATER CAN BE CONCEIVED” Article 3.6: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE JUSTICE IS A PROOF FOR THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN THEISM Article 3.7: WHETHER THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE JUSTICE IS A PROOF FOR THE TRUTH OF CATHOLICISM Article 3.8: WHETHER IT IS MORALLY PRAISEWORTHY FOR ATHEISTS TO REJECT RELIGIOUS CLAIMS DUE TO A PERCEIVED COMPROMISE WITH EVIL ON THE PART OF THE DEITY DESCRIBED BY THOSE CLAIMS Article 3.9: WHETHER IT IS MORALLY BLAMEWORTHY FOR THEISTS TO ACCEPT AND ADVOCATE RELIGIOUS CLAIMS DUE TO A PURPORTED THREAT FROM GOD LEVIED UPON NON-BELIEVERS Article 3.10: WHETHER THE EXISTENCE OF A LOGICALLY NECESSARY GUARANTOR OF PERFECT JUSTICE IS INDEPENDENTLY DERIVABLE FROM MALLEY’S DEONTIC LOGIC —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————– Article 4: WHETHER THE TRUE THEODICY CAN BE KNOWN BY HUMAN BEINGS Article 4.1: WHETHER THE TRUE THEODICY CAN BE DISCERNED BY REASON ALONE —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— PART II: REASONING ON THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD FROM METAPHYSICAL TRUTH AND FROM OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE HUMAN PERSON Article 5: WHETHER IT CAN BE KNOWN WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING Objection 1. It seems that it cannot be known why there is something rather than nothing. Supposing it could be known, such knowledge would only be possible on the condition that the knower comprehended all of reality so as to have insight into being at its most fundamental level. Because such knowledge is inaccessible to finite minds, it follows that the question of why there is something rather than nothing cannot be answered. Objection 2. Further, knowledge of causes cannot proceed past being itself. Therefore, an attempt to answer to the question of the cause of there being something rather than nothing is not a coherently conceived investigation. Objection 3. Further, whatever can be considered an answer to this question is not, itself, immune from the question. It can always be asked “Why this rather than something else?” On the contrary, The Church teaches: “Human intelligence is surely already capable of finding a response to the question of origins.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 286) I answer that, An analysis of the possible answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing illumines that there is only one reasonable answer to the question. The following argument serves to demonstrate this: 1) The correct explanation of why there is anything at all is either in terms of being or non-being. 2) It is not the case that the correct explanation of why there is anything at all is in terms of non-being. 3) Therefore, the correct explanation of why there is anything at all is in terms of being. [From 1 and 2, modus tollendo ponens] 4) If the explanation of why there is something rather than nothing is in terms of being, then it is either in terms of some being or set of beings which ultimately depends on something else, or it is in terms of some metaphysically ultimate reality which exists a se, that is without dependency on any other concrete object or set of objects. 5) It is not the case that the correct explanation is in terms of some being or set of beings which ultimately depends on something else. 6) The correct explanation is in terms of some metaphysically ultimate reality which exists a se, that is without dependency on any other concrete object or set of objects. [From 4 and 5, modus tollendo ponens] Reply to Objection 1. It is not the case that the knowledge that there is some ultimate reality existing a se requires a full comprehension of reality. Rather, the answer is attained through a process of elimination by which impossible answers are excluded. We arrive at the explanation of why there is something rather than nothing by excluding explanations in terms of non-being and metaphysically dependent beings. Therefore, we are left with the conclusion that there exists something a se. Reply to Objection 2. This objection presumes that the answer must be in terms of some external cause for the existence of any given being, but this is not reasonable because it illegitimately excludes the possibility that something may exist a se. Reply to Objection 3. The nature of whatever exists a se is such that its essence and existence are identical. In other words, there is no distinction between the “what” of its existence and the fact that it does indeed exist. The question of why this being exists with aseity rather than some other is not a coherent question as the “other” (in order to be other) must have an essence mixed with contingent or conditional properties which are inherently incompatible with existing a se. —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— ARTICLE 5.1: WHETHER THAT WHICH EXISTS A SE IS SIMPLE OR COMPLEX Objection 1. It seems that that which exists a se is complex. Supposing it to be simple, (viz., without parts), it follows that it could not give rise to the vast complexities observable in reality. For whatever is truly simple, by the fact of having no parts, can neither be altered nor can it change within itself to produce the variegated array of contingent things which we perceive to be real. Objection 2. Further, if that which exists a se is entirely simple, then it cannot be the ultimate substratum of spatiotemporal things. Consider that if something has spatial dimension, then it is divisible into parts and is both metaphysically dependent on those parts and dependent on the existence of space-time. Therefore, if that which exists a se is entirely simple, it cannot have spatial dimension. But if it has no spatial dimension, then it cannot be the ultimate ground of spatiotemporal things because it cannot contribute to the composition of those things being of zero spatial dimension itself. On the contrary, The Church teaches that God is perfectly simple: “We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three Persons indeed but one essense, substance, or nature absolutely simple …” (Fourth Council of the Lateran, 1215) “[God] is one, singular, completely simple …” (Vatican I, chapter 1, § 2, 1870) “Admittedly, in speaking about God like this, our language is using human modes of expression; nevertheless it really does attain to God himself, though unable to express him in his infinite simplicity.” (CCC, 43) I answer that, The simplicity of that which exists a se can be demonstrated by means of the following argument: 1) That which exists a se is either complex or it is non-complex. [For the purpose of this argument, something is defined to be complex if and only if it has parts.] 2) It is not the case that whatever exists a se is complex. [Whatever is complex always depends on simpler parts for its being. For example, in the case of a complex entity like a chair, it is dependent on the existence of simpler things, such as individual molecules. These complex molecules are, in turn, dependent on simpler things, such as atoms, which are similarly dependent on subatomic particles. Consequently, it is absurd to say that a chair exists a se. Being complex, it necessarily depends on more basic components for its being.] 3) Whatever exists a se is non-complex. [From 1 and 2, modus tollendo ponens] Reply to Objection 1. This objection presupposes that the only way for something with aseity to give rise to dependent beings is for it to change in its own nature. This is simply an incorrect assumption which will be further explored in Article 5.2 Reply to Objection 2. This objection presupposes that the only way for something with aseity to engender spatiotemporal beings is for it to compose them substantially. This is another incorrect assumption which will be further explored in Article 5.2 —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— PART III: REASONING CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE REDEMPTION AND ITS EFFECTS PART IV: REASONING CONCERNING THE PARADIGM OF HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY AND SPIRITUALITY Note: The Tractatus will be under continual development indefinitely. Please check back often for updates and new articles. It is our intention to publish 50 Tractatus articles in 2013. © 2013 NEWAPOLOGETICS.COM · 955 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, #344, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139
Posted on: Mon, 22 Jul 2013 17:18:50 +0000