Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles THE DISTINCTION OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD AND THE NEW LAW Next, this must be considered. Since the sacraments of this visible kind got their efficacy from the passion of Christ and in some way represent it, they must be such as to be in harmony with the salvation wrought by Christ. Now, this salvation was promised, indeed, before Christ’s Incarnation and death but not displayed, it was the incarnate and suffering Word who brought about this kind of salvation. Therefore, the sacraments which preceded Christ’s Incarnation had to be such as signified and somehow promised salvation. But the sacraments which follow the suffering of Christ ought to be such as deliver this salvation to men, not merely such as point to it by signs. Of course, in this way one avoids the opinion of the Jews, who believe that the sacraments of the Law must be observed forever precisely because they were established by God, since God has no regrets and is not changed. But without change or regret one who disposes things may dispose things differently in harmony with a difference of times; thus, the father of a family gives one set of orders to a small child and another to one already grown. Thus, God also harmoniously gave one set of sacraments and commandments before the Incarnation to point to the future, and another set after the Incarnation to deliver things present and bring to mind things past. But more unreasonable still is the error of the Nazarenes and the Ebionites, who used to say that the sacraments of the Law should be observed simultaneously with those of the Gospel. An error of this kind involves a sort of contrariety. For, while they observe the evangelical sacraments, they are professing that the Incarnation and the other mysteries of Christ have already been perfected; but, when they also observe the sacraments of the Law, they are professing that those mysteries are in the future. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica Whether evil is in good as in its subject? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists. Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject. Objection 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But non-being does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject. Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing. Reply to Objection 2: Not-being, understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such not-being is an evil. On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that evil exists only in good. I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness. Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good. Aristotles Metaphysics Being is Being Plotinus Enneads Third Tractate Section 3 3. The metaphysician, equipped by that very character, winged already and not like those others, in need of disengagement, stirring of himself towards the supernal but doubting of the way, needs only a guide. He must be shown, then, and instructed, a willing wayfarer by his very temperament, all but self-directed. Mathematics, which as a student by nature he will take very easily, will be prescribed to train him to abstract thought and to faith in the unembodied; a moral being by native disposition, he must be led to make his virtue perfect; after the Mathematics he must be put through a course in Dialectic and made an adept in the science.
Posted on: Sun, 23 Mar 2014 20:32:11 +0000
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