UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS - ON-LINE US Supreme Court Decisions - On-Line> Volume 61 > MCFAUL V. RAMSEY, 61 U. S. 523 (1857) MCFAUL V. RAMSEY, 61 U. S. 523 (1857) Subscribe to Cases that cite 61 U. S. 523 RSS feed for this section U.S. Supreme Court McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 20 How. 523 523 (1857) McFaul v. Ramsey 61 U.S. (20 How.) 523 ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF IOWA Syllabus Where the only bills of exception were to the refusal of the court to grant a continuance and change the venue, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, as these matters are not the subjects of review by this Court. The laws of Iowa permitting a demurrer only when the petition by a fair and natural construction does not show a substantial cause of action, a demurrer to part of the petition in this case was properly overruled. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court. Ramsey, the plaintiff below, instituted this suit in the District chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Page 61 U. S. 524 Court of the United States for the District of Iowa. The parties have been permitted by that court to frame their pleadings not according to the simple and established forms of action in courts of common law, but according to a system of pleadings and practice enacted by that state to regulate proceedings in its own courts. This code commences by abolishing "all technical forms of actions," prescribing the following curt rules for all cases, whether of law or equity: "Any pleading which possesses the following requisites shall be deemed sufficient:" "1st. When to the common understanding it conveys a reasonable certainty of meaning." "2d. When, by a fair and natural construction, it shows a substantial cause of action or defense." "If defective in the first of the above particulars, the court, on motion, will direct a more specific statement; if in the latter, it is ground of demurrer." If the right of deciding absolutely and finally all matters in controversy between suitors were committed to a single tribunal, it might be left to collect the nature of the wrong complained of, and the remedy sought from the allegations of the party ore tenus or in any other manner it might choose to adopt. But the common law, which wisely commits the decision of questions of law to a court supposed to be learned in the law and the decision of the facts to jury, necessarily requires that the controversy, before it is submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it, should be reduced to one or more integral propositions of law or fact; hence it is necessary that the parties should frame the allegations which they respectively make in support of their demand or defense into certain writings called pleadings. These should clearly, distinctly, and succinctly state the nature of the wrong complained of, the remedy sought, and the defense set up. The end proposed is to bring the matter of litigation to one or more points, simple and unambiguous. At one time, the excessive accuracy required, the subtlety of distinctions introduced by astute logicians, the introduction of cumbrous forms, fictions, and contrivances, which seemed only to perplex the investigation of truth, had brought the system of special pleading into deserved disrepute, notwithstanding the assertion of Sir William Jones that "it was the best logic in the world except mathematics." This system is said to have come to its perfection in the reign of Edward III. But in more modern times it has been so modified by the courts and trimmed of its excrescences, the pleadings in every form of common law action have been so completely reduced to simple, clear, and unambiguous forms, that the merits of a cause are now ever submerged under folios of special demurrers, alleging errors in pleading which, when discovered, are immediately permitted to be amended. This system, matured by the wisdom of ages, founded on principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished in many of our states, who have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of sciolists, who invent new codes and systems of pleading to order. But this attempt to abolish all species, and establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of legislative omnipotence. They cannot compel the human mind not to distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common law courts. T
Posted on: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 01:19:20 +0000
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