Unless you are in the habit of scouring my notes for newly offered comments, you probably missed this gem from Owen Byer. Its a fun problem for those of you who like such things, and the solution is surprising: There are 5 rational pirates, A, B, C, D and E. They find 100 gold coins. They must decide how to distribute them. The pirates have a strict order of seniority: A is superior to B, who is superior to C, who is superior to D, who is superior to E. The pirate worlds rules of distribution are thus: that the most senior pirate should propose a distribution of coins. The pirates, including the proposer, then vote on whether to accept this distribution. In case of a tie vote the proposer has the casting vote. If not, the proposer is thrown overboard from the pirate ship and dies, and the next most senior pirate makes a new proposal to begin the system again. Pirates base their decisions on three factors. First of all, each pirate wants to survive. Second, given survival, each pirate wants to maximize the number of gold coins he receives. Third, each pirate would prefer to throw another overboard, if all other results would otherwise be equal. The pirates do not trust each other, and will neither make nor honor any promises between pirates apart from the main proposal. So, given this scenario, how will the coins ultimately be divided amongst the five pirates? Spoiler alert: Dont read any comments if you want to solve this yourself.
Posted on: Sun, 18 May 2014 14:51:24 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015