Well, this is about as far as Ive gotten (of course, more than the introduction!!). Any more suggestions? I find this to be a fascinating and eye-opening project that keeps on giving.. At the very center of the Theaetetus, Socrates and Theodorus appear to take a break from the argument that refutes definitively Protagoras’ ‘Man is the Measure’ doctrine, or in what is typically called a ‘digression’, πἀρεργα (as Socrates himself calls it at 177b9): literally something ‘incidental,’ beside the main work or subject, subordinate, “bauble in comparison” (bauble, as everyone knows, means ‘mere trifle’). And yet, this ‘mere trifle’ is obviously nothing incidental, secondary or unrelated to the work: it is unfortunate that one of the great scholars of philosophy of the twentieth century made such an embarrassing mistake in taking Plato seriously in his pronouncement on the value of his little ‘trifle.’ Fortunately, however, no one has written on the dialogue and the Digression in particular since has had a similarly dull view. At 171d10 to roughly 172c3, Socrates states that while they have refuted the claim that every truth is made true by individual perspectives alone, the majority of people still hold a view that is more daunting and difficult to disprove than the stricter form of relativism: while the majority of people do not believe that what is advantageous and profitable (συμφέροντα) to, say, one’s health or to the State is something relative, but has a uniform standard, it is the common view of wisdom (σοφία) that the just and unjust, pious and impious do not have “by nature an existence/being of its own” (φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοὺ ἕχον). Socrates is here alluding to the massive and continuous struggle he has had with the sophists, whose very living depends on the distinction between what is just by physis versus nomos. These struggles are exemplified in Republic and Gorgias and it is significant that the content of the Digression is a reiteration of the arguments made there. For this argument made by the sophists and general public prompts Socrates to exasperatedly notice that now the argument is tumbling into a far larger and relatively different discussion. Here is the connection with what follows immediately after this daunting realization: Socrates calls to mind all the instances where he has in the past been attacked by the sophists, and particularly in the Gorgias and Republic. The attacks called to mind are those against his profession—that of the activities of philosophy and the properties that are bestowed on the proper upbringing in philosophy. Socrates states that he and philosophers are constantly lambasted by the sophists for being inept in worldly affairs, to a ridiculous degree. But their ineptitude (as it will be described by Socrates, as their aporia, atopia and apeiria) is not merely geloion, it is dangerous and deadly. Studying philosophy passed childhood most certainly will lead to the persecution of the philosopher as a corrupter of youths and cities and religions, and the philosopher will not be able to defend himself in court. The philosopher, like Socrates, will be killed, though as Socrates sees it: because of the misplaced moral priorities of the city and its citizens. And so the daunting challenge of refuting these claims and recounting the many and varied arguments made elsewhere against them by Socrates is put on hold, so that Socrates can launch into a rebuttal of rhetoric against his attackers in word and image. Socrates, in giving ground to his chorus-leaders, as we shall see, defiantly makes a defense of his philosophical profession. Whatever syllogistic arguments or otherwise there may be in the Digression (and obviously there are many and they are central to the dialogue), they are nevertheless secondary to the dramatic function of a rebuttal in word against Socrates’ attackers and accusers. In other words, while the Digression is secondary to the problem of relativism, the meaning of the importance of the arguments against relativism and the value of the deeds of Socrates in the dialogue, is derivative to the Digression. The Digression represents Plato’s ‘battle cry’, as it were. Burnyeat is correct to say that the Digression is less of an argument, rather than a reminder of what is important to know. But scholars have been at a loss as to explain the style of the Digression. It is not merely a ‘reminder’ of what is important to know; for, as Bradshaw indicates, such a position gets close to devoiding the Digression of any independent philosophical interest (though surely no modern scholar believes there is none), but it simply fails to address why there are such careful means of representing himself and his enemies in his polemic, and in such detail. The central stylistic problem that interpreters of the Digression have faced is summarized well also by Burnyeat: “The truth is, the digression paints a picture of Socrates that is hard to come to terms with.” The ideal-philosophers portrayed in the Digression represent an extreme way of living not paralleled elsewhere in his corpus. How committed is Plato to this extreme lifestyle? Why does Plato paint such extreme pictures and in such violent language? I suggest that because Plato here is clearly prioritizing the dramatic and stylistic epideictic function of the Digression, it is reasonable to first look in great detail why the style is the way it is. Approaching the Digression stylistically should provide the ‘road map’, as it were, to the presentation of Plato’s philosophy as such. I stated at the beginning that poor-old Ryle missed the irony in Plato’s use of the word ‘πἀρεργα’. But what I claim in the following paper is that all of the scholars hitherto have not taken one group of words literally enough: Socrates’ talk of chorality in the Digression. The digression is a choral display. Socrates and Theodorus describe themselves as members of the chorus of philosophers (173b4-5), but instead give way to a description of its chorus-leaders. My investigation into the stylistic functions of the Digression is revealing in a way that has not been noticed before: the Digression, I will demonstrate, is an appropriation of what is called a ‘Parabasis’ in Old Comedy, an episode where the actors leave the stage and the chorus steps forward to address the audience directly, and most significantly, in the persona of the poet himself, voiced by the chorus-leader. The parabasis was the unique opportunity for the poet to make his statements about the value of his plays and contemporary politics of the highest significance, to glorify himself and his works in an overtly exaggerated manner and to lambast his rivals (both political and poetical) in an equally vicious and overly-wrought manner. It was the most crucial part and point in Attic political theater; theater being a form of competitive self-assertion and national and international politics. It’s function, too, was to make clear that the action of the rest of the play is the argument that undergirds and supports the rhetorical talk of the parabasis as such. If, then, the Digression is a parabasis, it follows that Plato himself is explicitly making an appearance in the Theaetetus through his chorus-leaders. Admittedly, Socrates is the one giving voice to the chorus-leaders; but Socrates and Theodorus are both members of the chorus, and Plato simply cannot ‘pop’ into the scene. The overly exaggerated distance between Socrates, who ‘spends his time badly in philosophy’, is as clear an indication that he is giving way to a different character. If the Digression is a parabasis, it is the case that Plato is the chorus-leader. It is crucial to understand why Plato uses a chorus at all for this event: a chorus was an essentially educational entity, and a choral performance was an educational event, central to the spirit of Athenian democracy. This is a complicated notion that is to be explored below, but suffice it to say that when Plato speaks of chorality in any extended length at every point in his corpus, it is in the context of education. So when Socrates mentions Plato’s ideal philosophers, he is also giving voice to Plato’s ideal education and citizenry. In order to prove all of this, I will first set out in the most general possible way an adequate list of the essential features of a parabasis. I will then situate Plato’s works in the context of the dramatic and theatrical poetics of competition in Athens. I will then demonstrate that the essential structural features (aside from the use of lyric) in a parabasis corresponds nearly isomorphically with the Digression. The specific individuals and people at large Plato/Socrates is attacking is on the one hand Isocrates and his associates with their ‘implacable’ hatred of Plato’s program, and on the other hand, the public persona of Socrates and Plato as gleaned from the contemporaneous theatrical record, where Plato was a (portrayed) character in at least eight comedies. The result is that Plato indeed is making a polemical appearance in this Digression, making a rebuttal against his closest adversaries and his negative public persona (for indeed, as the theatrical record indicates, he was very public). The last pieces of evidence I will appeal to is that Plato was in actual historical fact a chorus-leader. The poet, khoregos (financier), chorus-leader on stage and the trainer of the choirs were all in unison with the moral of the tale being told on stage. Given that Plato actually existed in all such ways (the financier in particular, I shall demonstrate) indicates that the man whose voice given by Socrates through the image of the philosophical chorus is in fact the voice of Plato. This is all the more remarkable when we consider that this dialogue would almost undoubtedly have been read aloud by the actual voice of Plato. What results from this philosophically? For lack of space, this will be the shortest section. The first and most forcefully correct implication of this analysis gives us a direct and elegant solution to the otherwise inexplicable origins of the Platonist belief that the doctrine of ‘homoiosis theoi’ is the ‘locus classics’ of Platonist ethics. The reason could not be simpler: it is because Plato himself said it. What’s more: with the evidence from history, the ideal philosophical-choral education of Plato is not as anti-democratic as one may expect, and that, in fact, the ‘ideal’ philosophers do not in reality, for example, avoid dinner parties or the agora (as Plato’s rivals attack philosophers of doing) or even finance or produce democratic works of art. Politics as usual is attacked by Plato in his Digression. Again, the function of a parabasis was to lambast enemies, while also making clear the action of the play is the true argument against the playwright’s enemies. It will be seen how the content of Socrates’ behavior in the Theaetetus embodies all of the critical imagery bestowed upon him by his enemies (most importantly childish dialectic, and his relationship with Protagoras in Clouds), and in doing so, satyrically rebuts them in deed. The very last suggestion is a hypothesis that links the Eleaticism of Plato’s public image with the identical Eleaticism with the author of the Theaetetus, namely Euclides, and all with a fairly non-speculative link with the Digression. I suggest we look for some pathways to the One and Indivisible Dyad in the Digression and in the Theaetetus as a whole. In sum, a parabasis is satire: it is the author bearing properties that do not belong to him in order to make a point. Socrates in this work is particularly sat(y)rical. We shall see how this stylistic and dramatic function of the digression provides an essential road map in which to chart where Plato is in his own philosophical development.
Posted on: Fri, 09 Jan 2015 23:53:33 +0000
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