What at first looked like a neck-and-neck race in Moldova is now turning into a small but comfortable victory for the pro-Europe camp. Parliamentary elections pitted five major parties against each other: three (Liberals, Democrats, and Liberal Democrats) running on a platform of European integration against two (Socialists and Communists) running on a pro-Russia platform. A third pro-Russia party, the Patria party, was disqualified last-minute on grounds that they received funding from Russia; their supporters flocked to the Socialists instead, giving them the largest single share of the vote (20.7%, or around 25 seats). However, the Western-leaning parties scored a combined 45.4%, giving them a combined 57-58 seats in the 101-seat Parliament. The Liberals, Democrats, and Liberal Democrats can now be expected to form a coalition on their own, similar to the one they achieved after the previous elections. Had their seat numbers not surpassed 50, however, the three would have possibly still formed a grand coalition with the Communists, who are themselves at vicious loggerheads with the Socialists. While the Socialists favor breaking with Europe and joining the Russian-led Customs Union instead, the Communists remain pro-European integration but with a stronger nod towards mending relations with Russia. Communist stalwarts are more interested in punishing the Socialists for breaking away from their party in 2011, and would have likely joined with the pro-European parties in exchange for safeguarding certain trade ties with Russia or reducing defense ties with NATO. Even with a pro-Europe majority, the coalition may seek Communist buy-in to alleviate pro-Russian fears of political isolation; however, the Communists have already stated their intention to enter the opposition. The big question now is what, if any, retaliatory measures Moscow may take in response to unfavorable election results. Already, Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin has called into question the legitimacy of the election, citing the disqualification of the Patria party, the unavailability of absentee balloting, and the inability to carry out the election in the Russian-occupied breakaway region of Transnistria. Reinvigorating hostilities between Chișinău and Transnistria is a possible route, as is convincing Moldova’s autonomous Gagauzia region to push for the same kind of Moscow-backed separatism. Putin’s government could also use economic levers, as they’ve done in the past: when Moldova initialed their EU Association Agreement a year ago, Russia retaliated by declaring Moldovan wines unsafe to drink, hurting Moldova’s exports. Russian media is also priming its audiences for negative coverage of Moldova, focusing their coverage excessively on the Socialists’ first-place spot while both ignoring the pro-EU camp’s overall majority and portraying subsequent coalition-building talks as a pro-Western scheme to undercut the popular will. Between expected Russian hostilities and the EU’s effective delaying of new accession bids until at least the 2020s, Chișinău’s new government will have to tread carefully in all arenas to solve internal disputes, promote economic modernization, and advance the nation’s interests in the continent.
Posted on: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 01:13:06 +0000