34Great Powers and Geopolitical Change presence of certain geographic conditions. For instance, the possession and ex-ploitation of natural resources facilitates growth. The United States, for example, built its industrial base largely on its superior geological endowment. ∑∂ Con-versely, tropical climates accompanied by highly infectious diseases and land-locked locations hinder economic development. ∑∑ A nation’s or region’s culture, broadly and often vaguely defined, can be moreor less conducive to economic development. For instance, following Weber’sargument, some have found the Protestant ethic a source of western Europeaneconomic growth since the sixteenth century. Along similar lines, some arguethat Confucian values, which privilege obedience to a rigid social hierarchy andisolation from the outside world, stifled innovation and commerce, eventuallyleading to the economic decline of China. ∑∏ The role of the state, in particular the interaction between state institutionsand the market, is the principal factor behind the economic growth of states. Avibrant market develops when states create institutions, or more generally condi-tions, that allow a middle class to prosper through innovation, production, andcommerce. However, when states are overbearing, forcing societies to focus onthe interests of the political center, they are unlikely to be economically competi-tive in the long run. ∑π ‘‘Fatalistic’’ explanations constitute a world-view that tinges the abovemen-tioned explanations more than explanations in and of themselves. They are char-acterized by a structural fatalism, often leading to a cyclical view of change. Avariety of domestic and international structural variables, independent of theactions of individuals, determine the rise and decline of power. On the inter-national level, di√usion of technology, overextension of the state or empire, andthe imperial burden of defense are some of the variables adduced to explaingrowth or decline. ∑∫ On the domestic level, the internal structure of resourceextraction and the moral fabric of society influence the power of the state. Thesevariables carry a certain inevitability that forces states, in particular those that areeconomically powerful, into a cycle of rise and decline. As a result of such cycles,the geographic locus of power is constantly and inevitably changing.These four broad categories explaining geographic changes of economic re-sources are by no means exhaustive. The rise and decline of states and the geo-graphic migration of power have generated prolific studies that often do not fitinto one of the above categories. The complexity of the change in the distributionof economic resources is probably best explained by a multicausal argument thatcan indicate the conditions that favored or hindered economic growth.It is not my goal, however, to debate the merits of these explanations or to o√er Geography, Geopolitics, and Geostrategy35 a more comprehensive account of the rise and decline of economic powers. I limitmy argument to an acknowledgment of the fact that economic resources shiftgeographically and that it is very di≈cult to predict the geographic direction of such shifts. For whatever reason, whether the decline of the national character orthe costs of the defense apparatus, the location of the current economic powermight be di√erent from that of the past or future. For instance, the core of theworld’s economic power was located in the Mediterranean region until the fif-teenth or sixteenth century, when it shifted toward western or Atlantic Europe.Similarly, over the past half-century East Asia has become an important center of economic power, dramatically altering the distribution of wealth and power in theworld. As Jones, Frost, and White observed, ‘‘The rise of the Asia Pacific economyis the dominating fact of modern economic geography, the most striking event inthe economic history of the late twentieth geography. On the face of things, this isa virtual break in the trends of history—the first achievement of sustained growthby a major cultural area outside Europe or regions of European settlement.’’ ∑Ω Thus, the geopolitical situation is defined by lines of communication andcenters of natural and economic resources. Their geographic distribution deter-mines the strategic importance of regions, the control of which bestows economicpower and political leverage. Geopolitics is the map within which states, whetherthey perceive it correctly or not, act.While geopolitics is defined by two variables, trade routes and the location of resources, only one of them is necessary to change the geopolitical situation. Forinstance, a shift in trade routes without a corresponding change in the geographicconfiguration of resources is enough to create a new geopolitical situation. Thestate that controlled the old routes loses leverage because of competing lines of communication. But as I pointed out earlier, often such changes are intercon-nected because, for example, a change in resources also alters trade routes, andvice versa.There is no clear trend in geopolitical changes. Geopolitically inclined theo-rists often fall into the trap of wanting to find, and claiming to have found, adiscernible direction of geopolitical change. Some have argued that the strategicadvantage has been shifting historically from land to sea power. (This is Mahan’soverarching argument.) Others have claimed that the locus of power has movedinexorably from east to west or from the heartland to the rimland of Eurasia. I donot see any linear progression of geopolitical change. The development of newcommunications technologies does not necessarily lead to a greater advantage of sea powers over land powers, or vice versa. Similarly, new production technolo-gies do not progressively favor certain regions over others. 36Great Powers and Geopolitical Change Finally, I want to stress again that geopolitics does not determine foreignpolicy. Geopolitics simply limits the spectrum of strategic options available to astate. In fact, we cannot predict the course of a state’s foreign policy by simplylooking at the geopolitical variables of trade routes and centers of resources. Thefull range of human motivations lies behind foreign policy, and they must betaken into consideration when attempting to determine the direction of a state’sgeostrategy. This means that often states pursue goals that are not consistent withor informed by the geopolitical reality but are the result of ideological principles,interest-groups pressures, or other variables. In fact, states often ignore geopoli-tics and do not pursue control of resources and lines of communication, focusingfor a variety of reasons on other, less strategic regions. Geopolitics, therefore, doesnot o√er the motivation or the capacity to pursue a geostrategy that can reflect it.But geopolitics constrains the spectrum of possible geostrategies. Every state,no matter how ideologically motivated, acts within a setting determined by routesand the location of resources. Control over these objectives bestows power, andeven if a state is motivated by ideological concerns, it cannot ignore this cold fact.A foreign policy that does not reflect the underlying geopolitics cannot increase ormaintain the power of a state...scribd/doc/152986446/Geopolitical-Changes-Great-Powers
Posted on: Fri, 12 Jul 2013 17:36:20 +0000
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