I cannot accept Malacanang’s claim of good faith as justification for the billions of pesos worth of disbursements it made over a period of two years under its unconstitutional DAP, which, contrary to its pretense, was neither really novel nor innovative. In the simplest of terms, what it did was basically to draw monies from, by scrapping or not completing, existing projects covered by the applicable GAAs, treat them as “savings” and allocate them for “new” projects not covered by the same GAAs, or, in other words, for projects not authorized by law, or for items appropriated for other branches of government, including, yes, constitutional commissions and the Congress. In the first place, Article VI, Section 25 [5] is not really that difficult to understand. It says “…however, the President…may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.” The terms “savings” and “augment” are not sophisticated budgetary concepts. Housewives and freshman law students know what they mean. Certainly, a president, who professes to be meticulous when it comes to legal matters, and an experienced budget secretary, aided by the “wise” counsel of their many legal advisers, should be expected to know that only existing “items” [“for their respective offices”] as provided for in current GAAs can be “augmented.” In the second place, the Supreme Court made it clear in Demetria v. Alba [G.R. No. 71977], decided on February 27, 1987, or more than 27 years ago, that the “purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.” In that case, the Court nullified a law which “unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.” This pronouncement was reiterated by the Court in PHILCONSA v. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994] and further stressed by the Court in Nazareth v. Villar [G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013] where it said, “clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOST’s savings in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001.” It is significant that, in the Demetria case, the Court declared, “’for the love of money is the root of all evil: ...’ and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds... Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury…; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose …; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications…, among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, ‘... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency.’ Finally, if Malacanang were really in good faith and, as it now proclaims, truly considers its projects under its DAP as “laudable,” why did no one, not even our legislators, know about this program until a senator admitted having received an “additional” P50 Million allocation for his “projects for his constituents” a few months after he voted to remove Corona? Good faith then? I do not think so. As to Malacanang’s claim that its DAP disbursements benefited the country, I have only to quote my father, Justice Isagani A. Cruz – “The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.”
Posted on: Wed, 02 Jul 2014 23:09:16 +0000