If theres anything that annoys me its the polemics of nationalists. Most especially the idea that Prussia was the centre of resistance to Napoleon. Give me a break. The statue of the persistent defender of Germanys honour is of a Habsburg Archduke and is in Vienna, not in Berlin. It was Austria that defended Germany at Amberg, at Zurich, at Schliengen. It was Austria that expelled the French over the Rhine at Kehl. It was Austria that liberated Switzerland. It was Austria that stood against the storm at Ulm, and at Austerlitz. It was Austria that appealed to Germany to throw off its French fetters, and who alone challenged France in 1809. Where was Prussia? Prussia had betrayed Germany. Prussia had declared her neutrality, selling Germany to France in order to gain Poland and to seek the promise of Hanover. And after she was at last set upon and defeated, she retreated into obscurity cringing before Napoleon. Prussia was neutral from 1795 until 1806, and then again from 1807 until 1813. Austria by contrast was continuously at war with France from 1792 until 1815 with very few breaks. Let us not condemn Prussia too harshly though. The Holy Roman Empire served Austria, and Austria was Prussias rival. There was no nationalist considerations, no idea of a Fatherland to protect against the French. The Prussians acted like a rational state and sought advantages for themselves as any other did, including Austria whose interests were served by posing as the champion of Germany. Prussias game was to aggrandise herself even if this meant sacrificing the left bank of the Rhine to France. Even if this meant the end of the Empire, which was no longer serving Prussia anyway. But its curious. Many nationalists claim that Austria gradually became something other than German. It was diluted by its non-German element. This is strange. After sacrificing the left bank of the Rhine at Basel and annexing the heart of Poland Prussia had become as Polish as she was German. And this she wished to remain. Because she now formed a solid united entity, rationalisation and streamlining, that had been the programme of Frederick and Joseph. Get rid of useless strategic liabilities, like Jülich-Berg and the Netherlands, in exchange for contiguous territories regardless of who lived in them. But this she was not allowed to remain. After Prussias defeat in 1807 she was stripped of her Polish gains to create the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In 1812 this was conquered by Russia and the Tsar refused to consider returning it. Poland could not exist for Russia, and Russia had to make sure it never rose again. Russias insistence on retaining the heart of Poland at the expense of former Prussian territory compelled Prussia to seek compensation in Germany. This was necessarily along the Rhine which before 1792 had been ruled mostly by bishops whose territory had been secularised and could not be returned. One may well doubt the eagerness of Prussia to accept this. It was separated from the Prussian heartland by numerous German Principalities that were historically loyal to Austria, and the new Prussian Rhineland threw the Prussians in the front lines against France. Strategically it was much less valuable than Poland. Frederick the Great in his political testament had outlined the policy of Prussia, to connect its disparate elements, as he had done with Brandenburg and East Prussia, or exchange the outlying hostages to fortune for more easily protected territories, as Frederick William II had done by sacrificing Prussian interests on the Rhine in order to gain Poland. Austria had followed this programme too, laid out by Joseph. Though Josephs dearest desire of claiming Bavaria did not come about, Austria nonetheless achieved his other policies of shedding Belgium and acquiring the Republic of Venice. Austria, unlike Prussia, now formed a solid compact Central European bloc that was master of Northern Italy and the Adriatic, and shielded from immediate French attack through Germany and Italy by others (Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Wirtemberg, Switzerland, Sardinia) who were now on the front lines. This placed them in the power of Austria, whom they now needed for their own defence against France. That Prussia was forced to swallow this, as we may well suspect, against her will, is a further indication of the influence of Austria at the Congress of Vienna. In 1813 it was Austrias decision to join the alliance against Napoleon which at last sealed his fate. But Austria had joined it in order that she could control the peace. Austria fielded more soldiers than either Prussia or Russia, and Austrias traditional role as protector of Germany earned her the allegiance of the newly elevated German Princes. Austrias dominance at the peace table was underwritten by Metternichs flair and symbolised by the fact that the congress to redraw the map of Europe was to be held in Vienna. All of this shows that Prussia was very much on the sidelines. It was Austria, even more than Britain, who had resisted France most strenuously. It was Austrias contribution that kept the Russians in the field and resulted in Napoleons defeat at Leipzig. It was Austria that formed the German Confederation and guaranteed its protection against French aggression. It was Austria who was the leader and champion of all Germany. But something happened that is most fascinating. One of those odd brief flashes of lightning that upset everything in history. Napoleon returned to Europe in 1815, which did little good for him or for France, but it had incalculable benefits for Prussia. Austria immediately took the field against France, traversing Switzerland and crossing the Rhine to take the fortress of Huningue on the Upper Rhine near the Swiss border. From there presumably the Austrians would have crossed the Burgundian Gate to strike into the heart of France. But this operation was overshadowed by the stupendous victory at Waterloo which was decided by Prussian arms. Blüchers arrival on the field of Waterloo at the critical time dramatically concluded the career of Napoleon Bonparte and captured the imagination of the age. Prussia, Germans said, had vanquised Napoleon at Waterloo forever. They had forgotten the countless, no less glorious but much less fantastical, battles in which Austria had grappled doggedly with France while Prussia was enjoying its neutrality. Despite contributing by far the most for Napoleons defeat and the overthrow of French hegemony in Europe, Prussia was seen as the champion of Germany for this one battle which has cast a spell over Germany ever since. Today few can tell you of Archduke Charless superb victory over Moreau at Emmindingen, or at Stockach. Few can tell of Josias von Coburgs victories at Neerwinden and Tournai. Few even can tell of Archduke Charless victory at Aspern, or how Klenau came within an ace of victory at Wagram. But nearly everyone can speak of Waterloo and Blüchers timely arrival on that immortal plain. Austria won the war and Prussia won the peace by capturing the imagination as well as the hearts of Germany.
Posted on: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 05:48:44 +0000