NATO’s strikes in Libya have been described as a textbook case of RtoP’s third pillar, which preserves international intervention — military and otherwise — as a final bulwark against mass civilian violence. The Obama administration and its allies intervened in Libya despite Gaddafi’s obvious objections, while the effort in Iraq received a rubber-stamp approval from the central government in Baghdad. The distinction is important. The Iraqi government’s approval leaves intact what little sovereignty Baghdad possesses after more than a decade of civil conflict. With Baghdad’s approval, the U.S. intervention has become a second-pillar operation under RtoP. The violence of the U.S. government’s partners in Iraq is perhaps less gruesome than the IS’, but continued U.S. cooperation risks furthering civilian violence. The Iraqi government has perpetrated its own abuses against civilians in the wake of the IS invasion. The U.S. government faces a similar dilemma in its support for Kurdish paramilitary forces. The Kurdish peshmerga, paramilitary forces that have flourished with the oil revenues of Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish province, boast ongoing resistance against the Iraqi state. Their effectiveness as a shield against the IS — even if a result of political convenience rather than of the altruism of their fighters — has given them more legitimacy. However, as a recent report by The New Republic’s Jenna Krajeski suggests, the peshmerga thrive on a corrupt politics that resembles the broader rot of Iraq’s political institutions.
Posted on: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 04:31:36 +0000
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