See, e.g., Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1999); (noting that ‘‘a police officer sometimes may be liable if he fails to apprise the prosecutor or a judicial officer of known exculpatory information’’); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 298–99 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that ‘‘the police satisfy their obligations under Brady when they turn exculpatory evidence over to the prosecutors’’); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that ‘‘a police officer cannot availhimself of a qualified immunity defense if he procures false identification by unlawful means or deliberately conceals exculpatory evidence, for such activity violates clearly established constitutional principles’’); Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (concluding that police who deliberately withhold exculpatory evidence, and thus prevent the prosecutors from complying with Brady, violate the due process clause); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s ‘‘deliberate failure to disclose . . . undeniably credible and patently exculpatory evidence to the prosecuting attorney’s office plainly exposes him to liability under § 1983); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that ‘‘there is no doubt that the police are . . . capable of depriving criminal defendants of a fundamentally fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence’’); Jones v. Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that police officers who fail to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors ‘‘cannot escape liability by pointing to the decisions of prosecutors’’); White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that ‘‘Brady’s protections also extend to actions of other law enforcement officers such as investigating officers’’); Tennison v. City & County of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir.) (holding that a ‘‘deliberate indifference’’or ‘‘reckless disregard’’ standard is appropriate for Section 1983 suits based on Brady violations,rejecting inspectors’ request for a ‘‘bad faith’’ standard); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655–56 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that officers’ ‘‘argument that their misconduct is shielded by the acts of the prosecutor, the grand jury, and the trial and appellate courts is disingenuous . . . their actions were dependent in that they relied upon the falsified statements and testimony produced by the defendants in making their respective decisions’’); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1566–70 (11th Cir. 1996), amended by 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1996).
Posted on: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:30:25 +0000
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