The Durand Line and the hunt for peace Muhammad Zafar Khan Safdar The intelligence agencies of Pakistan felt they could no longer ignore the temptation to seek strategic advantage from the internal rifts among the Afghans When Pakistan came into being, the Afghan government was quick to reject the Durand Line, which was drawn by the British in 1893, as the international border between the two countries. Afghanistan laid claim to the larger Pashto-speaking areas that fall in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier (today’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan provinces. This led to heightened tensions between the two countries, so much so that Afghanistan, within two months of the creation of Pakistan, became the only country to have opposed Pakistan’s membership of the UN. The Durand Line was drawn arbitrarily by British negotiator Mortimer Durand with the British Empire’s interests as the sole factor behind it. It divided the Pakhtun tribes that inhabit the region on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The population of the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan now stands at nearly 14.7 million and forms just over 50 percent of the total Afghan population. On the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, there are some 16 million Pakhtuns. It was for this reason that former Afghan King Zahir Shah, himself an ethnic Pakhtun, raised the issue of creating a greater Pakhtunistan comprising the majority Pakhtuns who live outside Afghanistan in Pakistan’s North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces. The demand resonated somewhat among Pakhtun nationalists in Pakistan during the 1950s but Pakistan refused to cede any territory and firmly rejected the idea, insisting the Durand Line must be recognised as the international border between the two countries. The status of the Durand Line, however, remained a constant source of friction throughout Zahir Shah’s reign. The Durand Line is also a porous border at best, as tribal Pakhtuns, who intermarry into their cousins and trade and do business with Afghans, cross it freely. Zahir Shah was deposed in 1973 by one of his own kinsmen, with tribal leaders declaring independence and refusing to accept the writ of Kabul. In the cities, the Afghan communists gradually emerged as the main opposition group, demanding the abolition of the monarchy. The Soviet Union first helped stage a coup d’etat against the new monarch and then sent in its own forces to bolster the takeover of the government in Kabul by Babrak Karmal in 1979. The tribal warlords, however, refused support to the communist regime and launched an armed resistance against it. Some five million Afghans fled the country as a result of the Soviet invasion and the civil war and three million of them crossed the Durand Line seeking refuge in Pakistan. This made Pakistan a frontline state for the US. Washington funded a proxy war against the occupying Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s dictator, General Ziaul Haq, saw the US agenda as an opportunity for himself and wholeheartedly offered the use of Pakistani territory for training, arming and funding Afghan guerilla fighters, the mujahideen. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and the Soviet Union collapsed soon after, the Americans swiftly packed up their bags and left Pakistan and Afghanistan to clear up the mess of their proxy war. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan felt they could no longer ignore the temptation to seek strategic advantage from the internal rifts among the Afghans and the civil war that followed the departure of Soviet forces. The refugees were fast becoming a burden on Pakistan’s economy after international donor agencies scaled down humanitarian aid but could only go back if order was restored to Afghanistan. Moreover, our intelligence agencies saw wisdom in lending support to the Pakhtun mujahideen still fighting off other smaller ethnic groups who had joined forces under the banner of the Northern Alliance. The latter mainly comprised Tajik-Afghan groups and forces, who traditionally opposed Pakistan. The Taliban, a majority of whom attended Saudi-funded seminaries in Pakistan and had returned to their base in the southern city of Kandahar, showed promise for bringing the situation under control if they were helped by Pakistan. The intelligence agencies thus actively began to support, train and fund the Taliban’s march towards Kabul. The world at large, including the US and the Gulf Arab countries, Pakistan’s key allies during the Afghan war, saw no problem with Islamabad’s support of the Taliban as a viable force that could govern Afghanistan. In fact, after the Taliban seized Kabul and established control over 90 percent of Afghan territory in 1996, Saudi Arabia and the UAE officially recognised the Taliban government. The Northern Alliance continued to exercise control over a number of cities in northern Afghanistan and wage war on the Taliban. Then came September 11, 2001 and the world began to change. The Taliban, after their refusal to hand over al Qaeda suspects accused of masterminding the 9/11 attacks to the US, were ousted from power by US military action. Pakistan once again became a frontline state and a key ally in the global war against terrorism. This required making a complete U-turn in Islamabad’s short-lived policy of supporting the Taliban. The US subsequently installed Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul. For obvious reasons, Pakistan cannot disengage itself from developments in Afghanistan. Besides, a large number of Afghan refugees are still in Pakistan and will not return to their country until normality prevails. These factors define Pakistan’s need to ensure that a politically stable and Pakistan-friendly Afghanistan emerges out of the current chaos. Pakistan also looks forward to playing a greater role in the UN-sponsored and internationally funded reconstruction process that can only begin after the situation in Afghanistan stabilises, at least to the point where Kabul is able to extend its writ beyond the capital and its precincts. On the other hand, Afghanistan still lacks amity with Pakistan and tilts towards India despite our support at the national and international levels. Given Pakistan’s threat perceptions about India, the intelligence world still sees validity in seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan. First of all, Pakistan has obvious stakes in seeing the return of peace to Afghanistan. Secondly, the road to Central Asia and access to that emerging market with its vast trade potential and natural resources passes through Afghanistan. Finally, after being in a state of alert for almost 48 years on its eastern border with India, trouble on its western border is the last thing Pakistan wants. For now, it seems, there is no cause to worry about the prospects of a revival of the dispute over the Durand Line. The rationale for a larger Pakhtunistan is all but dead in the face of the tribal infighting in Afghanistan. If the Afghans are not able to achieve a consensus on forming a united national government that they can all respect and live with, they are hardly in a position to invite their Pakistani Pakhtun brothers to join them in a united Pakhtunistan. Secondly, and more importantly for Pakistan, Pakistani Pakhtuns are well integrated in their own country. Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan, can make this long process a less painful one by not getting involved in internal tribal, ethnic and political conflicts. These issues will not resolve themselves overnight. When a credible socioeconomic and political infrastructure is created in Afghanistan that offers equal opportunities for growth to its entire people regardless of their tribal or ethnic linkages, only then will such disputes become a thing of the past.
Posted on: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 06:31:29 +0000
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