The Myth of Ukraine’s Language Divide One of the most pervasive arguments heard from Moscow to justify its intervention in Ukraine is the supposed need to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the east and south of the country. This argument assumes that Ukraines population consists of two clearly separated linguistic groups, the Ukrainian-speakers of the west and center on the one hand, and Russian-speakers of the east and south on the other. This assumption often extends beyond linguistic groupings to equate them with identical ethnic ones, thus creating an image of the east and south of Ukraine as ethnically Russian and, by extension, pro-Russian and pro-Putin. In this way, Ukraine is presented as divided between the nationalist west and the pro-Russian east, the former instigated by NATO and the latter allegedly needing protection from Moscow. This assumption is wrong. To begin with, linguistic identity (perception of a certain language as native) in Ukraine does not coincide with ethnic identity (perception of oneself as a member of a certain group, or nationality). This discrepancy is the result of large-scale Russification of Ukrainians under imperial and Soviet rule, which the current Russian “protection” seeks to build on. While only 17 percent of Ukraine’s population claimed Russian nationality in the latest census of 2001, 30 percent called Russian their native language. In the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where Kremlin-backed separatists are currently seeking to undermine the country’s integrity and stability, almost 60 percent of the population considers itself ethnically Ukrainian, even though more than 70 percent claim Russian as their native language. In all other eastern and southern regions, those who identify themselves as Russian or native Russian-speakers are in the minority. And regardless of whether ethnicity or language is being considered, the differences between particular regions of southeast Ukraine are significant enough to make the notion of a uniform pro-Russian area of Ukraine an illusion. Furthermore, while only one in six ethnic Ukrainians asserted in 2001 their linguistic identity as Russian-speakers, the share of those who speak primarily Russian in everyday life is much higher. According to surveys, up to one third of ethnic Ukrainians throughout the country prefer to speak Russian, which makes the number of everyday speakers of each language within the country’s population roughly equal. In terms of the language people use in their homes, around 40 percent speak predominantly Ukrainian, a few percent fewer predominantly Russian, and more than 20 percent use both languages depending on the circumstances. In fact, many people, particularly in less educated rural areas of eastern Ukraine, mix Ukrainian and Russian together in what is known as surzhyk. The widespread use of both languages and mixed language means that the two linguistic groups overlap significantly, making their definitive distinction problematic. Another important feature of the linguistic situation in Ukraine is that speaking a certain language does not necessarily mean supporting its use and promotion by the state. In pressuring for the elevation of the legal status of Russian in Ukraine, the Kremlin usually presents this demand as one that reflects the unanimous will of eastern Ukraine. This blatantly distorts what is in reality a much more complex picture of popular preferences. Russian-speakers do not necessarily support granting the Russian language the status of a second state language. In a 2012 survey, this status was preferred by 55 percent of those speaking primarily Russian, while 18 percent opted for the status of Russian as a local official language. Remarkably, one in five Russian-speakers wanted the status of their language to remain unchanged, which at the time of the survey meant that Russian would retain the status of a national minority language, one that Russian propaganda has denounced as discriminatory. The responses to this question illustrate radical differences between the preferences of what the Russian government refers to as a supposedly homogenous “east”, or “south-east” of Ukraine. While in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, 61 percent wanted Russian to be a second state language, in other eastern and southern regions this share was only 36 percent. That is, in these regions most people are ready to accept the status of Russian as a local official language, one that is already enjoys according to current law. Another vivid illustration is the finding of a recent survey (April 2014) in which the introduction of a second state language was suggested among measures the government should take for the preservation of Ukraine’s unity. This measure was supported by 17 percent of respondents in Donetsk, 13 percent in Kharkiv, 7 percent in Odesa, and just 4 percent in Dnipropetrovsk. Apart from the striking differences between southeast regions, these figures confirm that an upgrade of the status of Russian is of a low priority to most Ukrainian citizens and that this issue is kept on the public agenda by politicians who seek to exploit it for their electoral benefit. Even those Ukrainians who want Russian as a second official language overwhelmingly prefer to live in Ukraine rather than in Russia. In the same survey, only a third of respondents in Ukraines eastern and southern oblasts agreed with the statement that “Russia justly protects the citizens’ interests” in their region and only 10 percent said they would greet or join the Russian army if it invaded Ukraine, half the number of those who declared their intention to put up military resistance. There was considerable regional variation within southeast Ukraine, implying that Russian-speakers in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv would behave very differently from their linguistic “brethren” in Donetsk or Luhansk, and more like Ukrainian-speakers in Lviv or Poltava. In reality, lines of division in Ukraine today run not between those who speak Ukrainian and those who speak Russian, but rather between the majority who love Ukraine and the minority who do not. Volodymyr Kulyk, Head Research Fellow, Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Posted on: Wed, 07 May 2014 08:30:02 +0000
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