Това го е писал човек с опит в управлението на Щатския фонд за гарантиране на депозитите. Така че е добре да се прочете от претендиращите да разбират. Вкл. и от някои мои бивши приятели, които иначе разбират от банки или са уплашени за парите си в някоя банка... Lessons for developing countries For countries considering the establishment or reform of a deposit insurance system, it is obvious that deposit insurance alone cannot increase financial system stability. Without a sound system of banking supervision that includes strong capital standards as well as mechanisms for enlisting help from the market in imposing discipline on system participants, deposit insurance and other elements of the financial safety net will be ineffective and will increase the costs and pain of resolving a financial crisis. Mechanisms for increasing market discipline include limiting deposit insurance protection in developing economies to small savers, putting uninsured depositors and large creditors at the end of the line for any recovery after resolution of a failed bank, and wiping out shareholder equity when a bank fails. Unfortunately, these kinds of legislative reforms will be useless if governments in emerging markets continue to give broad guarantees of support to market participants on an ad hoc basis when the financial system begins to experience trouble, or if international financial institutions encourage such support in a misguided effort at ensuring stability, which did not work in the Asian crisis. Such actions result in greater moral hazard without increasing systemic stability. Although allowing insolvent firms to fail may increase instability in the near term, it holds out the prospect of medium-to-long-term market discipline that should enhance the strength and stability of the financial system over time. For countries that are just beginning to think about setting up a deposit insurance system, this description of the limited role that deposit insurance can play in shoring up the stability of a financial system in the absence of strong bank supervision and mechanisms to limit moral hazard may be discouraging—and that is probably a good thing. Countries should move slowly, like the tortoise in Aesops fable. If they move too quickly to provide deposit insurance protection, without the necessary supervisory and financial underpinnings and market discipline, they may find they have written a blank check for financial losses. That can only weaken their economies and create a strong environment of moral hazard that will increase risk taking and systemic problems while exacerbating the pain during the next crisis. This may seem like bleak news, but it is easier to digest than a bankrupt deposit insurance fund or a depleted national treasury.
Posted on: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 07:30:01 +0000